3 ms·
You don't need crypto. You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt that the voter can see but not alter, which then drops into a secure ho
by jedberg 10y ago
You don't need crypto. You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt that the voter can see but not alter, which then drops into a secure holding area on the machine.
At the end of the day, you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside, making sure the counts and votes match. If they do, then you can be reasonably sure it wasn't tampered with, and if they don't match, then you can hand count all the paper ballots using the old system to verify the computer.
- razakel 10y ago>At the end of the day, you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside, making sure the counts and votes match. If they do, then you can be reasonably sure it wasn't tampered with, and if they don't match, then you can hand count all the paper ballots using the old system to verify the computer. If you're working on the assumption that there's a possibility that the machines may have been tampered with, does it not stand to follow that the procedures for redress may also have been?
- jedberg 10y agoNot really. We all know it's easy to tamper with an electronic system, which is why we don't trust them. It's a lot harder to tamper with a paper and pen system where many people are involved. To many people to rat you out, too many people to have to all do the right thing at the right time, etc.
- specialist 10y ago"You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt..." Why? Because marking a ballot is the challenge? How about we simplify ballots?
- jedberg 10y agoSo that the human who voted can verify it is correct and the person who might have to hand count it can read it.
- specialist 10y ago"...you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside..." The Election Verification Network has studied the auditing of elections exhaustively. Their conclusion: Expensive, approaching the costs of a full recount, and doesn't increase the certainty of the results. https://electionverification.org https://electionverification.org The correct answer (gold standard) remains precinct-based paper ballots tabulated on site when the polls close.