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> To say that consciousness is an illusion is ridiculous More likely, you simply misunderstand what is meant by "illusion". What is self-evident is that there
by naasking 10y ago
> To say that consciousness is an illusion is ridiculous
More likely, you simply misunderstand what is meant by "illusion". What is self-evident is that there are thoughts, and some of these thoughts are "I am experiencing X". It's naive to simply infer from that, that true subjective experience actually exists, just like it's naive to infer that water can break pencils simply because you can see it [1].
You should give Dennet more credit. He's almost certainly right, just like science proved in every other case humans thought they were special in the past. The closest analog of consciousness as a pseudo-mystical property that was eventually simply replaced by a scientific concept is "vitalism", which was eventually superceded by biology. Not by any proof that elan vital didn't exist, but by simple recognition that it was special pleading and provided no explanatory power whatsoever.
[1] http://etc.usf.edu/clippix/pix/refraction-of-pencil-in-cup-of-water_medium.jpg http://etc.usf.edu/clippix/pix/refraction-of-pencil-in-cup-o...
- aaimnr 10y agoI'm not sure your argument makes sense. To say there exists conscious experience doesn't add anything ontologically to 'it's self-evident that there are thoughts'. The self-evidence of thoughts and conscious experience are the same thing. Your statement "There are just thoughts with 'I am experiencing X' content" could be rightly used as a counterargument to "'I' exist" statement. It could also be used against 'there exists pure consciousness without content' statement. But to say that may be used against 'there exists experience of thoughts as opposed to just eg. electrical impulses' doesn't seem to make sense. The latter doesn't mean that the experience and thoughts are two different things, is it what bothers you?
- naasking 10y ago> To say there exists conscious experience doesn't add anything ontologically to 'it's self-evident that there are thoughts'. So you consider qualia and thoughts to be identical? Because I'm drawing a distinction between them and saying the former doesn't exist, while the latter do exist. They certainly seem qualitatively distinct since there's so much focus on qualia in the hard problem.
- aaimnr 10y agoThe problem with 'qualia' and 'consciousness' is that these concepts seem to reify something existing separately from their content. The other problem here is that 'thought' is a complex and compound entity while 'qualia' seems to imply something atomic. So let's not use this concept. Just realised that I seriously intended to argue with you about probably the single most mysterious thing known to humanity. Feels stupid. Anyway, what is a thought in your opinion? Is it just a physical thing? What is 'experience of red'? An illusion? (Again, I feel stupid trying to achieve something here :)
- naasking 10y ago> The other problem here is that 'thought' is a complex and compound entity while 'qualia' seems to imply something atomic. So let's not use this concept. Funny, I see it as exactly the opposite, as would any materialist I'd hazard. "Qualia" is a term describing a vague, poorly defined concept that's inherently intertwined with our complex perceptual systems and with our internal model of the world, and this dizzyingly complex aggregate leads us to falsely conclude we have subjective experience. "Thought" is merely a mentally held belief, a proposition inferred from ones perceptions.
- aaimnr 10y agoWell, when you analyse thought as something you experience, you'll come to realise eg. that it can be verbal or visual (check out Temple Grandin) and is always compound. You can talk about thought/belief as something basic on a level of propositional logic, but this level is as abstracted from experience and observation as possible. Thought is always 'made' of some prior experience/perception, when you look at it. It's a very high level of description compared to consciousness/qualia.
- naasking 10y ago> You can talk about thought/belief as something basic on a level of propositional logic, but this level is as abstracted from experience and observation as possible. Agreed, but this will necessarily be true of any objective, scientific account of consciousness. For instance, subatomic particles are as abstracted from our everyday macroscopic world as possible. > Thought is always 'made' of some prior experience/perception, when you look at it. It's a very high level of description compared to consciousness/qualia. I don't think we should conflate experience and perception. Materialists of course acknowledge we have perception, they simply deny the subjective experience that non-materialists infer from it. Of course, this fuzzy boundary is where our natural language often fails us, so when I equate a thought with a proposition, I of course don't mean a proposition in English or any other language, I mean some abstract representation that structurally conforms to a proposition in a given mind. The structure this thought takes isn't objective, in the sense that it's the same for every person, because the correspondence of that structure to that proposition is determined by the mind that interprets it, just like a program in x86 machine code isn't the same program when run on an ARM processor -- equivalent semantics have different structures on different CPUs, and equivalent structures have different semantics on different CPUs.
- theoh 10y ago"I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness." Max Planck, and nothing significant has changed since then.
- Florin_Andrei 10y ago> What is self-evident is that there are thoughts, and some of these thoughts are "I am experiencing X". Therein the problem lies. Equating consciousness with thoughts. It's vastly different. It can exist independently of "thoughts". It can exist independently of an "I". This can be verified as an experience. At most it could be a very, very special kind of "thought", radically different from the rest.
- naasking 10y ago> Therein the problem lies. Equating consciousness with thoughts. It's vastly different. Just because qualia seem "vastly different" to thoughts doesn't mean they aren't reducible to thoughts. This would make the qualitative distinction of qualia from thoughts an illusion, a false conclusion inferred from an incorrect perception.
- aaimnr 10y agoThere's a very distinct experience of being conscious and having completely no thoughts in the mind. To treat thoughts as some kind of basic element is a mistake that neither neuroscientist nor meditator would ever make. Look up default network mode and how it can be 'turned off'.
- naasking 10y agoI think you're mistaking the utility of epistemically treating qualia on their own terms, with their fundamental ontological status. Just because reducibility may not be useful in most cases of analyzing qualia as a phenomena reducible to thoughts, doesn't make it untrue that they are reducible to thoughts.