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> No electronic scheme can do that: anything that runs in software means that the correctness of the system depends on the experts' word only. No paper ballot
by andrepd 10y ago
> No electronic scheme can do that: anything that runs in software means that the correctness of the system depends on the experts' word only.
No paper ballot in box scheme can do that: anything that is run by officials means that the correctness of the system depends on the officials' word only.
- specialist 10y agoWhat is truth? What is reality? Turtles all the way down? Please sign up and observe your local elections. The Australian Ballot system (private voting, public counting) is time proven, battle hardened. Paper ballots cast at precincts counted when the polls close is the gold standard. It works because opposing belligerents agree on the outcome. Trust forged from mutual distrust. Paper ballots permit guaranteeing the physical chain of custody. You should show up and help keep that guarantee.
- smokeyj 10y agoBut how do you verify that each voter is authorized to vote, and that only one vote was cast? It seems if you involve a digital system you're kicking the trust bucket down the road. The security of a digital systems is "good enough" IMO, especially if there's a public cryptographically verifiable ledger. We bank online where the banks essentially only hold cash in the form of a database entry. The benefits of digital voting means we can have more granular input in our government's operations. I don't see paper ever scaling to meet that demand.
- nabla9 10y agoYes, IMO. Remember that your IMO is not what the consensus among security experts is. There are many things that you and me missed. The worst problem with electronic internet voting is that depending on country, something like 5-40 percent of voters loses the secret ballot and the opportunity to vote independently without coercion. Husband, brother or other family member will be behind their back to watch how they vote. Here in Finland I have a friend who has been election official and he says that it's not uncommon common for family member trying to squeeze into ballot box or try get behind. Especially if the ballot has been cast in post office with small space.
- smw 10y agoThis is a big deal.
- erispoe 10y agoWe can tolerate errors in banking that we cannot in voting. Banking can be good enough, voting must be trusted to the most absolute degree.
- specialist 10y agoFurther, our first past the post election voting system is especially brittle AND the window for detecting and correcting errors is very small.
- lambertsimnel 10y agoIf the United States were to adopt one practice from the Swiss government, proportional representation might do the most good.
- shortstuffsushi 10y agoIn the US, at least, we tolerate a fair amount of error. See the WI recount this election, which exposed the totals to be off by over one hundred votes. I'd be willing to bet if you recount again, it'd be off from that total as well. It isn't absolute is my point.
- aaron_m04 10y agoThe electoral college introduces quite a lot of error, but people don't seem to care enough to change it.
- specialist 10y agoI disagree. I'll be surprised if any electronic voting system matches the integrity, performance, scalability, feature set of the Australian Ballot, of paper ballots cast at polls sites counted when the polls close. Your jurisdiction's voter registration database is (hopefully) up to date. YMMV. Note that verified reports of registration fraud are very, very few. Whereas caging, purging are fairly common. Briefly, On election day: voter shows up to correct poll site, shows some kind of ID (YMMV), name found in that location's poll book, voter signs in, ballot is issued, voter marks ballot, voter casts ballot. If there's any error (question) during this process, voter is issued a provisional ballot, to be adjudicated out of band. Ballots are counted before the polls open and again when the polls close. The bookkeeping is simple and easily verified. Everything is bundled in tamper evident seals, observed and signed by members of opposing parties, physically escorted by opposing members, etc.
- smokeyj 10y ago> Everything is bundled in tamper evident seals, observed and signed by members of opposing parties, physically escorted by opposing members, etc. I don't see why this level of security couldn't be used to randomly and deterministically assign crypto keys that are used for some kind of blockchain voting scheme. Put a thousand pre-known keys in a hat, one thousand people draw keys from a hat, the key is activated on the blockchain and points to a user-defined voting wallet. Now you have anonymous cryptographically verifiable voting with double spend protection. Am I missing something?
- RangerScience 10y agoI don't know, but I'm commenting to bookmark your comment.
- dispose13432 10y agoSo you still have to come in to collect your ballot. Might as well just vote then and there
- smokeyj 10y ago
- geofft 10y ago> public cryptographically verifiable ledger This is a thing you actively don't want. You don't want to be able to prove to anyone else how you voted. Otherwise it would be absolutely trivial for your boss to say, "So, you voted for that anti-union candidate, right?" (Or your boss to not say that, but just happen to give promotions to people who show proof of voting the way the boss wants.) The right to a secret ballot is demanded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yes, this renders the electronic voting problem - and honestly the voting problem in general - very close to impossible. That's why it's hard.
- smokeyj 10y ago>> Put a thousand pre-known keys in a hat, one thousand people draw keys from a hat, the key is activated on the blockchain and points to a user-defined voting wallet. Now you have anonymous cryptographically verifiable voting with double spend protection I just invented a scheme to anonymize votes in 5 minutes. I'm sure if smarter people tried we could definitively solve this. I'm not convinced this is hard as much as people are saying it's hard.
- vertex-four 10y agoSo how does this stand up to "show me the private key you used"?
- tangent128 10y agoTo prevent coercion, it's not sufficient to allow anonymity; you have to disallow means by which a person can prove how they voted.
- smokeyj 10y agoHow true is this? Somebody could just take a picture of their ballot (under the threat of violence presumably). Sure they're not supposed to, but at this point we're relying on legislation - where the legislation could say employers aren't allowed to ask for employees voting wallets. Maybe I'm missing something.
- lazaroclapp 10y agoSome of the places with the highest levels of distrust on electoral authorities and government bureaucracy solve this problem by marking your thumb with indelible ink, which can't be washed off but fades away over the course of a week or so. This guarantees people enter polling stations only once, even if they magically happen to have been registered at multiple places. We use this in Mexico, in addition to (non-digital) fingerprint-carrying voter ids. Historically, it has not prevented fraud in general (most of which happened due to insufficient audit procedures and rural polls not having observers from all parties, allowing for stuffed ballots and the like). It did however close that particular attack vector. My trust on the results of an individual polling station in an urban area with observers from all major and most minor parties is actually quite high, even as I know any or all of the observers involved are likely to be corrupt and have low regard for the law. The reason for this is that they are all incentivized to prevent each other from cheating and have the means to detect tampering in such setting (without needing uncommon expertise beyond observation and basic arithmetic). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_ink https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_ink
- ciupicri 10y ago> It works because opposing belligerents agree on the outcome. Here in Romania there were cases when two or more parties agree to cancel the votes for the opposition or even count them as theirs.
- specialist 10y agotwo or more parties agree We call those "allies".
- germanier 10y agoEvery election I verify that my precinct is counted correctly. I'm just a regular citizen but I work as a volunteer election official (but you don't need to be that for just checking). There are a lot of people like me. If you don't trust any you can check as well. And everybody can do this – no university-level Math education needed. To change the outcome of an paper ballot election you need to have thousands of thousands of people on your side and have everybody keep quite.
- nabla9 10y agoThat's why you have multiple officials and observers. In most countries parties or volunteer groups nominate their own observers. UN can send their own observers. Electronic voting is by far most vulnerable. It's not the algorithms, it's all other tings around them and verifying them.
- DennisP 10y agoNot necessarily. See the paper-based Rivest and Smith secure voting protocols: http://rangevoting.org/RivSmiPRshort.html http://rangevoting.org/RivSmiPRshort.html http://rangevoting.org/RivSmiAnswers.html http://rangevoting.org/RivSmiAnswers.html
- cperciva 10y agoIn Canada, every candidate has the right to appoint representatives to observe the voting and the counting of ballots. Said representatives get a copy of the official counts from the polling places they were observing, and the campaigns check the arithmetic. Do most people trust the officials? Sure. But any campaign with enough volunteers is able to verify everything.
- Nitramp 10y agoIn Germany, every citizen is allowed to control and inspect the counting process, as long as they don't interfere with it (and likely to be deputized to help in the counting by the folks doing it, if they are interested). Assuming you have enough people interested, it'll be very hard to counterfeit (or just sow distrust in) a general election. Then again, it appears in some countries you can just claim millions of fraudulent votes without any proof without being called out for it.
- vmarsy 10y ago> > No electronic scheme can do that: anything that runs in software means that the correctness of the system depends on the experts' word only. > No paper ballot in box scheme can do that: anything that is run by officials means that the correctness of the system depends on the officials' word only. This comparison is flawed, the entire correctness of a electronic scheme could only be verified by a few experts, whereas in every polling place with a paper ballot, there is a committee, and witnesses of the vote count. Proving the correctness of a paper ballot system such as the one described in [1] is trivial. Ultimately, the correctness doesn't even depends solely on officials: In the course of the day, the polling station officials ask voters whether they want to participate in ballot counting as tellers. Voters can also volunteer to do so ; candidates can nominate tellers as well. [1] http://www.elections-legislatives.fr/en/system.asp http://www.elections-legislatives.fr/en/system.asp (search for "How are the ballots counted"). The presidential elections protocol is the same as the one described here.
- yason 10y agoThe process of voting shall be observed by members of opposing parties and members of opposing interests and similarly to the process of counting the votes. Depending on your country you can most likely keep an eye on them yourself. Typically it's citizens who are volunteering to run the elections, everyone with mixed interests. It's enough for one of them to be an outsider and blow the whistle if s/he sees everyone else try something shady together. It's to an extent possible to mount a local attack with paper ballots but its cost is an effort too great that it doesn't scale. You would basically have to get your own people, or paid people, to swap the ballots while nobody else is watching to get the results you want in one election district. Because ballots need to be saved for recounting the marks on the ballots also need to be sufficiently distinct so that they don't look like they all come from a photocopier. Again, if there seems to be anything fishy, people can and will organise to redo the election locally, this time with different representatives from the parties. With digital voting, vulnerabilities and malware and automated attacks scale to all systems involved and theoretically a single entity can rewrite the election results of the whole nation. Worse yet, it may not be evident whether the results are skewed or not as it's just digits in a computer and those can be changed without a trace.