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> [...] predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. This

> [...] predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. This bit is seems little bit strange to me in that it's actually not necessary at all[1]... a simulation runs on its "own timescale", i.e. it doesn't actually matter how fast/slowly the simulator runs -- the simulation still experiences time advancing at the proverbial dt/dt. This paragraph just seems to be scaremongering to the effect of "it'll happen soon because new processors!" Regardless: If we're living in a simulation of such fidelity it doesn't really matter if it's "really real" or a simulation; our lives will still start and end inside the simulation. (And I daresay this whole thing is just a trivial rehashing of solipsism with an added tinge of technophilia. I really wish physicists had more interaction with philosophers.) [1] I could imagine an argument for positing that e.g. Quantum Computing would be necessary, but the "enormous amounts of computing power" phrasing is incredibly vague, so who knows what the actual premise is? EDIT: Trim pointless "who said what" bit.

crooked-v 10y ago
> a trivial rehashing of solipsism Solipsism doesn't seem to quite fit. Like, sure, you're a brain in a jar in this scenario... but there are a lot of other brains sharing the jar with you, too. Solipsism inherently requires a singular existence rather than a communal one.
- lomnakkus 10y ago
  Ah, but as a brain-in-a-vat how could you distinguish other brains telling you things from the simulation just telling you what you want (or don't want) to hear? As long as we posit the "simulation" it doesn't really matter. EDIT: Pithyness. Solipsism is fun, isn't it? :) EDIT#2: I didn't mean to dismiss your point preemptively. I actually think it might be interesting to explore whether there could be (in principle) such a thing a shared-yet-simulated reality without succumbing to the solipsism argument. I don't think it's possible, but I'm not a philosopher. Incidentally physics has a similar problem. If you're interested, look up Boltzmann Brains and the "Arrow of Time".
inimino 10y ago
The argument is that you are likely to be in a simulation, because most minds will be simulated minds. The precondition of most minds being simulated is massive computing power. If we can run a simulation but it requires half the world's computational resources and simulates one second per century of real time, then obviously most minds (and most moments of lived experience) would not be simulated.
- lomnakkus 10y ago
  > The precondition of most minds being simulated is massive computing power. How so? I'm still not following the logic here. AFACS it does not matter how fast anything runs -- a simulation always proceeds a tick at a time. The simulated reality cannot (almost by definition) observe time at a smaller time scale.
  - inimino 10y ago
    The key point is most minds. The argument is that as a conscious being, your prior expectation of "where you are" should be a uniform distribution over all conscious beings. So the idea that you are "probably" in a simulation relies on the assumption that there will be more conscious beings inside simulations than in the top-level "real" universe.
    - lomnakkus 10y ago
      > So the idea that you are "probably" in a simulation relies on the assumption that there will be more conscious beings inside simulations than in the top-level "real" universe. I mean I can sort-of-see-it if this is the assumption, but the assumption itself seems quite circular to me. EDIT: I also don't understand how this is connected to my point about speed-of-simulation, but...

crooked-v 10y ago

> a trivial rehashing of solipsism Solipsism doesn't seem to quite fit. Like, sure, you're a brain in a jar in this scenario... but there are a lot of other brains sharing the jar with you, too. Solipsism inherently requires a singular existence rather than a communal one.

lomnakkus 10y ago
Ah, but as a brain-in-a-vat how could you distinguish other brains telling you things from the simulation just telling you what you want (or don't want) to hear? As long as we posit the "simulation" it doesn't really matter. EDIT: Pithyness. Solipsism is fun, isn't it? :) EDIT#2: I didn't mean to dismiss your point preemptively. I actually think it might be interesting to explore whether there could be (in principle) such a thing a shared-yet-simulated reality without succumbing to the solipsism argument. I don't think it's possible, but I'm not a philosopher. Incidentally physics has a similar problem. If you're interested, look up Boltzmann Brains and the "Arrow of Time".

inimino 10y ago

The argument is that you are likely to be in a simulation, because most minds will be simulated minds. The precondition of most minds being simulated is massive computing power. If we can run a simulation but it requires half the world's computational resources and simulates one second per century of real time, then obviously most minds (and most moments of lived experience) would not be simulated.

lomnakkus 10y ago
> The precondition of most minds being simulated is massive computing power. How so? I'm still not following the logic here. AFACS it does not matter how fast anything runs -- a simulation always proceeds a tick at a time. The simulated reality cannot (almost by definition) observe time at a smaller time scale.
- inimino 10y ago
  The key point is most minds. The argument is that as a conscious being, your prior expectation of "where you are" should be a uniform distribution over all conscious beings. So the idea that you are "probably" in a simulation relies on the assumption that there will be more conscious beings inside simulations than in the top-level "real" universe.
  - lomnakkus 10y ago
    > So the idea that you are "probably" in a simulation relies on the assumption that there will be more conscious beings inside simulations than in the top-level "real" universe. I mean I can sort-of-see-it if this is the assumption, but the assumption itself seems quite circular to me. EDIT: I also don't understand how this is connected to my point about speed-of-simulation, but...