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It's an interesting problem! There's a lot of pieces that are equally strong "personal identifiers" to a phone number, including your carrier tying your IP addr
by tonyarkles 10y ago
It's an interesting problem! There's a lot of pieces that are equally strong "personal identifiers" to a phone number, including your carrier tying your IP address to your IMSI. Add to that, if both parties of the communication are under surveillance, there's going to be strong time correlations.
You're describing a very different use case than what I use Signal for (discussing things that could be harmful for clients if it got out, not things where I'd want repudiation).
I think my use case is relatively well solved, but I'd be super curious to see how algorithms could be changed to solve yours.
- Asooka 10y agoMine was solved decades ago when I was allowed to just make an account with an e-mail and create any number of pseudonymous accounts. This allows me things like to have a personal and work account, and not leak information between different identities. And, most importantly, it lets me talk to someone without having first to reveal my real-world identity. With Signal, I have to already know that person and trust them with my phone number. It's not really state surveillance, it's the fact that what used to be private information I only shared with close friends now has to be public and told to every random person online I want to chat with. Just.. just let me make an account tied to an e-mail or to my google profile or anything but my phone number. The entire thing creeps me out.