5 ms·
"I wonder if pgp is fundamentally flawed, or we have a deep conceptual usability issue here." I think it's the key model that's fundamentally flawed rather tha
by jerf 10y ago
"I wonder if pgp is fundamentally flawed, or we have a deep conceptual usability issue here."
I think it's the key model that's fundamentally flawed rather than pgp itself, which I believe the author of the article is also asserting.
In cryptography, it is often explained that despite the fact a one-time pad is guaranteed-secure (given various conditions I'm eliding), it is not practical in the vast majority of cases because of a chicken-and-egg problem: How do you distribute the one time pad in the first place? If you do it insecurely, it's a waste of time. If you can do it "securely", why not just use that secure channel to send the message in the first place? OTPs can still be useful because you can establish a secure channel once for a limited duration of time and then use it to temporally shift your security into the future, but that's a relatively rare use case. (That is, the vast bulk of encryption is being used between people who may never have had a "secure" channel between them; think HTTPS here.)
Similarly, PGP's got this significant problem where given that you have the correct keys and that you know you can trust them, it secures your communication quite effectively. But the question is, how do we get to the point where you know that you have the correct keys and you can trust them? Well... that's a hard problem itself. Especially considered over time.
So alternate models must be pursued.
Like the author, I think the Keybase approach is a good idea. In fact I'd even suggest that the idea should be generalized away from "social media accounts" to just "potentially unreliable mechanism" in general. If I have 6 mechanisms for asserting identity on my key, each of which are 95% reliable over the course of a year, then from an absolutist security point of view, that key is still insecure... but assuming even modest independence between the unreliable mechanisms (assuming naive total independence is definitely incorrect, once one is hacked the others are certainly more likely, but neither is it the case that one hack guarantees all others can be hacked), it's still much more secure than nothing at all.
- coldpie 10y ago> Like the author, I think the Keybase approach is a good idea. In fact I'd even suggest that the idea should be generalized away from "social media accounts" to just "potentially unreliable mechanism" in general. It already has this to a small extent. You can sign other stuff like domain DNS entries or HTTP servers (by hosting a file).
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- UweSchmidt 10y ago"How do you distribute the one time pad " Well you hand it over to the person you want to communicate with when you see them? Obviously that doesn't work in many use cases, but in many other cases it does: many of the most important secrets are typically shared with people you already know and have met before, no?
- sdenton4 10y agoLike when I buy a new laptop from new egg, or contact Laura Poitras with a hot scoop...
- UweSchmidt 10y agoNo. But when you discuss the real secrets with a journalist or business partner in another country. Email communication with family members, business partners. Potentially web traffic with your company's or bank's website, why not.
- KMag 10y agoThat's exactly what the OP was talking about when s/he said "temporally shift your security".
- jerf 10y agoWhen did you meet Paul Graham and hand over to him the crypto material you are using on the HTTPS connection you are reading this on? The vast majority of encryption in the real world is between people who did not meet and exchange crypto info. (Note this is specifically about one-time pads. While I agree the Web of Trust has failed, it is one effort to circumvent the problem.)
- UweSchmidt 10y agoIf he cared then he'd probably be the one handing over crypto material and instructions (about whatever crypto), as you probably need some clout to make it happen. If even he says "write me an email in plaintext" then I'm not too hopeful for crypto in General.
- lmm 10y agoInnovative new ways of distributing PGP key fingerprints are to be welcomed. But why would you not keep using PGP for the part that it's good at?
- floatrock 10y agoThe author did include the standard UX-of-PGP-sucks arguments, but he was also making the point that some of the core models around PGP suck. eg he was saying you can't share a key across multiple devices. Or if you do, you just increase your attack vector and your weakest link becomes the hotel wifi you plug into. eg if your key does get compromised, now you have to rotate all your contacts, which if you distributed your key on a business card, is pretty friction-prone and encourages you to discount that weird activity that could have been a blip you saw on the hotel wifi. The big one is if your key ever does get compromised, now all your past history becomes accessible. So he's saying there's some things that PGP is fundamentally bad at, and you need a new model, not just a band-aid UX fix. > Finally, these days I think I care much more about forward secrecy, deniability and ephemerality than I do about iron clad trust. Are you sure you can protect that long-term key forever? Because when an attacker decides to target you and succeeds, it won't have access from that point forwards, but to all your past communications, too. And that's ever more relevant.
- lmm 10y ago> eg he was saying you can't share a key across multiple devices. Or if you do, you just increase your attack vector and your weakest link becomes the hotel wifi you plug into. So what are the options here? You can have a GPG key protected by any mechanism you care to think of (passphrase, smartcard, ...). You can share it between devices or not as you see fit, subject to the same tradeoff that is always going to be involved in that decision. I can't see any way to do it better? > eg if your key does get compromised, now you have to rotate all your contacts, which if you distributed your key on a business card, is pretty friction-prone and encourages you to discount that weird activity that could have been a blip you saw on the hotel wifi. PGP actually has very good support for key rotation by using subkeys - you keep your master identity key offline/secure and that's what other people sign, but you use it only to sign subkeys with short expiry times. People don't use it, but that's a UX issue. > The big one is if your key ever does get compromised, now all your past history becomes accessible. So he's saying there's some things that PGP is fundamentally bad at, and you need a new model, not just a band-aid UX fix. True, but I think long-term signing is often what you want. There are different models that make sense for different communication scenarios certainly.
- pdkl95 10y ago> How do you distribute the one time pad in the first place? Something I've wanted to make for a while now, that should be possible to make with almost any cheap embedded microcontroller, is a hardware dongle that stores OTP pads. This would be a generic character device that could be integrated into existing chat programs. * Each device has a hardware RNG, e.g. [1] or similar * A port that allows two devices to connect. When connected, they each start generating random numbers, sending a copy to the other device. They both store the XOR of each device's random number as the pad. * A USB interface accepts plaintext, the device generates the cyphertext, while enforcing deletion of the used portion of the pad. Decryption is handled with a similar interface, so the pads never leave the device. * The device would provide to the host how much pad is remaining, to be used in the UI. Warnings should be provided when the pad is running low, etc. The goal is to utilize existing knowledge and experience. Schneier (and others) recommend[2] that passwords be written down because people's understanding of physical security is better than their chances of memorizing enough entropy to actually make a usable password. This isn't trying to solve the general WoT problem. Instead, it tries to solve a piece of it in a way that most people can understand. Connect devices when you meet in person, and you gain a certain amount of secure chat. Refill by meeting in person again. It would be easy to extend this idea to provide other features (e.g. generating pubkeys), but since the goal is a simple device that is easy to understand, avoiding feature creep is important, at least initially. Features like WoT will be easier to implement if there is existing infrastructure that can be exploited. [1] http://holdenc.altervista.org/avalanche/ http://holdenc.altervista.org/avalanche/ [2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/06/write_down_your.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/06/write_down_yo...
- politician 10y agoIf you only use the OTP data for a protocol that exchanges symmetric keys, then you could effectively extend the capacity of such a device. I'd buy one - it's an enhanced business card.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoYou don't need to store a true one time pad. Keystreams are enough. So, while your device may act like it delivers a one time pad, it could instead draw a pseudo-random sequence from a chacha20 stream. That way, any synchronisation you do lasts for life. But if we go to all this trouble, we might as well use public key cryptography, it's even easier to use. Internally, the dongle will be quite complicated, with stuff like Curve-stuff, Xchacha-something and poly-whatnot. What the users needs to know is simple: Once initialised, your Dongle can publish a public a "fingerprint" that is unique to it. To decrypt messages encrypted with this "fingerprint", you need your dongle. To sign messages according to this "fingerprint", you need your dongle. If you lose it, your "fingerprint" becomes unusable, no recourse. If it gets stolen, the thief will be able to impersonate you, unless you did the sensible thing and locked your dongle with a secure passphrase (think Diceware). Now we engineers can figure out how to make that dongle easy to use and secure against any compromised computer it may be plugged in. (We don't want the dongle to become untrustworthy just because it got out of your sight during lunch).
- ihnorton 10y ago> How do you distribute the one time pad in the first place? I'm fairly naive to this area, but wouldn't video chat initiated with public keys suffice? Then confirm identities and exchange secrets. To me this seems substantially equivalent to in-person key exchange for non-Three Letter Agency threat models. 20 years ago this wouldn't really have been feasible, but today it (mostly) is -- from a quick glance at the FAQ, Signal may even support something like this already. (If your threat model includes "abduction and coercion", then aren't you kind of hosed even with previous in-person OTPs?)
- PuffinBlue 10y agoIf a video chat with public keys is secure enough to exchange a one time pad, why would you need to bother with the one time pad at all? By transmitting your OTP it is no stronger than the method used to protect it in transport, so if that transport method is secure enough to guarantee the security of the OTP, why not simply use that method for everything and forget about the OTP?
- ihnorton 10y agoI did say "exchange secrets" for a reason -- that secret may be a key for later use (e.g. for data dumps), or actual information. What I'm trying to understand is whether the (relatively new) feasibility of interactive video channels allows for building roughly the same level of trust as would be provided by in-person key exchange. I'm basing this on the understanding, possibly incorrect, that encryption with a public key allows for creating a secure communication channel, but not necessarily a trusted one. The hypothesis is that the capability to conduct interactive video provides a way to verify identity and establish trust at roughly the same level as would be provided by in-person exchange (again, assuming 1-1 trust, and excluding TLA threat models).
- mcbits 10y agoI might trust a video chat today to verify an identity, but only because it would be a relatively new method. Definitely not in a few years if it ever took off. It's already possible to forge a talking head and fall back on "sorry, bad connection out here in the field" to hide glitches.
- at612 10y ago> How do you distribute the one time pad in the first place? If you do it insecurely, it's a waste of time. If you can do it "securely", why not just use that secure channel to send the message in the first place? Because you may not have any messages to send at the time of the secure exchange of OTPs. Do note that one time pads are (or at least were) commonly used in the military. > But the question is, how do we get to the point where you know that you have the correct keys and you can trust them? That is not a technological problem per se, but rather a social one. Imagine that when you exchange phone numbers (or Farcebook IDs, if you're into that) with your work colleagues, or friends, or fellow attendees at that developer meetup, you also exchanged public keys. Mechanically, the interaction is at about the same level of complexity, and effectively, as has already been mentioned, the web of trust already exists (Farcebook, ChainedIn, and all the other bollocks). If any of those decided to implement secure end-to-end comms using PGP and offered you the possibility of uploading your public key for dissemination to your "friends", PGP might become ubiquitous in a matter of weeks. At a smaller scale, German email provider GMX is doing exactly this, by the way.