The author makes some interesting points, that I haven't seen made elsewhere, although I think they could have been made much more briefly and cogently. Also t

The author makes some interesting points, that I haven't seen made elsewhere, although I think they could have been made much more briefly and cogently. Also the Author makes the curious choice to use the metric of "EBITAR" rather than the standard metric of "EBITDA" with no mention of the "rents and restructuring" that his metric exudes. This makes me think he is not all that familiar with financial analysis. Lots of his article is "Uber's aggregated financials suck and they aren't getting better." This is pretty useless without more data on current per city or per unit economics. Also, maybe give Uber credit for splashing some cash to grow 10x in 1 year? That won't happen again. The per ride subsidies are the most worrisome. I took an $11 Uber ride the other day, if that was a $22 Uber ride I would have definitely thought about it twice! But you can't really throw headquarters cost into that subsidy calculation- which he seems to do. For me, the analysis of Uber really comes down to that old chestnut of low user acquisition / user behavior. If every time a consumer wants to do a web search they go to your site (google) and if every time they want to sell their junk they go to your site (ebay) you'll generally have a good business. If there is one thing that Uber has taught us is that the product of "car rides hailed by an app" does have huge and sustained demand. Will the consumer be trained to always go to Uber? Or will the regional nature of the business and low barriers to entry (easy consumer and driver app switching) allow small regional apps to sprout up take flow / demand from Uber.