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I made this comment on a related thread yesterday[0]: You don't need crypto. You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt that the voter ca
by jedberg 10y ago
I made this comment on a related thread yesterday[0]:
You don't need crypto. You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt that the voter can see but not alter, which then drops into a secure holding area on the machine.
At the end of the day, you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside, making sure the counts and votes match. If they do, then you can be reasonably sure it wasn't tampered with, and if they don't match, then you can hand count all the paper ballots using the old system to verify the computer.
[0]https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12924053 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12924053
- jjoonathan 10y agoHow does this accomplish goals #1 and #2 of TFA?
- jedberg 10y agoWhat do you mean? It meets all six goals: - Be verifiable - you should be able to see your own vote. You can view the print out of your vote before it drops into the secure box. - Be auditable - anyone should be able to tally up the results of the election. Anyone can count the paper ballots - Be secure - it must not leak anyone's vote to anyone else. It's on an unidentified piece of paper - Be genuine - it should be cryptographically impossible to commit voter fraud. Well, you have to rely on standard methods of preventing voter fraud, but since there have only been five cases of proven voter fraud in the history of US elections, it's not really a big deal - Be tamper-proof - it must be impossible to forge results from the inside. Since the paper is in the machine and verified by a human, you can't really tamper with it any more than you can tamper with paper ballots today, and since those or monitored by adversarial groups, it's basically impossible to tamper with them.