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Alternatively, why not just go full Condorcet? The Schulze Method has a significant backing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Users https://en.wikip

Alternatively, why not just go full Condorcet? The Schulze Method has a significant backing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Users https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Users If you really want simplicity though, I suppose you could use IRV as your tie breaker amongst the Schwartz set.

albinofrenchy 10y ago
While I think the argument that voters won't understand how winners are chosen for IRV is a bit overstated, I think it'd be completely true with the Schulze method -- its safe to say that the average voter doesn't have a strong understanding of graph theory. Which isn't to say it isn't a good system; but its definitely a draw back. Supporting IRV seems like a good first step in which we don't let perfect be the enemy of good.
- bradbeattie 10y ago
  Barring edge cases, Condorcet methods can be described like single-elimination tournaments which pretty much everyone is familiar with. Yes, graph theory comes into play for tie breaking (assuming we can agree that cyclic Condorcet paradoxes are ties of sorts), but the core of the idea is already understood by an overwhelming majority in concept if not by name.
  - dragonwriter 10y ago
    Condorcet methods are more like a particular method of choosing the winner of a round-robin tournament; they don't really map naturally to a single-elimination tournament. Of course, if you assume consistent relative performance, then any single winner tournament that you construct among the candidates in a Condorcet election would choose the Condorcet winner of one exists, and some member of the Smith set in any case (though different initial bracket structure can choose different Smith set members in the absence of a Condorcet winner.)
- dragonwriter 10y ago
  Simplicity for voters is one example concern, but administrative/tallying simplicity is important for large elections with potentials for challenges of election counts and gear, and the potential need to fallback to humans in a distributed network of locations tallying votes. A method which is summable for k=1 is good for this, one which is summable for some k>1 is less good, and a nonsummable method (like IRV) is, to me, unacceptable. [0] [0] http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Summability_criterion http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Summability_criterion
  - lambertsimnel 10y ago
    Is that a problem in practice, though? If I were conducting a count under a cardinal voting system (such as range voting or approval voting) I would count one candidate after another. This would really slow down a count involving a large number of candidates, which is bad for a system aiming to increase voter choice. However, under IRV/RCV I would literally put the ballot papers in piles (one for each candidate) and count each pile. It's possible (and, I believe, typical) that less counting is required under IRV/RCV than under any of the other voting systems mentioned on the page you linked to (with the exception of plurality voting).

albinofrenchy 10y ago

While I think the argument that voters won't understand how winners are chosen for IRV is a bit overstated, I think it'd be completely true with the Schulze method -- its safe to say that the average voter doesn't have a strong understanding of graph theory. Which isn't to say it isn't a good system; but its definitely a draw back. Supporting IRV seems like a good first step in which we don't let perfect be the enemy of good.

bradbeattie 10y ago
Barring edge cases, Condorcet methods can be described like single-elimination tournaments which pretty much everyone is familiar with. Yes, graph theory comes into play for tie breaking (assuming we can agree that cyclic Condorcet paradoxes are ties of sorts), but the core of the idea is already understood by an overwhelming majority in concept if not by name.
- dragonwriter 10y ago
  Condorcet methods are more like a particular method of choosing the winner of a round-robin tournament; they don't really map naturally to a single-elimination tournament. Of course, if you assume consistent relative performance, then any single winner tournament that you construct among the candidates in a Condorcet election would choose the Condorcet winner of one exists, and some member of the Smith set in any case (though different initial bracket structure can choose different Smith set members in the absence of a Condorcet winner.)
dragonwriter 10y ago
Simplicity for voters is one example concern, but administrative/tallying simplicity is important for large elections with potentials for challenges of election counts and gear, and the potential need to fallback to humans in a distributed network of locations tallying votes. A method which is summable for k=1 is good for this, one which is summable for some k>1 is less good, and a nonsummable method (like IRV) is, to me, unacceptable. [0] [0] http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Summability_criterion http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Summability_criterion
- lambertsimnel 10y ago
  Is that a problem in practice, though? If I were conducting a count under a cardinal voting system (such as range voting or approval voting) I would count one candidate after another. This would really slow down a count involving a large number of candidates, which is bad for a system aiming to increase voter choice. However, under IRV/RCV I would literally put the ballot papers in piles (one for each candidate) and count each pile. It's possible (and, I believe, typical) that less counting is required under IRV/RCV than under any of the other voting systems mentioned on the page you linked to (with the exception of plurality voting).