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The author directly addresses this, and hits it dead on with >Most of the unhappiness about Secure Boot is not really about Secure Boot the mechanism – whether
by boomboomsubban 10y ago
The author directly addresses this, and hits it dead on with
>Most of the unhappiness about Secure Boot is not really about Secure Boot the mechanism – whether the people expressing that unhappiness think it is or not – but about specific implementations of Secure Boot in the real world
Maybe the UEFI specification should have implemented a way to distribute keys, though that would have been seen as a way to lock out smaller Linux distros. Maybe the ability to self sign keys should be part of the specs, I'm not sure it isn't, but that adds an additional security risk with fresh hardware.
- mindslight 10y agoTo me, creation and standardization of the capability is evil, even if it takes a further party's decision to cause actual effects. And I see those subsequent decisions as pretty inevitable, given how the market functions. I would draw an analog to surveillance. I have a problem with surveillance itself, even without the surveillance being used to facilitate any bad effects. Even just building the systems normalizes the paradigm and puts us in a precarious situation.
- Hello71 10y agoa more precise analogy might be surveillance cameras. while an argument could be made for their immorality, the vast majority of society accepts at this point that while they can be used for bad (mass surveillance), their uses are varied and beneficial enough that we accept their costs as one of society's.
- mindslight 10y agoWhat benefit [0] does anchoring the trust root to immutable keys [0] have over anchoring the trust root to a non-trapdoored proof of work? [0] Besides to a manufacturer, being able to retain control of hardware they do not own. [1] In a scheme anchored in specific keys, the keys must be immutable to prevent against evil maid.
- boomboomsubban 10y agoHow is this different than every other instance of signing for verification? Are you opposed to package managers, publicly posted hashes, GPG, and even TLS works with the same method. What about it verifying the operating system makes it more prone to being misused?
- vilhelm_s 10y agoThe problem is who uses it. A packet manager is installed by the user of the system. It's protecting against attackers elsewhere on the internet tricking the user into installing malware. The "secure boot" is installed by the manufacturer before selling the computer. It's "protecting" the computer against running the software that the user wants. One of them gives users more control over what programs they run, the other gives them less.
- boomboomsubban 10y agoIt's protecting users from running unsigned operating systems on their computer, protecting the user from a malicious operating system having full access to their computer. You're arguing against the implementation, which both the author and I agree is flawed, where hardware manufacturers are the only ones regularly controlling keys.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- MertsA 10y agoThat just isn't true, especially on x86. I can and have loaded my own keys and made secure boot validate against my keys to force it to only run what I wanted it to. The standard actually mandates this so it's pretty disingenuous to state that secure boot on a computer prevents the user from running whatever software they want to. The user is always free to control secureboot except for on windows phones, you might have a point about it being a bad thing for mobile.
- mindslight 10y ago