4 ms·
> Presumably you agree that you could replace all the muscles and bones of a bird and it would still fly Well here's the thing, I think I have a problem with t
by GuiA 10y ago
> Presumably you agree that you could replace all the muscles and bones of a bird and it would still fly
Well here's the thing, I think I have a problem with that premise in itself. Theoretically that idea seems easy to agree with. But in practice, has it ever been done? The answer is a resounding no.
Can we make things fly? Of course, but only by being insanely inefficient at it. Humans have never built something like a common swift, which can fly for 10 months without landing (http://phys.org/news/2016-10-ten-months-air.html http://phys.org/news/2016-10-ten-months-air.html).
Can we reach that point one day? Maybe yes, maybe no, I have no clue. But if we are to reach that point, we need to build sound formal models to get there.
Until we have such models for reasoning with things at that scale, I don't think claiming vehemently that these things are 100% known is intellectually honest.
- nkurz 10y agoMaybe yes, maybe no, I have no clue. The question isn't whether we can make an artificial bird now, but whether such a thing is possible in principle. I think logicallee's point is that any answer other than a clear "yes" would require the assumption that there is something fundamentally "unknowable" about the problem, and generally such objections are considered unscientific. Unscientific doesn't mean wrong, of course, but it does weaken the case. So let's go back a step: can we theoretically replace a single bone in a single bird with without affecting its flight performance? I think the answer has to be yes. If so, is there a point at which we can no longer replace successive bones? While it might be a technical challenge, it's difficult to see how there could be a clear line between "flies" and "doesn't fly". Can we replace an individual neuron in a human brain with an electronic equivalent without affecting the perception of pain? The argument is that if one can, what's to prevent replacing all the other neurons in succession? Are certain neurons special and unreplaceable? Again, it's difficult to see that there could be any clear line between "pain" and "no pain". I think the strength and weakness of logicallee's argument is the assumption that it's possible to replace a single neuron with an electronic equivalent without causing any other changes to the system. If one can, it would seem straightforward to argue that machines can feel pain. I think the alternative would require assuming the existence of some "life force" for which we currently have no scientific basis. But if we are to reach that point, we need to build sound formal models to get there. To actually build such a system, probably, but are formal models necessary to reason about the consequences? Maybe, but thought experiments might help us build those models. With that in mind, do you think it's possible to functionally emulate any single neuron in silicon? If not, what's the missing entity? I don't think claiming vehemently that these things are 100% known is intellectually honest. Be gentle with accusations of intellectual honesty. Honesty does not require absolute correctness, only belief. I see no reason to believe that logicallee is overstating his confidence in his logic, which at its base is Occam's Razor. This may be a case where it is better to be "clear and wrong" than "fuzzy and arguably correct". (the article on swifts is great, thanks!)
- GuiA 10y ago> I think logicallee's point is that any answer other than a clear "yes" would require the assumption that there is something fundamentally "unknowable" about the problem, and generally such objections are considered unscientific. Unscientific doesn't mean wrong, of course, but it does weaken the case. My take on it is that anything other than a "we really don't know right now, being able to reason about this question is far beyond our current scientific models" requires a burden of proof that I have not seen matched anywhere (either in logicallee's posts, or in the writings of other "computable consciousness"-ists (don't know if there is a better word for them)). Testable, verifiable models would be what this particular burden of proof calls for for me to be satisfied with a clear "yes" or "no". > Can we replace an individual neuron in a human brain with an electronic equivalent without affecting the perception of pain? The argument is that if one can, what's to prevent replacing all the other neurons in succession? Are certain neurons special and unreplaceable? Again, it's difficult to see that there could be any clear line between "pain" and "no pain". Well, you can easily turn this around - can we remove an individual neuron in a human brain without affecting the perception of pain? We actually know the experimental answer to this one, and it is a resounding yes - in fact, a few of your neurons probably have naturally died since you started reading my post, and your perception of pain (or anything else) most likely hasn't changed. And there are medical cases of people losing significant brain mass and operating in society at a perfectly normal level. This makes it quite hard to build a recursive argument around "if we can substitute one neuron with an electronic equivalent without changes, we can substitute all neurons with electronic equivalents without changes", because that argument would also work with "removing the neuron" instead of "replacing it with an electronic one" (and in fact, if removing a single neuron has no effect on the perception of pain, and replacing a neuron with an electronic one has no effect on the whole either, how does that help you in any way?). The analogy with a bird's bones doesn't quite hold - there are specific bones that we can remove that will completely prevent a bird from flying, and others that will have no effect; modern science gives us a pretty good idea of how a bird's various bones fit in the "enabling flight" hierarchy. This clear and well defined "hierarchy of bones for flying" does not seem to be present in neurons. We might yet establish a clear, systemic hierarchy of neurons one day that lets us explain consciousness rigorously, the same way that we can explain how the different bones and muscles of a bird let it fly! But we are far from it, and there is no certainty about the feasibility of such an endeavor.