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It's a realistic stance. What's possible or achievable is not what's commonly done. Even companies that know better or have staff often don't care enough to app
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
It's a realistic stance. What's possible or achievable is not what's commonly done. Even companies that know better or have staff often don't care enough to apply it. Malware with keyloggers and search functions hit computers regularly. The expectation should be, "If it's connected to Internet, treat it like it's public."
It's why quite a few organizations still used air gapped systems, link/IP encryption between locations, and private, leased lines. A smaller number use more secure or just obscure endpoints that can't execute the programs malware authors write. You don't read about such people in the news getting hit by malware or hackers. They can be hit, esp by high-strength attackers, but it's just rare because they don't trust the Internet, Windows, etc in how they do IT.
- cm2187 10y agoThis is such a statement of failure of the IT industry as a whole. And I think it's right. None of the large OS are fit for purpose. And it's about time that regulators start protecting unsuspecting consumers from unscrupulous incompetent fly-by-night developpers like the ones behind this website.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoI wrote a quick rundown of it on Schneier's blog discussing liability: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/09/an_interesting.html#c595111 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/09/an_interestin... Idea being we just combine the right features, often standardized in libraries, with the most cost-effective of assurance activities proven to work. I gave a list of the latter to pick and choose from in another discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10734477 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10734477 Cleanroom methodology with safer languages with test-case generation, battle-tested libraries for common risk areas (esp web attacks or crypto), automation of parsing/protocol handling, static analysis to eliminate common issues, and basic code review would knock out vast majority of code-injections.
- wepple 10y agoI think I mostly agree with what you're saying. I'm under no illusion that things can actually be secured; I don't own a single device that I'm not even slightly suspicious is running malicious code or otherwise leaking information I'm not aware of. Whether by negligence or purely the asynchronous nature of attack. But is it productive for us to declare everything unsafe and somewhat give up believing we can build and use safe platforms? I think there's a balance somewhere. I (to give a rather crude example, apologies) would never take a nude photograph of my partner on a digital camera because it's an unacceptable risk. But I'll share fairly personal thoughts knowing that they may come back to embarass me one day. I want to put the pressure on companies who make such bold claims about their "military grade encryption" to face bankruptcy and shame when it's proven they're full of lies and negligence; if we just assume everything can be attacked with an LFI, it seems we've stopped caring about trying. Caveat: I still haven't had breakfast, I don't have my best thinking cap on right now, but that's my gut instinct.
- nickpsecurity 10y ago"But is it productive for us to declare everything unsafe and somewhat give up believing we can build and use safe platforms?" There's the problem: we. We might be able to do it with time and money. Most startups, publicly-traded companies, regular companies, government groups (esp w/ legacy systems), and IOT makers aiming for max cost-cutting won't do it. Most don't know how but won't make the sacrifices even if they learn. Their incentives plus demand-side tell them not to. So, no reason to think they'll do it any time soon past marginal improvements for public relations. What can happen is people forming organizations idealogically and/or by charter committed to puting quality/security over highest-margins in their products or services. Look up Praxis Correct-by-Construction for an example who charges 50% premium for software they warranty for quality. Secure64 sells DNS with ultra-hardened OS. GENU builds on OpenBSD. Green Hills has INTEGRITY-178B. OK Labs (now GD) put microvisor in a billion phones. There's some others but really niche and still successful where well-marketed. We could see more of that. Only problem is they fight an uphill battle since they're expected to include a pile of insecure features and protocols in lots of products. And, despite maximum quality, at same price or cheaper than competition! What could go wrong in such an IT market?!