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How is this different than every other instance of signing for verification? Are you opposed to package managers, publicly posted hashes, GPG, and even TLS work
by boomboomsubban 10y ago
How is this different than every other instance of signing for verification? Are you opposed to package managers, publicly posted hashes, GPG, and even TLS works with the same method. What about it verifying the operating system makes it more prone to being misused?
- vilhelm_s 10y agoThe problem is who uses it. A packet manager is installed by the user of the system. It's protecting against attackers elsewhere on the internet tricking the user into installing malware. The "secure boot" is installed by the manufacturer before selling the computer. It's "protecting" the computer against running the software that the user wants. One of them gives users more control over what programs they run, the other gives them less.
- boomboomsubban 10y agoIt's protecting users from running unsigned operating systems on their computer, protecting the user from a malicious operating system having full access to their computer. You're arguing against the implementation, which both the author and I agree is flawed, where hardware manufacturers are the only ones regularly controlling keys.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- MertsA 10y agoThat just isn't true, especially on x86. I can and have loaded my own keys and made secure boot validate against my keys to force it to only run what I wanted it to. The standard actually mandates this so it's pretty disingenuous to state that secure boot on a computer prevents the user from running whatever software they want to. The user is always free to control secureboot except for on windows phones, you might have a point about it being a bad thing for mobile.
- mindslight 10y agoPlease read my above comments more carefully. Secure boot on x86 (amd64) is deliberately crippled to avoid anti-trust scrutiny.
- MertsA 10y agoSo they deliberately made it so that the end user has control over their own computer to avoid looking evil! How dastardly of them. Either way, right now Secure Boot gives me more control over what runs on my computer, that's a fact.
- mindslight 10y agoIt's not the usage of the mechanism itself, but how the mechanism is used that mandates specific types of policy. It's a matter of where the trust is anchored: > publicly posted hashes The method you used to retrieve the hash and ... > package managers The method you used to obtain the initial install and ... > GPG The web of trust (how you came to associate a given key with an identity) and ... > TLS As commonly used, the CAs. Which we're presently having a problem with, because the list is too damn fixed. In the case of TLS applied to other protocols (eg openvpn), then the trust lies in how the keys are distributed. And ... The "..." is of course the integrity of your machine. Which, unless you always keep it in your sight, is a big if. A large part of this is what boot image verification is aiming to solve. But to do this, one needs to choose somewhere else to anchor the trust. "Secure Boot" specifies that this trust should be anchored in manufacturer-designated entities using public key signatures. On x64 this this would raise antitrust hackles, so Microsoft mandates (for now) that its primary security property be destroyed, leaving the anchor back to possession/integrity of the machine. What I'm advocating is that this trust anchor could also be something non-trapdoored like a proof of work (or simple waiting time, since we're dealing with trusted hardware). For example, imagine if the specification mandated that all conforming implementations allow changing the keys after waiting in an offline "key provision mode" for a week. The trust root would then be "possession of the hardware for a week" (defeating an evil maid), rather than a fixed set of manufacturer-designated signers.
- boomboomsubban 10y ago>Secure Boot" specifies that this trust should be anchored in manufacturer-designated entities using public key signatures. No, it doesn't. It doesn't specify how the keys should be dealt with at all. The implementation currently has manufacturers controlling that aspect, which the author views as flawed.
- mindslight 10y agoAs long as the trust root consist of public keys and not physical possession of the device, then the manufacturer inherently controls those public keys.
- 10y ago
- comex 10y ago> Are you opposed to package managers, publicly posted hashes, GPG, and even TLS works with the same method. A lot of people are opposed to centralized package managers - not the (desktop) Linux ones, since Linux distros aren't monopolish enough to have political power, but their proprietary equivalents, the Windows Store and Mac App Store (also mobile app stores but that's a bit different). Nothing stops you from installing software from outside the store on Macs (in fact the store's pretty dead), but there's no end of complaints about walled gardens and speculation about an iOS-style lockdown being implemented in the future. Ditto on Windows, but Gabe Newell famously called Windows 8 a catastrophe (and was widely cheered for it) and started a big Linux push, just because Microsoft created a store to compete with his own company's centralized store.