5 ms·
Actually I was more referring to the hard work we do to avoid that kind of vulnerabilities by design: http://securitytracker.com/alerts/2010/Apr/1023839.html h
by shin_lao 17y ago
Actually I was more referring to the hard work we do to avoid that kind of vulnerabilities by design:
http://securitytracker.com/alerts/2010/Apr/1023839.html http://securitytracker.com/alerts/2010/Apr/1023839.html
and
http://securitytracker.com/alerts/2009/Apr/1022140.html http://securitytracker.com/alerts/2009/Apr/1022140.html
Everything we do we consider security first and do threat modeling.
All remote connections are done via TLS, we don't cipher the database on the disk but if there is a demand for it we'll add the feature.
We've been extremely thorough to review the code an reduce the possibility for buffer overflows to occur. We use only safe API and validate input thoroughly. Buffers are encapsulated by a class in such a way that unsafe writing is difficult to do.
I'm not claiming we'll never have an exploit, just saying we're doing the best we can to avoid it.
- moe 17y agoI would say those are non-issues in most deployments. Application caches are normally deployed within an isolated, trusted environment. TCP connections from untrusted clients simply don't happen, so hardening is not needed at that level. I'm confused about what use-case you have in mind with this. Is your cache meant to be exposed to the general public, sort of like the things you can do with couchdb?
- shin_lao 17y agoWe want indeed the software to be usable as a high-performance key/value storage system, which is why we think about security.