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I do not see any comments to tackle the weakest link: exploits on the OS. Federated or not, the tunnel can be encrypted. On the servers static data can be encry

I do not see any comments to tackle the weakest link: exploits on the OS. Federated or not, the tunnel can be encrypted. On the servers static data can be encrypted. How can a regular user know his/her device's OS is not compromised? That is the problem to solve now and it seems that a formally verified OS code is the only long path.

lorenzhs 10y ago
That's not an argument for or against Signal, though, as it affects all messenger apps in the same way. While OS trustworthiness is an interesting topic, it's not really the one being discussed here.
- bikamonki 10y ago
  It seems you did not read the article thoroughly. The argument being made is that Signal is sending the WRONG signal by making the user think/feel that encrypting the tunnel and passive data is enough to guarantee privacy and security. Quoting: There are many things users can and maybe should be concerned about: Hackers, providers, promoters, crooks, spooks, shareholders or maybe the person on the next seat in the bus. Do they want to prevent their data from being used for other purposes than communication itself? Maybe they want their messages to be tamper-evident, or perhaps they want plausible deniability or immunity against eavesdropping? What is the use of end-to-end encryption when there could be a key logger or a rootkit on their device, transmitting everything they do to a remote entity? Encouraging users to believe in a general sense that Signal makes their communication safe, will tend to promote a false sense of once-and-for-all security (regardless of the indisputable and substantial increase in end-to-end encryption). It is very important to remember that even though encryption will increase security, some information should not be stored in IT systems at all – and especially not if they are provided by a third party. However this is no argument against the use of the Signal messenger or protocol itself. We instead want to think about the problems created or supported by OWS‘ promise of security.
- aminorex 10y ago
  It is however an argument for enabling Signal to work well on, e.g. CopperheadOS. The patches moxie requested for bypassing Play services would help in this regard.

lorenzhs 10y ago

That's not an argument for or against Signal, though, as it affects all messenger apps in the same way. While OS trustworthiness is an interesting topic, it's not really the one being discussed here.

bikamonki 10y ago
It seems you did not read the article thoroughly. The argument being made is that Signal is sending the WRONG signal by making the user think/feel that encrypting the tunnel and passive data is enough to guarantee privacy and security. Quoting: There are many things users can and maybe should be concerned about: Hackers, providers, promoters, crooks, spooks, shareholders or maybe the person on the next seat in the bus. Do they want to prevent their data from being used for other purposes than communication itself? Maybe they want their messages to be tamper-evident, or perhaps they want plausible deniability or immunity against eavesdropping? What is the use of end-to-end encryption when there could be a key logger or a rootkit on their device, transmitting everything they do to a remote entity? Encouraging users to believe in a general sense that Signal makes their communication safe, will tend to promote a false sense of once-and-for-all security (regardless of the indisputable and substantial increase in end-to-end encryption). It is very important to remember that even though encryption will increase security, some information should not be stored in IT systems at all – and especially not if they are provided by a third party. However this is no argument against the use of the Signal messenger or protocol itself. We instead want to think about the problems created or supported by OWS‘ promise of security.
aminorex 10y ago
It is however an argument for enabling Signal to work well on, e.g. CopperheadOS. The patches moxie requested for bypassing Play services would help in this regard.