4 ms·
Another fine exploit by Samy [1]. At the risk of sounding like a killjoy, once the attacker has physical access to a machine, let alone plugs in their own devic
by niftich 10y ago
Another fine exploit by Samy [1]. At the risk of sounding like a killjoy, once the attacker has physical access to a machine, let alone plugs in their own device, you can usually abandon all security hope [2]. But that entirely notwithstanding, the techniques presented in this exploit are actually quite clever, and they conspire to make for a nasty set of scenarios. Kudos to him for raising awareness once again!
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_Kamkar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_Kamkar [2] https://hn.algolia.com/?query=tptacek%20"physical%20access"&type=comment https://hn.algolia.com/?query=tptacek%20"physical%20access"&...
- nine_k 10y agoA powered-down machine with full disk encryption is reasonably safe against physical access, I still hope?
- pulse7 10y agoUnless USB keylogger is present which will log the disk encryption password when user is unaware of it...
- goda90 10y agoI've already seen lockable boxes around computer ports on some older model workstations. Combine that with some tamper proofing on the keyboard, and you've probably bought yourself a little more security against any intruder who has limited time with physical access.
- arantius 10y agoNot if you can get access twice. A variety of "evil maid" style attacks exist. For example, imagine I replace your FDE's bootloader with a version that appears identical, except it also logs your passphrase. Then I come back, read the passphrase, decrypt, and win. For scarier thoughts, imagine I know how to control the Intel Management Engine, and attack that instead. That's not covered by FDE.