4 ms·

Signal is atrocious for security. You literally log in with your phone number. Anything you send is directly and irrevocably tied with your physical identity. W

by Asooka 10y ago

Signal is atrocious for security. You literally log in with your phone number. Anything you send is directly and irrevocably tied with your physical identity. What good is to me that the messages are encrypted? When the police come knocking, either I'll decrypt them, they'll beat me until I decrypt them, or I'll die in prison for not decrypting them. I do want my messages encrypted, but more than that I really want them not tied to ME.

tonyarkles 10y ago
It's an interesting problem! There's a lot of pieces that are equally strong "personal identifiers" to a phone number, including your carrier tying your IP address to your IMSI. Add to that, if both parties of the communication are under surveillance, there's going to be strong time correlations. You're describing a very different use case than what I use Signal for (discussing things that could be harmful for clients if it got out, not things where I'd want repudiation). I think my use case is relatively well solved, but I'd be super curious to see how algorithms could be changed to solve yours.
- Asooka 10y ago
  Mine was solved decades ago when I was allowed to just make an account with an e-mail and create any number of pseudonymous accounts. This allows me things like to have a personal and work account, and not leak information between different identities. And, most importantly, it lets me talk to someone without having first to reveal my real-world identity. With Signal, I have to already know that person and trust them with my phone number. It's not really state surveillance, it's the fact that what used to be private information I only shared with close friends now has to be public and told to every random person online I want to chat with. Just.. just let me make an account tied to an e-mail or to my google profile or anything but my phone number. The entire thing creeps me out.
ThrustVectoring 10y ago
Walk to a Target with $200 cash and no electronic devices on you. Buy a prepaid android smart-phone and a pre-paid airtime card, and activate them using said device. Too bad meta-data and social graphs will screw you over anyways. Unless you don't use the device for interacting with people you know, in which case, what's the point?
- sbsdfgsgSFEYRG 10y ago
  Best find a Target you can walk to without being on camera.
  - ThrustVectoring 10y ago
    Depends on your threat model, really.
    - mcbits 10y ago
      If the threat model includes "the police come knocking" and "die in prison" then it's best to assume the phone can be traced back to the store and approximate time it was sold (potentially even the exact time and cash register), and surveillance videos will be searched.
      - nickpsecurity 10y ago
        On top of that, Target has the best video surveillance and most cooperation with police of any large retailer. Their surveillance group even spends a good chunk of its time doing work for various police departments who don't have resources to process the evidence themselves. One should never use a target for anything privacy-related if the police are in the threat model.

by Asooka 10y ago

tonyarkles 10y ago

It's an interesting problem! There's a lot of pieces that are equally strong "personal identifiers" to a phone number, including your carrier tying your IP address to your IMSI. Add to that, if both parties of the communication are under surveillance, there's going to be strong time correlations. You're describing a very different use case than what I use Signal for (discussing things that could be harmful for clients if it got out, not things where I'd want repudiation). I think my use case is relatively well solved, but I'd be super curious to see how algorithms could be changed to solve yours.

Asooka 10y ago
Mine was solved decades ago when I was allowed to just make an account with an e-mail and create any number of pseudonymous accounts. This allows me things like to have a personal and work account, and not leak information between different identities. And, most importantly, it lets me talk to someone without having first to reveal my real-world identity. With Signal, I have to already know that person and trust them with my phone number. It's not really state surveillance, it's the fact that what used to be private information I only shared with close friends now has to be public and told to every random person online I want to chat with. Just.. just let me make an account tied to an e-mail or to my google profile or anything but my phone number. The entire thing creeps me out.

ThrustVectoring 10y ago

Walk to a Target with $200 cash and no electronic devices on you. Buy a prepaid android smart-phone and a pre-paid airtime card, and activate them using said device. Too bad meta-data and social graphs will screw you over anyways. Unless you don't use the device for interacting with people you know, in which case, what's the point?

sbsdfgsgSFEYRG 10y ago
Best find a Target you can walk to without being on camera.
- ThrustVectoring 10y ago
  Depends on your threat model, really.
  - mcbits 10y ago
    If the threat model includes "the police come knocking" and "die in prison" then it's best to assume the phone can be traced back to the store and approximate time it was sold (potentially even the exact time and cash register), and surveillance videos will be searched.
    - nickpsecurity 10y ago
      On top of that, Target has the best video surveillance and most cooperation with police of any large retailer. Their surveillance group even spends a good chunk of its time doing work for various police departments who don't have resources to process the evidence themselves. One should never use a target for anything privacy-related if the police are in the threat model.