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> The perfect system would be way more trustworthy than backroom hand counting by party insiders where the only metric to try to avoid corruption is to have two

by taejo 10y ago

> The perfect system would be way more trustworthy than backroom hand counting by party insiders where the only metric to try to avoid corruption is to have two parties counting at the same time. I studied cryptography, and it's hard for me to imagine a cryptographic proof I'd trust more than that system; it's almost impossible for me to imagine an implementation that I'd trust as much. Most people have never studied cryptography, and will never trust a cryptographic proof at all.

jedberg 10y ago
You don't need crypto. You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt that the voter can see but not alter, which then drops into a secure holding area on the machine. At the end of the day, you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside, making sure the counts and votes match. If they do, then you can be reasonably sure it wasn't tampered with, and if they don't match, then you can hand count all the paper ballots using the old system to verify the computer.
- razakel 10y ago
  >At the end of the day, you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside, making sure the counts and votes match. If they do, then you can be reasonably sure it wasn't tampered with, and if they don't match, then you can hand count all the paper ballots using the old system to verify the computer. If you're working on the assumption that there's a possibility that the machines may have been tampered with, does it not stand to follow that the procedures for redress may also have been?
  - jedberg 10y ago
    Not really. We all know it's easy to tamper with an electronic system, which is why we don't trust them. It's a lot harder to tamper with a paper and pen system where many people are involved. To many people to rat you out, too many people to have to all do the right thing at the right time, etc.
- specialist 10y ago
  "You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt..." Why? Because marking a ballot is the challenge? How about we simplify ballots?
  - jedberg 10y ago
    So that the human who voted can verify it is correct and the person who might have to hand count it can read it.
- specialist 10y ago
  "...you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside..." The Election Verification Network has studied the auditing of elections exhaustively. Their conclusion: Expensive, approaching the costs of a full recount, and doesn't increase the certainty of the results. https://electionverification.org https://electionverification.org The correct answer (gold standard) remains precinct-based paper ballots tabulated on site when the polls close.
specialist 10y ago
"I studied cryptography..." I studied a few of the crypto voting systems a while back. TLDR: For real world elections, they leak information. Meaning they don't protect the secret ballot. Each system I studied relies on a hash collision to hide your ballot in the herd of ballots. Alas, our precincts are too small and our ballots to complex (too many choices, meaning too many combinations, meaning too much information) so the trick doesn't work. Heck, it often doesn't now with mail ballot processing. For comparison, when using paper ballots, dropping the ballot into the ballot box is the secure one-way hash that separates you from your ballot. Because it's physical, poll site based can also ensure the chain of custody, which is also not possible with electronic voting or tabulating.
specialist 10y ago
"...it's almost impossible for me to imagine an implementation that I'd trust as much." Further, who would provide that implementation? A vendor. Our election administration is increasingly outsourced (privatized). Using crypto would be the final nail in the coffin of public, citizen administered elections.

by taejo 10y ago

jedberg 10y ago

You don't need crypto. You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt that the voter can see but not alter, which then drops into a secure holding area on the machine. At the end of the day, you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside, making sure the counts and votes match. If they do, then you can be reasonably sure it wasn't tampered with, and if they don't match, then you can hand count all the paper ballots using the old system to verify the computer.

razakel 10y ago
>At the end of the day, you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside, making sure the counts and votes match. If they do, then you can be reasonably sure it wasn't tampered with, and if they don't match, then you can hand count all the paper ballots using the old system to verify the computer. If you're working on the assumption that there's a possibility that the machines may have been tampered with, does it not stand to follow that the procedures for redress may also have been?
- jedberg 10y ago
  Not really. We all know it's easy to tamper with an electronic system, which is why we don't trust them. It's a lot harder to tamper with a paper and pen system where many people are involved. To many people to rat you out, too many people to have to all do the right thing at the right time, etc.
specialist 10y ago
"You just need a machine that prints out a human readable receipt..." Why? Because marking a ballot is the challenge? How about we simplify ballots?
- jedberg 10y ago
  So that the human who voted can verify it is correct and the person who might have to hand count it can read it.
specialist 10y ago
"...you randomly select say 1% of all the machines and hand count all the ballots inside..." The Election Verification Network has studied the auditing of elections exhaustively. Their conclusion: Expensive, approaching the costs of a full recount, and doesn't increase the certainty of the results. https://electionverification.org https://electionverification.org The correct answer (gold standard) remains precinct-based paper ballots tabulated on site when the polls close.

specialist 10y ago

"I studied cryptography..." I studied a few of the crypto voting systems a while back. TLDR: For real world elections, they leak information. Meaning they don't protect the secret ballot. Each system I studied relies on a hash collision to hide your ballot in the herd of ballots. Alas, our precincts are too small and our ballots to complex (too many choices, meaning too many combinations, meaning too much information) so the trick doesn't work. Heck, it often doesn't now with mail ballot processing. For comparison, when using paper ballots, dropping the ballot into the ballot box is the secure one-way hash that separates you from your ballot. Because it's physical, poll site based can also ensure the chain of custody, which is also not possible with electronic voting or tabulating.

specialist 10y ago

"...it's almost impossible for me to imagine an implementation that I'd trust as much." Further, who would provide that implementation? A vendor. Our election administration is increasingly outsourced (privatized). Using crypto would be the final nail in the coffin of public, citizen administered elections.