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Well, I disagree that having keys be trivially verifiable by the voter is a problem. That's a selling point - you can be sure that your vote wasn't altered in-
by paulmd 10y ago
Well, I disagree that having keys be trivially verifiable by the voter is a problem. That's a selling point - you can be sure that your vote wasn't altered in-transit. In fact that's largely the point of the system.
This is a general problem with absentee/mail voting, though, and it's a strong argument. If your boss/spouse/etc is being an asshole there's little to stop them from coercing you to show your paper absentee ballot, marking it in for you, etc. Yes, it's illegal, but what are you going to do about it after your at-will employment is terminated without cause next month? In the privacy of a voting booth, you can vote however you want and nobody will ever know. It's real easy.
I think you can still keep votes secret if you have in-person voting. Just have the secret key never leave the polling place, it's equivalent to collecting the ballot after tabulation (we have paper ballots that are run through a ScanTron machine, we don't get to keep the ballots). You get a printout of the hash values you selected (but not the key) and can validate that the hash exists on the blockchain afterwards (signed by the polling place's private key), but there's no proof as to what the particular hash values actually indicated.
Really though you have to trust that people will treat their electronic ballot with just as much import as their paper ballot. I don't think an electronic works without some kind of secret key/token.
- eridius 10y agoIf you haven't seen it, Spivak's other comment explains why you don't want voters to be able to verify their vote later (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12923958 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12923958).
- paulmd 10y agoI don't think you actually read my comment. His point is fully responded to.