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Timing aside, the namesake for Berkshire Hathaway is actually a pretty striking parallel to Sears Holding and Lampert: My first mistake, of course, was in buyi
by throwaway5752 10y ago
Timing aside, the namesake for Berkshire Hathaway is actually a pretty striking parallel to Sears Holding and Lampert:
My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of
Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.
If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the
street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.
Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded
by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the
mediocre.
You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to
learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were
first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best
Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1989.html http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1989.html
- dharmon 10y agoYou are generally right, but there is one super key distinction: despite being a "bad" business, Berkshire was throwing of real hard cash, albeit in decreasing amounts. Buffett used that cash to invest in Washington Post and buy See's Candies, among other things. Buffett never let them do any serious reinvestment in the textile business. Sears, on the other hand, has been a cash consumer, not producer. Just look at the FCF numbers from the past 10 years: -2,175 -2,378 -1,657 -1,438 -681 -707 -311 1146 495 977 931 There was some money at the beginning, but not nearly enough to justify a $20B market cap. If you want to be like Buffett, buying a dying business is a terrible place to start. It'd be like someone idolizing Steve Jobs, so they go get a woman pregnant then abandon the offspring.