4 ms·
> Probabilistic protections can be defeated if the information leaks out, but they are still effective and worth doing. What is the argument here? Is there som
by acobster 10y ago
> Probabilistic protections can be defeated if the information leaks out, but they are still effective and worth doing.
What is the argument here? Is there something about this randomization that distinguishes it from classic security through obscurity?
- willvarfar 10y agoExploit mitigation may be all that stops a vulnerability being successfully exploited. Here are some excellent slides on exploit mitigation in general: https://events.yandex.com/events/ruBSD/2013/talks/103/ https://events.yandex.com/events/ruBSD/2013/talks/103/ Of the top of my head there are four approaches to stopping memory vulnerabilities: 1) have no bugs, e.g. formal verification etc 2) use a memory-safe language 3) accept that there can be vulnerabilities, and use exploit mitigation to harden it 4) capability-based addressing as a mitigation (it doesn't solve use-after-free, for example; it relies on software to do that etc) Of these, (3) is the one you can retrofit to existing C/C++ codebases... a route you are usually forced to travel. (There may still be other kinds of bugs, e.g. the obvious sql injections etc; I am talking above about memory bugs specifically)
- acobster 10y agoYeah, makes sense. Thanks for the link.
- commenting 10y agoSecurity through obscurity can be very useful. It just shouldn't be the only thing you rely on to secure your systems.
- acobster 10y agoTotally agree. I just don't know too much about kernel security and wanted to clarify whether this was mitigation via stc or something else.