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(TL;DR: I believe the term is being used both proscriptively and descriptively, and that is the heart of the problem) > One group yells "women belong in the ki

by xaa 10y ago

(TL;DR: I believe the term is being used both proscriptively and descriptively, and that is the heart of the problem) > One group yells "women belong in the kitchen; blacks are inferior" or whatever. I, and even most conservatives, would have absolutely no problem calling that racism or sexism. Those are overt, direct statements meeting the popular definitions of those terms. I am assuming we are debating the more expansive definitions that are more under public dispute. > saying that the term is just a tool for moral condemnation serves their interest of resisting the facts behind it I agree, as long as it can be established that it does indeed have a useful purpose as a descriptive term. > classifying actions as racist isn't prescriptive but descriptive, and is certainly under the purview of science. I find the assertion that it isn't prescriptive, especially when you later admit that it does serve at least partially as a tool for moral condemnation, unconvincing. But it could be both prescriptive and descriptive, so how about that? You are surely aware that one fashionable definition of racism, with some academic support, is that it is equivalent to power or privilege, and therefore no member of a disadvantaged group can be racist, and all members of a privileged group are by definition racist. In addition to being needlessly provocative and drawing attention away from "real", intentional racism, this kind of definition is utterly useless from a descriptive standpoint. After all, if it is completely equivalent to power/privilege, why not use those words? And if racism occurs completely without choice on the part of the accused, is it not paradoxical to use it as a term of moral condemnation, since morality presumably requires choice? Another common usage is the idea that racism is a set of power structures in society that promote unequal outcomes. If abstract, nonhuman entities (societies, governments, etc) can be racist, apart from the racism of their constituent members, how can the same term be used as a term of moral condemnation? Note that I am not objecting to the idea that privilege, implicit bias, or self-perpetuating power structures exist. They certainly do. But I am arguing that conflating these things with overt racism (or anything involving conscious choice, and therefore subject to moral condemnation) is intellectually muddled, counterproductive, and is at the heart of why conservatives are so angry about this issue.

pron 10y ago
> I agree, as long as it can be established that it does indeed have a useful purpose as a descriptive term. But it does. The definition has become more refined in order to be more useful. This is commonly done in science. > You are surely aware that one fashionable definition of racism, with some academic support, is that it is equivalent to power or privilege, and therefore no member of a disadvantaged group can be racist, and all members of a privileged group are by definition racist. This is very inaccurate. The "fashionable definition" you're is really a very simplified, catch-phrasy shorthand for something much more subtle, which is this: Racism is the property of a society or social dynamics that create and perpetuate an unfair distribution of power between groups viewed as races. It is this definition that is shortened to be "discrimination plus power". Obviously, groups that are powerless in a society cannot shape it to withdraw power from themselves, which is why we say, as shorthand, "blacks can't be racist". But it is important to understand that in either case the word does not refer to individuals and certainly not to their sentiments, but to the way they are a vessel for social dynamics. Blacks, by being less powerful, are not as strong conduits for social dynamics, and hence they are not the mechanism for the perpetuation of racism, and hence "they" "are" not racist. > In addition to being needlessly provocative and drawing attention away from "real", intentional racism, this kind of definition is utterly useless from a descriptive standpoint. After all, if it is completely equivalent to power/privilege, why not use those words? This is perhaps better called xenophobia, just as "intentional sexism" is better called misogyny. I don't think it is more or less real than the academic definition, but it's not as useful because research has shown that the main mechanism by which racism is perpetuated has little to do with people's conscious intentions. You want to use the description of the main effect, not secondary ones that are perhaps more emotionally obvious but far less influential in practice. > And if racism occurs completely without choice on the part of the accused, is it not paradoxical to use it as a term of moral condemnation, since morality presumably requires choice? Without intent does not mean without choice. When I smoke a cigarette I don't intend to make myself sick, but if I know that is the likely outcome, then by smoking I choose to increase my likelihood of getting sick even though it is not my intent. The "moral condemnation" of smoking is effective in reducing smoking by drawing attention to this unintentional choice. > If abstract, nonhuman entities (societies, governments, etc) can be racist, apart from the racism of their constituent members, how can the same term be used as a term of moral condemnation? This is related to my smoking analogy. Once you know that your actions are part of an unwanted social dynamics, you can choose to change them. > But I am arguing that conflating these things with overt racism (or anything involving conscious choice, and therefore subject to moral condemnation) is intellectually muddled, counterproductive, and is at the heart of why conservatives are so angry about this issue. Right, but as in my reply to 794CD01[1], the difference is what you view as the main issue. Conservatives may view the issue as merely ethical, and when it comes to ethics, intentions matter a lot. The left cares a lot more about the result, and it turns out that what you call "overt racism" has very little effect on the result, and it is racism in the broader sense that is much more important. The left wants to draw attention to what it views as the bigger problem. [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522
- xaa 10y ago
  I'm sorry you're getting downvoted. I'm very happy you're willing to engage with me on this. Obviously I'm somewhat familiar with this subject, but not as much as you, and it's nice to have a more detailed discussion on HN. > But it is important to understand that in either case the word does not refer to individuals and certainly not to their sentiments, but to the way they are a vessel for social dynamics. > the main mechanism by which racism is perpetuated has little to do with people's conscious intentions. Yep, I understand this, and this is key to the disconnect between academia and the public. Academia is saying, "it's not individuals, it's institutions, social habits, etc". That's a perfectly legitimate and important point to make. But the public hears "you're racist" (by which academia and their surrogates mean, "you're a participant in these phenomena"), and understands it to mean "xenophobia" (implying intentionality). And you cannot fault the public for this misunderstanding because that is the common and historical meaning of the word. > The left cares a lot more about the result, and it turns out that what you call "overt racism" has very little effect on the result, and it is racism in the broader sense that is much more important. The left wants to draw attention to what it views as the bigger problem. As they should. I think we agree on just about everything except the question of whether repurposing an existing word is an unhelpful confusion-causing conflation or not. I do not question the motives of academia or the left on this issue, only their linguistic methods. They are the ones trying to make the change, so they are the ones responsible for clear communication. More concretely, I am arguing that this confusion has cost the left dearly in this election on the very goals they claim to be working towards. > Once you know that your actions are part of an unwanted social dynamics, you can choose to change them. Just to be clear then, it is possible for a person, even a white person, not to be racist assuming they take appropriate actions? If so, I think we are very close to resolving our disagreement. > Without intent does not mean without choice. When I smoke a cigarette I don't intend to make myself sick... A decent analogy. I think however when we shift from the popular to the academic definition of racism, we have made a crucial shift from a "negative ethical obligation" (an obligation not to do direct harm to another) to a positive one (an obligation to take direct action to fix problems you didn't directly cause). Generally positive obligations are weaker and more dubious than negative ones, so this could be seen by conservatives as a bit of a bait-and-switch.

by xaa 10y ago

pron 10y ago

> I agree, as long as it can be established that it does indeed have a useful purpose as a descriptive term. But it does. The definition has become more refined in order to be more useful. This is commonly done in science. > You are surely aware that one fashionable definition of racism, with some academic support, is that it is equivalent to power or privilege, and therefore no member of a disadvantaged group can be racist, and all members of a privileged group are by definition racist. This is very inaccurate. The "fashionable definition" you're is really a very simplified, catch-phrasy shorthand for something much more subtle, which is this: Racism is the property of a society or social dynamics that create and perpetuate an unfair distribution of power between groups viewed as races. It is this definition that is shortened to be "discrimination plus power". Obviously, groups that are powerless in a society cannot shape it to withdraw power from themselves, which is why we say, as shorthand, "blacks can't be racist". But it is important to understand that in either case the word does not refer to individuals and certainly not to their sentiments, but to the way they are a vessel for social dynamics. Blacks, by being less powerful, are not as strong conduits for social dynamics, and hence they are not the mechanism for the perpetuation of racism, and hence "they" "are" not racist. > In addition to being needlessly provocative and drawing attention away from "real", intentional racism, this kind of definition is utterly useless from a descriptive standpoint. After all, if it is completely equivalent to power/privilege, why not use those words? This is perhaps better called xenophobia, just as "intentional sexism" is better called misogyny. I don't think it is more or less real than the academic definition, but it's not as useful because research has shown that the main mechanism by which racism is perpetuated has little to do with people's conscious intentions. You want to use the description of the main effect, not secondary ones that are perhaps more emotionally obvious but far less influential in practice. > And if racism occurs completely without choice on the part of the accused, is it not paradoxical to use it as a term of moral condemnation, since morality presumably requires choice? Without intent does not mean without choice. When I smoke a cigarette I don't intend to make myself sick, but if I know that is the likely outcome, then by smoking I choose to increase my likelihood of getting sick even though it is not my intent. The "moral condemnation" of smoking is effective in reducing smoking by drawing attention to this unintentional choice. > If abstract, nonhuman entities (societies, governments, etc) can be racist, apart from the racism of their constituent members, how can the same term be used as a term of moral condemnation? This is related to my smoking analogy. Once you know that your actions are part of an unwanted social dynamics, you can choose to change them. > But I am arguing that conflating these things with overt racism (or anything involving conscious choice, and therefore subject to moral condemnation) is intellectually muddled, counterproductive, and is at the heart of why conservatives are so angry about this issue. Right, but as in my reply to 794CD01[1], the difference is what you view as the main issue. Conservatives may view the issue as merely ethical, and when it comes to ethics, intentions matter a lot. The left cares a lot more about the result, and it turns out that what you call "overt racism" has very little effect on the result, and it is racism in the broader sense that is much more important. The left wants to draw attention to what it views as the bigger problem. [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522

xaa 10y ago
I'm sorry you're getting downvoted. I'm very happy you're willing to engage with me on this. Obviously I'm somewhat familiar with this subject, but not as much as you, and it's nice to have a more detailed discussion on HN. > But it is important to understand that in either case the word does not refer to individuals and certainly not to their sentiments, but to the way they are a vessel for social dynamics. > the main mechanism by which racism is perpetuated has little to do with people's conscious intentions. Yep, I understand this, and this is key to the disconnect between academia and the public. Academia is saying, "it's not individuals, it's institutions, social habits, etc". That's a perfectly legitimate and important point to make. But the public hears "you're racist" (by which academia and their surrogates mean, "you're a participant in these phenomena"), and understands it to mean "xenophobia" (implying intentionality). And you cannot fault the public for this misunderstanding because that is the common and historical meaning of the word. > The left cares a lot more about the result, and it turns out that what you call "overt racism" has very little effect on the result, and it is racism in the broader sense that is much more important. The left wants to draw attention to what it views as the bigger problem. As they should. I think we agree on just about everything except the question of whether repurposing an existing word is an unhelpful confusion-causing conflation or not. I do not question the motives of academia or the left on this issue, only their linguistic methods. They are the ones trying to make the change, so they are the ones responsible for clear communication. More concretely, I am arguing that this confusion has cost the left dearly in this election on the very goals they claim to be working towards. > Once you know that your actions are part of an unwanted social dynamics, you can choose to change them. Just to be clear then, it is possible for a person, even a white person, not to be racist assuming they take appropriate actions? If so, I think we are very close to resolving our disagreement. > Without intent does not mean without choice. When I smoke a cigarette I don't intend to make myself sick... A decent analogy. I think however when we shift from the popular to the academic definition of racism, we have made a crucial shift from a "negative ethical obligation" (an obligation not to do direct harm to another) to a positive one (an obligation to take direct action to fix problems you didn't directly cause). Generally positive obligations are weaker and more dubious than negative ones, so this could be seen by conservatives as a bit of a bait-and-switch.