4 ms·

I was having a discussion about security of the voting systems with my neighbor from Germany. He was of the belief that the mechanical machines without compute

by tmaly 10y ago

I was having a discussion about security of the voting systems with my neighbor from Germany. He was of the belief that the mechanical machines without computers were more secure. I like the type of machines we have in Connecticut. There is a paper ballot that is filled out and then scanned optically. We get a paper ballot that acts as an audit trail. There is always the possibility that the optical scanner contains a bug or something, but the 2000 election showed that even mechanical machines have flaws if not maintained. I would not prefer the touch screen voting machines as there are always reports of the machines switching the vote. It just seems like more can go wrong with those machines.

nickbauman 10y ago
The voting machine's viability is all about how easily a layman can verify its correctness. This is why any mechanical voting machines are theoretically "better" because the layman can actually SEE it working correctly or not.
- akytt 10y ago
  Have you ever tried to inpelement a modified d'hont method manually? There are always computers involved. Counting hundreds thousands of votes manually will always yield an error that can be exploited. Voting as a concept has changed beyond what mr. Halderman is willing to admit. Let's say you have widespread electronic id and electronic voting. In isolation, this sounds mad. In conjunction with physical voting and common use of eid, not so much.
  - oh_sigh 10y ago
    How would one exploit a seemingly random error to favor a specific candidate over the other?
  - admax88q 10y ago
    Seems harder to exploit manual counting of paper ballots than the firmware of some closed source system that's poorly understood by those deploying it. The larger the election, the more manual counters you will have. Which means the more people you would have to influence in order to rig an election.
    - ComodoHacker 10y ago
      Ironically, Russia is particularly good at it.
      - blobbles 10y ago
        Manipulating a manual ballot process is easy. Just stuff some ballot boxes. Doing so without leaving evidence all over the place is really hard. Widespread vote manipulation of electronic systems much, much easier to keep a secret.
      - makomk 10y ago
        Russia tends to leave a massive trail of evidence when it rigs its own elections. It's just that Putin has enough of an iron grip on the Russian press and political system that it doesn't matter.
  - kgwgk 10y ago
    > Have you ever tried to implement a modified d'hont method manually? What do you mean? Doesn't it just requiere to perform a few divisions?
  - hackuser 10y ago
    > Voting as a concept has changed beyond what mr. Halderman is willing to admit. I don't understand what you mean. Why specifically can't we use the technology he describes? > Have you ever tried to inpelement a modified d'hont method manually? Where in the U.S. is that method used?
- exo762 10y ago
  To make things worse - you can't really verify your vote unless there is a complete paper trail. Basically you can have one of two things - computerased voting machines without denialbility of vote (impossiblity to sold the vote or impossiblity of getting punished for voting wrong) OR paper ballot voting somewhat augmented by computers. Reason - we haven't solved basic issue of endpoint security yet!
  - nickbauman 10y ago
    In MN optical voting processors are OK because the paper ballot is always there to back up the electronic version. Not perfect but a decent compromise.
  - tmaly 10y ago
    A friend of mine served as the registrar of voters for a small town in Connecticut. He told me there is a whole procedure they have in place to even handle the ballots once they are placed in the machine. There has to be a chain of custody. There is always that aspect of it, it someone can get a hold of a box of ballots and somehow slip those into the process, it would be easy to circumvent any machine that relies on a paper audit trail. A double entry system where you get your paper ballot optically scanned and you also place your vote into a independent system maybe even an electronic one could provide a better check against having just one system as a point of failure?
wirelessest 10y ago
Can't touch screens give you a "receipt"? Particularly if it's validated by the voter, this removes the machine-failure hole where the optical scan fails for non-compromised reasons.
- linkregister 10y ago
  Touch screens in Maryland give a receipt that you voted. But the votes themselves are not included on the receipt. The purpose behind this is to mitigate people paying for votes in a very close district. Having a reliable method of determining someone's vote compromises this mitigation. Is one threat greater than the other? I actually think the threat of vote payment is lower due to the the high risk of the illegal act being exposed. But this is strictly intuition and I have no actual knowledge of the matter. Edit: in the article, they describe a receipt method that matches your description. But the voter doesn't retain it.

by tmaly 10y ago

nickbauman 10y ago

The voting machine's viability is all about how easily a layman can verify its correctness. This is why any mechanical voting machines are theoretically "better" because the layman can actually SEE it working correctly or not.

akytt 10y ago
Have you ever tried to inpelement a modified d'hont method manually? There are always computers involved. Counting hundreds thousands of votes manually will always yield an error that can be exploited. Voting as a concept has changed beyond what mr. Halderman is willing to admit. Let's say you have widespread electronic id and electronic voting. In isolation, this sounds mad. In conjunction with physical voting and common use of eid, not so much.
- oh_sigh 10y ago
  How would one exploit a seemingly random error to favor a specific candidate over the other?
- admax88q 10y ago
  Seems harder to exploit manual counting of paper ballots than the firmware of some closed source system that's poorly understood by those deploying it. The larger the election, the more manual counters you will have. Which means the more people you would have to influence in order to rig an election.
  - ComodoHacker 10y ago
    Ironically, Russia is particularly good at it.
    - blobbles 10y ago
      Manipulating a manual ballot process is easy. Just stuff some ballot boxes. Doing so without leaving evidence all over the place is really hard. Widespread vote manipulation of electronic systems much, much easier to keep a secret.
    - makomk 10y ago
      Russia tends to leave a massive trail of evidence when it rigs its own elections. It's just that Putin has enough of an iron grip on the Russian press and political system that it doesn't matter.
- kgwgk 10y ago
  > Have you ever tried to implement a modified d'hont method manually? What do you mean? Doesn't it just requiere to perform a few divisions?
- hackuser 10y ago
  > Voting as a concept has changed beyond what mr. Halderman is willing to admit. I don't understand what you mean. Why specifically can't we use the technology he describes? > Have you ever tried to inpelement a modified d'hont method manually? Where in the U.S. is that method used?
exo762 10y ago
To make things worse - you can't really verify your vote unless there is a complete paper trail. Basically you can have one of two things - computerased voting machines without denialbility of vote (impossiblity to sold the vote or impossiblity of getting punished for voting wrong) OR paper ballot voting somewhat augmented by computers. Reason - we haven't solved basic issue of endpoint security yet!
- nickbauman 10y ago
  In MN optical voting processors are OK because the paper ballot is always there to back up the electronic version. Not perfect but a decent compromise.
- tmaly 10y ago
  A friend of mine served as the registrar of voters for a small town in Connecticut. He told me there is a whole procedure they have in place to even handle the ballots once they are placed in the machine. There has to be a chain of custody. There is always that aspect of it, it someone can get a hold of a box of ballots and somehow slip those into the process, it would be easy to circumvent any machine that relies on a paper audit trail. A double entry system where you get your paper ballot optically scanned and you also place your vote into a independent system maybe even an electronic one could provide a better check against having just one system as a point of failure?

wirelessest 10y ago

Can't touch screens give you a "receipt"? Particularly if it's validated by the voter, this removes the machine-failure hole where the optical scan fails for non-compromised reasons.

linkregister 10y ago
Touch screens in Maryland give a receipt that you voted. But the votes themselves are not included on the receipt. The purpose behind this is to mitigate people paying for votes in a very close district. Having a reliable method of determining someone's vote compromises this mitigation. Is one threat greater than the other? I actually think the threat of vote payment is lower due to the the high risk of the illegal act being exposed. But this is strictly intuition and I have no actual knowledge of the matter. Edit: in the article, they describe a receipt method that matches your description. But the voter doesn't retain it.