> If rocks on the ground can be (slowly) self aware, then doesn't that mean everything in the universe is self-aware? This is a formal logical fallacy. If we

> If rocks on the ground can be (slowly) self aware, then doesn't that mean everything in the universe is self-aware? This is a formal logical fallacy. If we accept the antecedent "rock does not imply not-conscious", your consequent of "rock implies conscious" does not follow. > For example, say I throw a bucket full of sand on the ground. Then, later, I define an incredibly complex abstract computer, such that the sand falling out of the bucket and shifting along the ground exactly represents a self-aware AI within my defined computer going through its states. Does that mean as I was pouring the the sand on the ground, the sand was momentarily self-aware? You're assuming that is possible to define a mapping between the mechanics of the falling-sand dynamic system and a dynamic system that satisfies a definition of "self-aware". It is difficult to argue this in any meaningful sense because there is no satisfactory formal definition of consciousness in existence. I strongly suspect that if a such a definition did exist, the falling-sand dynamic system would not satisfy it, but if it did, then yes, the falling sand is conscious ;)