I have created Alzheimer Password Manager on the same ideas as this one. I believe the better idea is to use also user specific salt per browser. In that case,

I have created Alzheimer Password Manager on the same ideas as this one. I believe the better idea is to use also user specific salt per browser. In that case, the passwords are more unique, and the threat model changes dramatically. Current Threat Model: * No one with an access to the PC with installed extension should be able to authenticate without knowing the correct passphrase. * The same passphrase used in two different web browsers should produce two different passwords (cryptographic salt will solve this problem). * If an attacker obtains password for some websites, she should not be able to derive passwords for another websites using that knowledge. * Attacker should not be able to brute force master passphrase from the salt and knowledge of one password (PBKDF with lots of iterations). * it provides protection against basic keyloggers (but they can read our salt from the memory / file...) https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/alzheimer-password-genera/emclcafdgdeodlhpenmejdapecfgenof https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/alzheimer-password... https://github.com/viralpoetry/password-generator https://github.com/viralpoetry/password-generator