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But the answer to that is not to try to suppress the first article, but rather to draw attention to the second. You're assuming the second exists, but that is

But the answer to that is not to try to suppress the first article, but rather to draw attention to the second. You're assuming the second exists, but that is outside the control of sites like search engines that are just linking to others' content. In any case, I don't agree. If the first article is incorrect or misleading, I have no problem with suppressing that article rather than unfairly damaging the person who was described in it. This is not censorship any more than saying you'll arrest someone who shouts "Fire!" in a crowded theatre just to cause a dangerous panic or someone who phones in a false bomb threat just to disrupt a big public event. Words are powerful things. People who abuse their ability to speak and in doing so cause unjust harm to others need to be treated appropriately by the law. People who propagate or perpetuate those harmful words are contributing to the harm themselves and also need to be treated in some appropriate way by the law. The point is that France should not be able to censor information outside its own borders. We agree on the underlying principle here. I wrote a little more about this in my first comment in this HN discussion.

lisper 10y ago
> You're assuming the second exists You stipulated that it did. If it didn't, then on what basis do you determine that the first article is wrong? > We agree on the underlying principle here. Maybe we should just leave it at that.
- Silhouette 10y ago
  If it didn't, then on what basis do you determine that the first article is wrong? That brings us back to where we came in: the "right to be forgotten" measures provide a way for someone who is suffering harm as a result of information being spread about them to notify the likes of search engines that that information should not be spread about them. Having been so notified, if the search engine continues to propagate the information anyway, it can't say it wasn't warned and it's on the hook for any harm it causes. It's a similar principle to various other "safe harbour" style laws that have been written in recent years, trying to balance the benefits that derive from having these powerful, automated services available online with the dangers that they inherently bring if they act unfairly or get something wrong. The consensus so far seems to be that such services shouldn't necessarily be on the hook for automatically generated or user-supplied content by default, but making them provide a clear notification mechanism and accept responsibility once they have actual knowledge of something going wrong is a fair trade for that safety net.
  - lisper 10y ago
    > provide a way for someone who is suffering harm as a result of information being spread about them to notify the likes of search engines that that information should not be spread about them Yes, of course. But whether or not an individual should be able to censor true information about themselves, even if that information is harmful to them, is highly debatable. I'm happy to engage in that debate if you want, but that is a different issue than the one which I originally raised, which is the question of whether a country's power to censor should extend beyond its own borders. The answer to that is IMHO an unequivocal "no". (The answer to the question of whether a person should be empowered to censor true information about themselves is also IMHO "no", but that is not nearly so clear-cut. Like I said, if you want to engage on this topic I'm happy to have that debate as well. But let us not conflate the two issues. They need to be kept separate or we will end up in a hopeless muddle.)
    - Silhouette 10y ago
      Just to be clear, my original comment wasn't disputing your point about international enforcement (on which, once again, it seems we agree on the main principle). I was challenging your characterisation of the RTBF as "an individual's ability to censor true information simply because that information happens to be about them". The original CJEU ruling was pretty clear that, in the court's opinion, there were some circumstances under which restricting the promotion of personal information by search engines, even if that information was true, could be justified. However, the court was also pretty clear that merely disliking the fact that some information about you was being shared was not sufficient grounds for the law to restrict that sharing. I'm happy to debate more specifically the circumstances where that sort of restriction might be reasonable, but if you believe as a philosophy that freedom of expression and the right to say true things should always outweigh an individual's right to privacy then it's unlikely we're going to agree on so much there. I don't personally believe in an absolute right to free speech regardless of the consequences. I do believe that there are many good reasons that privacy is important, and sometimes that it is the more important of the two. To give one concrete example, I think it is a general good that anyone -- including public figures with influential and highly stressful jobs -- should be able to seek help for mental health problems if and when they need to, without fear of suffering criticism or abuse for doing so. That makes respecting the privacy of those who do seek help important, regardless of the truth of any statement that they are doing so. To give another example, the evidence appears to be overwhelming that punitive "justice" systems are far less effective at reducing crime and improving general quality of life than systems based on the rehabilitation of offenders. A huge part of that rehabilitation is allowing past offenders an opportunity to move beyond their old situation, to "turn over a new leaf". It's pretty difficult to do that if stories of the chocolate bar you stole from a store aged 18 are still keeping a very different you out of good job opportunities aged 28 or 38 or 48. Again, it might be true, but there is a strong public interest in concealing that fact once it is no longer relevant to understanding your character, which is exactly why concepts like spent convictions and probationary periods exist in many legal systems. In the age of an Internet that never forgets, that concealment becomes a lot harder, but the evidence for its benefits not just for the individual but for society as a whole is still the same.

lisper 10y ago

> You're assuming the second exists You stipulated that it did. If it didn't, then on what basis do you determine that the first article is wrong? > We agree on the underlying principle here. Maybe we should just leave it at that.

Silhouette 10y ago
If it didn't, then on what basis do you determine that the first article is wrong? That brings us back to where we came in: the "right to be forgotten" measures provide a way for someone who is suffering harm as a result of information being spread about them to notify the likes of search engines that that information should not be spread about them. Having been so notified, if the search engine continues to propagate the information anyway, it can't say it wasn't warned and it's on the hook for any harm it causes. It's a similar principle to various other "safe harbour" style laws that have been written in recent years, trying to balance the benefits that derive from having these powerful, automated services available online with the dangers that they inherently bring if they act unfairly or get something wrong. The consensus so far seems to be that such services shouldn't necessarily be on the hook for automatically generated or user-supplied content by default, but making them provide a clear notification mechanism and accept responsibility once they have actual knowledge of something going wrong is a fair trade for that safety net.
- lisper 10y ago
  > provide a way for someone who is suffering harm as a result of information being spread about them to notify the likes of search engines that that information should not be spread about them Yes, of course. But whether or not an individual should be able to censor true information about themselves, even if that information is harmful to them, is highly debatable. I'm happy to engage in that debate if you want, but that is a different issue than the one which I originally raised, which is the question of whether a country's power to censor should extend beyond its own borders. The answer to that is IMHO an unequivocal "no". (The answer to the question of whether a person should be empowered to censor true information about themselves is also IMHO "no", but that is not nearly so clear-cut. Like I said, if you want to engage on this topic I'm happy to have that debate as well. But let us not conflate the two issues. They need to be kept separate or we will end up in a hopeless muddle.)
  - Silhouette 10y ago
    Just to be clear, my original comment wasn't disputing your point about international enforcement (on which, once again, it seems we agree on the main principle). I was challenging your characterisation of the RTBF as "an individual's ability to censor true information simply because that information happens to be about them". The original CJEU ruling was pretty clear that, in the court's opinion, there were some circumstances under which restricting the promotion of personal information by search engines, even if that information was true, could be justified. However, the court was also pretty clear that merely disliking the fact that some information about you was being shared was not sufficient grounds for the law to restrict that sharing. I'm happy to debate more specifically the circumstances where that sort of restriction might be reasonable, but if you believe as a philosophy that freedom of expression and the right to say true things should always outweigh an individual's right to privacy then it's unlikely we're going to agree on so much there. I don't personally believe in an absolute right to free speech regardless of the consequences. I do believe that there are many good reasons that privacy is important, and sometimes that it is the more important of the two. To give one concrete example, I think it is a general good that anyone -- including public figures with influential and highly stressful jobs -- should be able to seek help for mental health problems if and when they need to, without fear of suffering criticism or abuse for doing so. That makes respecting the privacy of those who do seek help important, regardless of the truth of any statement that they are doing so. To give another example, the evidence appears to be overwhelming that punitive "justice" systems are far less effective at reducing crime and improving general quality of life than systems based on the rehabilitation of offenders. A huge part of that rehabilitation is allowing past offenders an opportunity to move beyond their old situation, to "turn over a new leaf". It's pretty difficult to do that if stories of the chocolate bar you stole from a store aged 18 are still keeping a very different you out of good job opportunities aged 28 or 38 or 48. Again, it might be true, but there is a strong public interest in concealing that fact once it is no longer relevant to understanding your character, which is exactly why concepts like spent convictions and probationary periods exist in many legal systems. In the age of an Internet that never forgets, that concealment becomes a lot harder, but the evidence for its benefits not just for the individual but for society as a whole is still the same.