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I agree wholeheartedly with grzm. And I do believe the skepticism he is talking about has generated one positive result: if you want people to believe in expert

by xaa 10y ago

I agree wholeheartedly with grzm. And I do believe the skepticism he is talking about has generated one positive result: if you want people to believe in expertise now, you have to not just define terms and explain reasoning, but show concrete proof. People believe (mostly) in modern medicine not because of our fancy jargon, or our explained logic about why the cell does this or that, but because it obviously works. I am a liberal living in a conservative state, with many conservative friends and family. I can assure you that many of them have never heard the reasoning and arguments you're referring to. Sure, you can find it on Slate. But they don't read Slate. But if and when these conservatives are confronted with these arguments, they will mostly agree that implicit bias exists, and accept data about unconscious associations, police profiling, etc. But they do NOT accept the conclusion drawn from it -- that we are all therefore "racist". Because to them that term is as much or more a political tool for moral condemnation as it is a description of objective reality. And we liberals (I assume) would be kidding ourselves if we didn't admit it has been used this way frequently. And they also tend to resist the conclusion that we ought to do this or that about it -- because science, if sociology claims to be one, never does or can tell us what we ought to do, only what is reality (the is-ought problem). Once we start talking about what we should do, we are completely outside the realm of science.

pron 10y ago
> if you want people to believe in expertise now, you have to not just define terms and explain reasoning, but show concrete proof. Yes, and even then you should expect a few decades or centuries for people to be convinced. I think the evidence is here, but sufficient time hasn't passed. > And they also tend to resist the conclusion that we ought to do this or that about it I have absolutely no problem with that. People are free to have different views about the goals, and even if the goals are shared, about the best means of achieving them. I'm just not so happy about the denial of facts, but I'm well aware that it takes a long time for facts to sink in. > Once we start talking about what we should do, we are completely outside the realm of science. Absolutely, and I don't think social research is about telling us what to do, but classifying actions as racist isn't prescriptive but descriptive, and is certainly under the purview of science. > Because to them that term is as much or more a political tool for moral condemnation Right, but there's a problem here. First, saying that the term is just a tool for moral condemnation serves their interest of resisting the facts behind it. Second, in addition to being an academic classification, it is used a (rather weak) tool for condemnation that serves as a very weak defense much stronger opposing forces of marginalization. I mean, in the end, politics is a struggle over the distribution of power. One group yells "women belong in the kitchen; blacks are inferior" or whatever. What tools do you suggest the other side use to fight back? Present evidence? They do, but you just said that the intended audience don't read Slate. So moral condemnation is such (rather ineffective) means.
- xaa 10y ago
  (TL;DR: I believe the term is being used both proscriptively and descriptively, and that is the heart of the problem) > One group yells "women belong in the kitchen; blacks are inferior" or whatever. I, and even most conservatives, would have absolutely no problem calling that racism or sexism. Those are overt, direct statements meeting the popular definitions of those terms. I am assuming we are debating the more expansive definitions that are more under public dispute. > saying that the term is just a tool for moral condemnation serves their interest of resisting the facts behind it I agree, as long as it can be established that it does indeed have a useful purpose as a descriptive term. > classifying actions as racist isn't prescriptive but descriptive, and is certainly under the purview of science. I find the assertion that it isn't prescriptive, especially when you later admit that it does serve at least partially as a tool for moral condemnation, unconvincing. But it could be both prescriptive and descriptive, so how about that? You are surely aware that one fashionable definition of racism, with some academic support, is that it is equivalent to power or privilege, and therefore no member of a disadvantaged group can be racist, and all members of a privileged group are by definition racist. In addition to being needlessly provocative and drawing attention away from "real", intentional racism, this kind of definition is utterly useless from a descriptive standpoint. After all, if it is completely equivalent to power/privilege, why not use those words? And if racism occurs completely without choice on the part of the accused, is it not paradoxical to use it as a term of moral condemnation, since morality presumably requires choice? Another common usage is the idea that racism is a set of power structures in society that promote unequal outcomes. If abstract, nonhuman entities (societies, governments, etc) can be racist, apart from the racism of their constituent members, how can the same term be used as a term of moral condemnation? Note that I am not objecting to the idea that privilege, implicit bias, or self-perpetuating power structures exist. They certainly do. But I am arguing that conflating these things with overt racism (or anything involving conscious choice, and therefore subject to moral condemnation) is intellectually muddled, counterproductive, and is at the heart of why conservatives are so angry about this issue.
  - pron 10y ago
    > I agree, as long as it can be established that it does indeed have a useful purpose as a descriptive term. But it does. The definition has become more refined in order to be more useful. This is commonly done in science. > You are surely aware that one fashionable definition of racism, with some academic support, is that it is equivalent to power or privilege, and therefore no member of a disadvantaged group can be racist, and all members of a privileged group are by definition racist. This is very inaccurate. The "fashionable definition" you're is really a very simplified, catch-phrasy shorthand for something much more subtle, which is this: Racism is the property of a society or social dynamics that create and perpetuate an unfair distribution of power between groups viewed as races. It is this definition that is shortened to be "discrimination plus power". Obviously, groups that are powerless in a society cannot shape it to withdraw power from themselves, which is why we say, as shorthand, "blacks can't be racist". But it is important to understand that in either case the word does not refer to individuals and certainly not to their sentiments, but to the way they are a vessel for social dynamics. Blacks, by being less powerful, are not as strong conduits for social dynamics, and hence they are not the mechanism for the perpetuation of racism, and hence "they" "are" not racist. > In addition to being needlessly provocative and drawing attention away from "real", intentional racism, this kind of definition is utterly useless from a descriptive standpoint. After all, if it is completely equivalent to power/privilege, why not use those words? This is perhaps better called xenophobia, just as "intentional sexism" is better called misogyny. I don't think it is more or less real than the academic definition, but it's not as useful because research has shown that the main mechanism by which racism is perpetuated has little to do with people's conscious intentions. You want to use the description of the main effect, not secondary ones that are perhaps more emotionally obvious but far less influential in practice. > And if racism occurs completely without choice on the part of the accused, is it not paradoxical to use it as a term of moral condemnation, since morality presumably requires choice? Without intent does not mean without choice. When I smoke a cigarette I don't intend to make myself sick, but if I know that is the likely outcome, then by smoking I choose to increase my likelihood of getting sick even though it is not my intent. The "moral condemnation" of smoking is effective in reducing smoking by drawing attention to this unintentional choice. > If abstract, nonhuman entities (societies, governments, etc) can be racist, apart from the racism of their constituent members, how can the same term be used as a term of moral condemnation? This is related to my smoking analogy. Once you know that your actions are part of an unwanted social dynamics, you can choose to change them. > But I am arguing that conflating these things with overt racism (or anything involving conscious choice, and therefore subject to moral condemnation) is intellectually muddled, counterproductive, and is at the heart of why conservatives are so angry about this issue. Right, but as in my reply to 794CD01[1], the difference is what you view as the main issue. Conservatives may view the issue as merely ethical, and when it comes to ethics, intentions matter a lot. The left cares a lot more about the result, and it turns out that what you call "overt racism" has very little effect on the result, and it is racism in the broader sense that is much more important. The left wants to draw attention to what it views as the bigger problem. [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522

by xaa 10y ago

pron 10y ago

> if you want people to believe in expertise now, you have to not just define terms and explain reasoning, but show concrete proof. Yes, and even then you should expect a few decades or centuries for people to be convinced. I think the evidence is here, but sufficient time hasn't passed. > And they also tend to resist the conclusion that we ought to do this or that about it I have absolutely no problem with that. People are free to have different views about the goals, and even if the goals are shared, about the best means of achieving them. I'm just not so happy about the denial of facts, but I'm well aware that it takes a long time for facts to sink in. > Once we start talking about what we should do, we are completely outside the realm of science. Absolutely, and I don't think social research is about telling us what to do, but classifying actions as racist isn't prescriptive but descriptive, and is certainly under the purview of science. > Because to them that term is as much or more a political tool for moral condemnation Right, but there's a problem here. First, saying that the term is just a tool for moral condemnation serves their interest of resisting the facts behind it. Second, in addition to being an academic classification, it is used a (rather weak) tool for condemnation that serves as a very weak defense much stronger opposing forces of marginalization. I mean, in the end, politics is a struggle over the distribution of power. One group yells "women belong in the kitchen; blacks are inferior" or whatever. What tools do you suggest the other side use to fight back? Present evidence? They do, but you just said that the intended audience don't read Slate. So moral condemnation is such (rather ineffective) means.

xaa 10y ago
(TL;DR: I believe the term is being used both proscriptively and descriptively, and that is the heart of the problem) > One group yells "women belong in the kitchen; blacks are inferior" or whatever. I, and even most conservatives, would have absolutely no problem calling that racism or sexism. Those are overt, direct statements meeting the popular definitions of those terms. I am assuming we are debating the more expansive definitions that are more under public dispute. > saying that the term is just a tool for moral condemnation serves their interest of resisting the facts behind it I agree, as long as it can be established that it does indeed have a useful purpose as a descriptive term. > classifying actions as racist isn't prescriptive but descriptive, and is certainly under the purview of science. I find the assertion that it isn't prescriptive, especially when you later admit that it does serve at least partially as a tool for moral condemnation, unconvincing. But it could be both prescriptive and descriptive, so how about that? You are surely aware that one fashionable definition of racism, with some academic support, is that it is equivalent to power or privilege, and therefore no member of a disadvantaged group can be racist, and all members of a privileged group are by definition racist. In addition to being needlessly provocative and drawing attention away from "real", intentional racism, this kind of definition is utterly useless from a descriptive standpoint. After all, if it is completely equivalent to power/privilege, why not use those words? And if racism occurs completely without choice on the part of the accused, is it not paradoxical to use it as a term of moral condemnation, since morality presumably requires choice? Another common usage is the idea that racism is a set of power structures in society that promote unequal outcomes. If abstract, nonhuman entities (societies, governments, etc) can be racist, apart from the racism of their constituent members, how can the same term be used as a term of moral condemnation? Note that I am not objecting to the idea that privilege, implicit bias, or self-perpetuating power structures exist. They certainly do. But I am arguing that conflating these things with overt racism (or anything involving conscious choice, and therefore subject to moral condemnation) is intellectually muddled, counterproductive, and is at the heart of why conservatives are so angry about this issue.
- pron 10y ago
  > I agree, as long as it can be established that it does indeed have a useful purpose as a descriptive term. But it does. The definition has become more refined in order to be more useful. This is commonly done in science. > You are surely aware that one fashionable definition of racism, with some academic support, is that it is equivalent to power or privilege, and therefore no member of a disadvantaged group can be racist, and all members of a privileged group are by definition racist. This is very inaccurate. The "fashionable definition" you're is really a very simplified, catch-phrasy shorthand for something much more subtle, which is this: Racism is the property of a society or social dynamics that create and perpetuate an unfair distribution of power between groups viewed as races. It is this definition that is shortened to be "discrimination plus power". Obviously, groups that are powerless in a society cannot shape it to withdraw power from themselves, which is why we say, as shorthand, "blacks can't be racist". But it is important to understand that in either case the word does not refer to individuals and certainly not to their sentiments, but to the way they are a vessel for social dynamics. Blacks, by being less powerful, are not as strong conduits for social dynamics, and hence they are not the mechanism for the perpetuation of racism, and hence "they" "are" not racist. > In addition to being needlessly provocative and drawing attention away from "real", intentional racism, this kind of definition is utterly useless from a descriptive standpoint. After all, if it is completely equivalent to power/privilege, why not use those words? This is perhaps better called xenophobia, just as "intentional sexism" is better called misogyny. I don't think it is more or less real than the academic definition, but it's not as useful because research has shown that the main mechanism by which racism is perpetuated has little to do with people's conscious intentions. You want to use the description of the main effect, not secondary ones that are perhaps more emotionally obvious but far less influential in practice. > And if racism occurs completely without choice on the part of the accused, is it not paradoxical to use it as a term of moral condemnation, since morality presumably requires choice? Without intent does not mean without choice. When I smoke a cigarette I don't intend to make myself sick, but if I know that is the likely outcome, then by smoking I choose to increase my likelihood of getting sick even though it is not my intent. The "moral condemnation" of smoking is effective in reducing smoking by drawing attention to this unintentional choice. > If abstract, nonhuman entities (societies, governments, etc) can be racist, apart from the racism of their constituent members, how can the same term be used as a term of moral condemnation? This is related to my smoking analogy. Once you know that your actions are part of an unwanted social dynamics, you can choose to change them. > But I am arguing that conflating these things with overt racism (or anything involving conscious choice, and therefore subject to moral condemnation) is intellectually muddled, counterproductive, and is at the heart of why conservatives are so angry about this issue. Right, but as in my reply to 794CD01[1], the difference is what you view as the main issue. Conservatives may view the issue as merely ethical, and when it comes to ethics, intentions matter a lot. The left cares a lot more about the result, and it turns out that what you call "overt racism" has very little effect on the result, and it is racism in the broader sense that is much more important. The left wants to draw attention to what it views as the bigger problem. [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12981522