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The Monero blockchain is comprised of inputs and outputs - public keys/one-time addresses to power of 10 denominated amounts into which each transaction is spli

by pero 10y ago

The Monero blockchain is comprised of inputs and outputs - public keys/one-time addresses to power of 10 denominated amounts into which each transaction is split and mixed with past public keys of identical power of 10 amounts. There are no 'orthodox' addresses on the blockchain which can be linked to transactions or to an identity.

Taek 10y ago
That's just a misunderstanding of inherent blockchain limitations. It's very easy for me to reveal a bunch of addresses on the Monero blockchain. Step 1: make a bunch of addresses Step 2: the world know it was you That reduces the anonymity set for everyone else. They thought they were mixing with you anonymously but now that you are revealed, your participation in the mixing is useless, people would have done better to select someone else. Combine this with Sybil attacks, criminal investigation, and other unmasking techniques and you might get the anonymity set down to 1 for a particular output, allowing you to further reduce other anonymity sets. I was not aware, but apparently the Monero blockchain has a snowball effect to help mitigate this.
- plasticmachine 10y ago
  What you're talking about has already been covered in research by the Monero Research Lab: https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf and https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf Basically, unless you own 80% of the outputs on the blockchain you don't have enough to identify subsequent transactions, so any foothold you gain in owning outputs becomes rapidly weaker. Given the cost of owning 80% of the blockchain outputs, it's not an attack that is particularly effective even at Monero's current state of usage. Individuals who publish their input history won't make any significant difference.

by pero 10y ago

Taek 10y ago

That's just a misunderstanding of inherent blockchain limitations. It's very easy for me to reveal a bunch of addresses on the Monero blockchain. Step 1: make a bunch of addresses Step 2: the world know it was you That reduces the anonymity set for everyone else. They thought they were mixing with you anonymously but now that you are revealed, your participation in the mixing is useless, people would have done better to select someone else. Combine this with Sybil attacks, criminal investigation, and other unmasking techniques and you might get the anonymity set down to 1 for a particular output, allowing you to further reduce other anonymity sets. I was not aware, but apparently the Monero blockchain has a snowball effect to help mitigate this.

plasticmachine 10y ago
What you're talking about has already been covered in research by the Monero Research Lab: https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf and https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf Basically, unless you own 80% of the outputs on the blockchain you don't have enough to identify subsequent transactions, so any foothold you gain in owning outputs becomes rapidly weaker. Given the cost of owning 80% of the blockchain outputs, it's not an attack that is particularly effective even at Monero's current state of usage. Individuals who publish their input history won't make any significant difference.