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Would someone explain the counterpoint that this will, "further disenfranchise voters by using the recounted ballots of the loser to determine the winner"? I ca

Would someone explain the counterpoint that this will, "further disenfranchise voters by using the recounted ballots of the loser to determine the winner"? I can't understand how counting voter's second and third choices until a majority agree on a candidate could be seen as disenfranchisement.

stanleydrew 10y ago
I'm not sure it can be explained. To borrow a phrase from economics, moving to instant runoff has always seemed Pareto efficient to me. Which would mean that there are no possible counterpoints.
- zeroer 10y ago
  It's definitely not Pareto efficient. If you're a member of the party establishment in one of the big two parties of a system, you stand to lose a lot by moving to an instant runoff and nothing to gain. Unfortunately, most of the power to change the voting system is in the hands of these kinds of people, so it's going to be pretty hard to change it. Kind of a Catch-22.
  - stanleydrew 10y ago
    Why are we considering the preferences of the parties? We're talking about the most efficient way to allow the electorate to express its representational preferences. I understand that things get a bit muddled because the individual representatives are also members of the electorate, and thus they may have warped incentives relative to the vast majority. But they are such a small fraction of the overall electorate that we should be able to ignore them in any kind of efficiency discussion.
    - cbr 10y ago
      "Pareto efficiency" is a very strong claim, and it's invalidated by any single individual doing worse.
      - stanleydrew 10y ago
        You seem to be missing the point. Or perhaps we are talking about two different things? I am talking about the efficiency of the voting system itself, and its ability to express the preferences of the electorate. Note that I'm not talking about changes related to the election outcomes that such a shift in voting systems would potentially cause.
    - zeroer 10y ago
      > Why are we considering the preferences of the parties? I mentioned it because you said something about Pareto efficiency, and moving to instant runoff would not be Pareto efficient because some people (the parties are made up of people, remember) would be worse off. Declaring something Pareto efficient has a specific meaning, and it applies to all people, not all the people that stanleydrew thinks are important. Though it's a comparatively small number of people, it's not some weird edge case that can be discounted. Rather, these are precisely the best people to convince to get the law changed. Note well that even this story in Maine, the measure was passed by ballot initiative, not by a legislature vote.
      - stanleydrew 10y ago
        I wrote this in a sibling reply, but I'll post it here too. Perhaps we are talking about two different things? I am talking about the efficiency of the voting system itself, and its ability to express the preferences of the electorate. Note that I'm not talking about changes related to the election outcomes that such a shift in voting systems would potentially cause. Put another way, it would seem to be efficient to move to any voting system that would allow a voter to express more preferences than just one, since then we're getting strictly more information.
    - r00fus 10y ago
      The same reason we care about the rights of multinational corporations when it comes to voting on things that concern them - they have lots of entrenched power and/or money so ignoring them is unwise and unrealistic.
- bandrami 10y ago
  Arrow's theorem[1] demonstrates that no voting system can be "efficient" in the normal sense of the word. That is, no voting system can guarantee: 1. If every voter prefers A over B, the electorate prefers A over B 2. If no voter changes preference between A and B, the electorate's preference of A and B is unchanged 3. No single voter can always change the electorate's preference [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theore...
  - VodkaHaze 10y ago
    That's a bad argument to make, though, because nothing about Arrow's theorem says how much the criteria will be broken, only that they can't be fully satisfied. Moreover, it doesn't apply to "range voting" methods (cardinal information-based voting systems). See here: https://www.reddit.com/r/badeconomics/comments/5a9a1b/arrows_impossibility_theorem_implies_there_is_no/ https://www.reddit.com/r/badeconomics/comments/5a9a1b/arrows...
  - wutbrodo 10y ago
    That's a different issue from what the parent comment is talking about. He's not saying that IRV will be fully efficient, but that the switch itself will be Pareto efficient (which means that each entity is better off, or the same). This actually isn't true, because major party candidates will be worse off, but I think he meant something like Hicks-Kaldor efficient, or positive sum.
    - stanleydrew 10y ago
      Yes, I wasn't claiming that there is a perfect voting system. Just that IRV seems strictly better for pretty much all voters than FPTP. I am also seeing several comments that try to take into account the preferences of the candidates themselves, or their parties. Why? Aren't we talking about efficiency from the perspective of the electorate? To the extent that the candidates are themselves members of the electorate, and can vote for themselves, shouldn't we ignore them in this analysis because their preferences are inherently biased?
tehwalrus 10y ago
Have a look at how the UK's 2011 referendum was fought. The No campaign frequently made the charge that people who voted for marginal parties (their example was usually the far right BNP) have votes which "count twice" because the votes must be recounted/resorted. (We still use paper ballots). The referendum was roundly rejected.
- domador 10y ago
  Don't first-preference votes count twice as well, since they're counted in the first round, and also in the second round?
  - kylestlb 10y ago
    Any vote that makes it to another round of counting is 'counted twice', yes?
  - Flimm 10y ago
    Yes, you're correct.
  - tehwalrus 10y ago
    That is why the argument made me so angry at the time- unfortunately, while the UK has law making it criminal to lie about your opponent in an election[1], there is no equivalent for slandering a concept (or institution like the EU) in a referendum. [1] slander raised to a criminal offence, punished by forced resignation from the office you won by deceit, and prohibition of standing again for some years.
microcolonel 10y ago
The party which can afford a larger number of candidates will be at an advantage, because if they don't catch the primary vote they (almost certainly) get the secondary, the tertiary, the quaternary, etc.

stanleydrew 10y ago

I'm not sure it can be explained. To borrow a phrase from economics, moving to instant runoff has always seemed Pareto efficient to me. Which would mean that there are no possible counterpoints.

zeroer 10y ago
It's definitely not Pareto efficient. If you're a member of the party establishment in one of the big two parties of a system, you stand to lose a lot by moving to an instant runoff and nothing to gain. Unfortunately, most of the power to change the voting system is in the hands of these kinds of people, so it's going to be pretty hard to change it. Kind of a Catch-22.
- stanleydrew 10y ago
  Why are we considering the preferences of the parties? We're talking about the most efficient way to allow the electorate to express its representational preferences. I understand that things get a bit muddled because the individual representatives are also members of the electorate, and thus they may have warped incentives relative to the vast majority. But they are such a small fraction of the overall electorate that we should be able to ignore them in any kind of efficiency discussion.
  - cbr 10y ago
    "Pareto efficiency" is a very strong claim, and it's invalidated by any single individual doing worse.
    - stanleydrew 10y ago
      You seem to be missing the point. Or perhaps we are talking about two different things? I am talking about the efficiency of the voting system itself, and its ability to express the preferences of the electorate. Note that I'm not talking about changes related to the election outcomes that such a shift in voting systems would potentially cause.
  - zeroer 10y ago
    > Why are we considering the preferences of the parties? I mentioned it because you said something about Pareto efficiency, and moving to instant runoff would not be Pareto efficient because some people (the parties are made up of people, remember) would be worse off. Declaring something Pareto efficient has a specific meaning, and it applies to all people, not all the people that stanleydrew thinks are important. Though it's a comparatively small number of people, it's not some weird edge case that can be discounted. Rather, these are precisely the best people to convince to get the law changed. Note well that even this story in Maine, the measure was passed by ballot initiative, not by a legislature vote.
    - stanleydrew 10y ago
      I wrote this in a sibling reply, but I'll post it here too. Perhaps we are talking about two different things? I am talking about the efficiency of the voting system itself, and its ability to express the preferences of the electorate. Note that I'm not talking about changes related to the election outcomes that such a shift in voting systems would potentially cause. Put another way, it would seem to be efficient to move to any voting system that would allow a voter to express more preferences than just one, since then we're getting strictly more information.
  - r00fus 10y ago
    The same reason we care about the rights of multinational corporations when it comes to voting on things that concern them - they have lots of entrenched power and/or money so ignoring them is unwise and unrealistic.
bandrami 10y ago
Arrow's theorem[1] demonstrates that no voting system can be "efficient" in the normal sense of the word. That is, no voting system can guarantee: 1. If every voter prefers A over B, the electorate prefers A over B 2. If no voter changes preference between A and B, the electorate's preference of A and B is unchanged 3. No single voter can always change the electorate's preference [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theore...
- VodkaHaze 10y ago
  That's a bad argument to make, though, because nothing about Arrow's theorem says how much the criteria will be broken, only that they can't be fully satisfied. Moreover, it doesn't apply to "range voting" methods (cardinal information-based voting systems). See here: https://www.reddit.com/r/badeconomics/comments/5a9a1b/arrows_impossibility_theorem_implies_there_is_no/ https://www.reddit.com/r/badeconomics/comments/5a9a1b/arrows...
- wutbrodo 10y ago
  That's a different issue from what the parent comment is talking about. He's not saying that IRV will be fully efficient, but that the switch itself will be Pareto efficient (which means that each entity is better off, or the same). This actually isn't true, because major party candidates will be worse off, but I think he meant something like Hicks-Kaldor efficient, or positive sum.
  - stanleydrew 10y ago
    Yes, I wasn't claiming that there is a perfect voting system. Just that IRV seems strictly better for pretty much all voters than FPTP. I am also seeing several comments that try to take into account the preferences of the candidates themselves, or their parties. Why? Aren't we talking about efficiency from the perspective of the electorate? To the extent that the candidates are themselves members of the electorate, and can vote for themselves, shouldn't we ignore them in this analysis because their preferences are inherently biased?

tehwalrus 10y ago

Have a look at how the UK's 2011 referendum was fought. The No campaign frequently made the charge that people who voted for marginal parties (their example was usually the far right BNP) have votes which "count twice" because the votes must be recounted/resorted. (We still use paper ballots). The referendum was roundly rejected.

domador 10y ago
Don't first-preference votes count twice as well, since they're counted in the first round, and also in the second round?
- kylestlb 10y ago
  Any vote that makes it to another round of counting is 'counted twice', yes?
- Flimm 10y ago
  Yes, you're correct.
- tehwalrus 10y ago
  That is why the argument made me so angry at the time- unfortunately, while the UK has law making it criminal to lie about your opponent in an election[1], there is no equivalent for slandering a concept (or institution like the EU) in a referendum. [1] slander raised to a criminal offence, punished by forced resignation from the office you won by deceit, and prohibition of standing again for some years.

microcolonel 10y ago

The party which can afford a larger number of candidates will be at an advantage, because if they don't catch the primary vote they (almost certainly) get the secondary, the tertiary, the quaternary, etc.