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> And no, Secure Boot itself is not evil. I am entirely comfortable stating this as a fact, and you should be too, unless you think GPG is evil Actually no, se
by mindslight 10y ago
> And no, Secure Boot itself is not evil. I am entirely comfortable stating this as a fact, and you should be too, unless you think GPG is evil
Actually no, secure boot is evil, and comparing it to GPG is fallacious. The objection isn't to code signatures in general, but the inevitability of baked-in privileged keys inherent in its design. Calling it just an impartial mechanism is flat out naive, and the author even goes on to describe why:
> But it’s worth noting it’s no more bad or wrong than most other major ARM platforms. Apple locks down the bootloader on all iDevices, and most Android devices also ship with locked bootloaders.
While Microsoft exempts x64 hardware because they're concerned about further anti-trust action, the ARM ecosystem actually demonstrates the end result. By providing these companies the capability to lock things down, they inevitably will use it to enforce their inherent authoritarianism onto their customers. The majority of their customers will not care, accepting the age-old excuses for authoritarianism like "security". But capturing a pragmatic majority does not make something right, as apparent to anybody who struggled due to Microsoft's monopoly in its heyday.
A freedom-preserving boot verification specification is definitely possible. In such, there must be no privileged key that cannot be disabled or augmented. Microsoft's x64 requirements do fulfill this, but as a result cause the system to fall to evil maid attacks. However, evil maid attacks can be prevented by incorporating an open-to-all proof-of-work / timed-lockout scheme. The core specification must incorporate this type of non-privileging scheme as a required element, to preempt any contractual requirements like Microsoft's.
- NeutronBoy 10y ago> Actually no, secure boot is evil, and comparing it to GPG is fallacious. The objection isn't to code signatures in general, but the inevitability of baked-in privileged keys inherent in its design. I mean, both my desktop and laptop have extensive BIOS options for key management - including removing the initial keys and loading your own.
- mindslight 10y agoYes, and this is actually encouraged by Microsoft to avoid anti-trust action. As I said, take a look at ARM for what an actual locked-down ecosystem looks like. Manufacturers inherently want to lock stuff down (for one, they sell more devices when someone wants to try out a new OS), but functionality being called a "standard" should actually be accessible to device purchasers.
- johncolanduoni 10y agoDo you think their reaction to not having a standardized version would be "aw shucks, I guess we totally won't go with our own proprietary version then!"
- mindslight 10y agoIf markets were perfectly efficient, then we wouldn't be having this conversation. In reality defaults matter, whether for a manufacturer following a standard or a consumer buying an off the shelf PC.
- boomboomsubban 10y agoThe author directly addresses this, and hits it dead on with >Most of the unhappiness about Secure Boot is not really about Secure Boot the mechanism – whether the people expressing that unhappiness think it is or not – but about specific implementations of Secure Boot in the real world Maybe the UEFI specification should have implemented a way to distribute keys, though that would have been seen as a way to lock out smaller Linux distros. Maybe the ability to self sign keys should be part of the specs, I'm not sure it isn't, but that adds an additional security risk with fresh hardware.
- mindslight 10y agoTo me, creation and standardization of the capability is evil, even if it takes a further party's decision to cause actual effects. And I see those subsequent decisions as pretty inevitable, given how the market functions. I would draw an analog to surveillance. I have a problem with surveillance itself, even without the surveillance being used to facilitate any bad effects. Even just building the systems normalizes the paradigm and puts us in a precarious situation.
- Hello71 10y agoa more precise analogy might be surveillance cameras. while an argument could be made for their immorality, the vast majority of society accepts at this point that while they can be used for bad (mass surveillance), their uses are varied and beneficial enough that we accept their costs as one of society's.
- mindslight 10y agoWhat benefit [0] does anchoring the trust root to immutable keys [0] have over anchoring the trust root to a non-trapdoored proof of work? [0] Besides to a manufacturer, being able to retain control of hardware they do not own. [1] In a scheme anchored in specific keys, the keys must be immutable to prevent against evil maid.
- boomboomsubban 10y ago
- Cyph0n 10y agoMaybe it's evil in consumer devices, but secure boot is very effective when you don't want people to tamper with your hardware, e.g., preventing counterfeit commercial-grade routers from entering the market. Cisco for example is facing a HUGE problem with counterfeits and is looking at secure boot as a potential solution. I'm not affiliated with Cisco, but I did attend a talk by one of their researchers at Georgia Tech.
- mindslight 10y agoSecure boot solves the opposite problem from counterfeit hardware. If you make the hardware, you can insert whatever signing key you'd like - including Cisco's. This argument demonstrates why architecture is so insidious. Yes, "Secure Boot" solves real problems. As I said, these problems can be solved through similar functionality that does not anchor the trust root to private keys. But now that Microsoft (et al) have promulgated their naive fully-trusted-publisher implementations, we're left having to dispel the primacy of "keys" in the first place.
- Cyph0n 10y agoI don't understand your point. You cannot "insert" Cisco's signing key into your own hardware because 1) the device does not possess it, and 2) only Cisco (ideally) has access to its signing key. If you instead mean that you can build your own custom hardware that mimics the functionality of Cisco's TPM and uses another key pair for signing boot code, then I give you a pat on the back for the accomplishment.
- mindslight 10y agoSorry, by "signing key" I meant "public part of the signing key", which is what is used for verification. Counterfeit hardware can also just ignore signatures on binaries. Presumably Cisco is really talking about using trusted hardware to preserve secrecy of their binaries (as the march of software eats their custom hardware, too). Which as I said, is possible to do without privileging specific signing keys.
- mwfunk 10y agoI can see why you as a consumer might not want hardware that you can't install custom software on. I can see why it might not be the best solution for legitimate non-nefarious engineering problems as well. What I've never related to, however, is the application of a moral dimension to someone selling such a thing. I'm all in favor of pragmatic arguments for openness and hackability for the sake of good engineering, transparency, generosity, customer expectations, etc. Those are all good things. I've never gotten the sense that the absence of those things are necessarily evil, however. You clearly do, based on your choice of words. Maybe that's the difference between the (for lack of a better term) BSD philosophy vs. RMS. The BSD (permissive?) philosophy seems rooted in the sense that sharing is a virtue, and not sharing is neutral (not necessarily evil). RMS' philosophy has always felt like, sharing is neutral, and not sharing is evil. It's a gross generalization, but copyleft vs. permissive reminds me of western vs. eastern religions. The FSF philosophy is defined by a large number of very strict thou shalt nots, defined as carefully and precisely as possible. Permissive licenses like BSD/MIT/Artistic/Apache/etc. are defined by their lack of conditions, which usually just amount to "do whatever you want, but you can't sue the author". Similarly, one of the ways western vs. eastern religions (from the outside looking in, at least) feel different is the focus on not being evil, by being aware of all of the behavioral laws you shouldn't violate, vs. the focus on trying to attain enlightenment by trying to elevate yourself. Stamping out bad behavior vs. encouraging good behavior. I see the merits of both, but for whatever reason the latter has always been much more relatable for me. I wonder if an individual's preference of copyleft vs. permissive is correlated with whether they think humans are inherently evil, vs. humans being inherently good or neutral. As cynical and pessimistic as I feel about humanity sometimes, deep down I do have a conviction that people are inherently good. It might be naive but I've never been able to totally shake it.
- krylon 10y ago> "do whatever you want, but you can't sue the author" Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law, but thou shalt not sue me! ;-) SCNR!
- mindslight 10y ago> Maybe that's the difference between the (for lack of a better term) BSD philosophy vs. RMS I like your characterization of this, but keep in mind you're proceeding to apply a moral dimension here ;) > I wonder if an individual's preference of copyleft vs. permissive is correlated with whether they think humans are inherently evil, vs. humans being inherently good or neutral. As cynical and pessimistic as I feel about humanity sometimes, deep down I do have a conviction that people are inherently good. Most people have an internal narrative whereby they are doing good, yet we still get emergent evil behavior. I tend to look at good/evil in terms of describing constructive end results, rather than as intent behind individual actions. Pragmatically, I'm seeing an awful lot of Free software that has been locked down through one scheme or another, making it non-Free for its end users. Since the intention of at least some of this software was to be Free for end users, I'd say nullifying that goal is moving in an evil direction. While fewer restrictions is indeed "simpler", such a regime isn't necessarily sufficient to achieve certain goals. When something is existentially defined as "base primitives", complexity will build on top of it to undermine the goals that fostered the axioms. Only by defining universal quantifications on behavior can specific qualities be preserved through time.