4 ms·

Questions about the model are addressed with handwaving such as "use numbers and your head" or "this is obvious and everyone else is wrong"; no existing literat

by GuiA 10y ago

Questions about the model are addressed with handwaving such as "use numbers and your head" or "this is obvious and everyone else is wrong"; no existing literature or prior work is cited; rather, thought experiments that completely evade the points raised by others are built out of thin air. The core point is that qualia emerges out of perception, and therefore that any system that can perceive in a broad sense, even if that perception is merely simulation of perception, will effectively experience consciousness. But there isn't any reference to proven scientific models for any of the parts at play here; posts treat the core premises as ultimate truths and then spin around that. Regarding your mention of your posting history and complaining of ad hominem, this is completely disingenuous given the way you have responded to other posters. If you wish a better response to your future posts, I suggest making your posts shorter, supporting your core points with references to existing work, and not use at all the "everyone but me is wrong" style of discourse.

logicallee 10y ago
if you meant to summarize my ultimate truth via "The core point is that qualia emerges out of perception, and therefore that any system that can perceive in a broad sense, even if that perception is merely simulation of perception, will effectively experience consciousness" then you didn't understand. The ultimate truth or core point is that qualia emerges as an emergent property of what the parts are doing, and if you simulate those parts with enough fidelity consciousness still emerges. Certainly lots of things could perceive without being conscious - a roomba vacuum cleaner for one thing. So this argument about simulating parts -- it's like a fine mechanical watch that tells time: if you simulate it with enough precision the simulation can "tell time" only rather than telling time, the emergent property of the clockwork is "be conscious". you may not get my analogy and that's fine. I'm not here to convince anyone. it's not worth discussing in my opinion. I've given a very explicit model under which I'm wrong. if you disagree with me that's fine.
- nkurz 10y ago
  it's not worth discussing in my opinion. No, I think it's worth discussing. I may not have understood you completely, but I for one appreciated reading your explanation. You may or may not be right, but I thought your exposition was coherent and worth reading. GuiA: Perhaps you could be a little more rigorous yourself. Where in here do you start to disagree: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12878939 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12878939? Presumably you agree that you could replace all the muscles and bones of a bird and it would still fly, but you feel it is not obvious that you could replace all the neurons in a brain and it would still think. Why not? what's different? What's missing?
  - GuiA 10y ago
    > Presumably you agree that you could replace all the muscles and bones of a bird and it would still fly Well here's the thing, I think I have a problem with that premise in itself. Theoretically that idea seems easy to agree with. But in practice, has it ever been done? The answer is a resounding no. Can we make things fly? Of course, but only by being insanely inefficient at it. Humans have never built something like a common swift, which can fly for 10 months without landing (http://phys.org/news/2016-10-ten-months-air.html http://phys.org/news/2016-10-ten-months-air.html). Can we reach that point one day? Maybe yes, maybe no, I have no clue. But if we are to reach that point, we need to build sound formal models to get there. Until we have such models for reasoning with things at that scale, I don't think claiming vehemently that these things are 100% known is intellectually honest.
    - nkurz 10y ago
      Maybe yes, maybe no, I have no clue. The question isn't whether we can make an artificial bird now, but whether such a thing is possible in principle. I think logicallee's point is that any answer other than a clear "yes" would require the assumption that there is something fundamentally "unknowable" about the problem, and generally such objections are considered unscientific. Unscientific doesn't mean wrong, of course, but it does weaken the case. So let's go back a step: can we theoretically replace a single bone in a single bird with without affecting its flight performance? I think the answer has to be yes. If so, is there a point at which we can no longer replace successive bones? While it might be a technical challenge, it's difficult to see how there could be a clear line between "flies" and "doesn't fly". Can we replace an individual neuron in a human brain with an electronic equivalent without affecting the perception of pain? The argument is that if one can, what's to prevent replacing all the other neurons in succession? Are certain neurons special and unreplaceable? Again, it's difficult to see that there could be any clear line between "pain" and "no pain". I think the strength and weakness of logicallee's argument is the assumption that it's possible to replace a single neuron with an electronic equivalent without causing any other changes to the system. If one can, it would seem straightforward to argue that machines can feel pain. I think the alternative would require assuming the existence of some "life force" for which we currently have no scientific basis. But if we are to reach that point, we need to build sound formal models to get there. To actually build such a system, probably, but are formal models necessary to reason about the consequences? Maybe, but thought experiments might help us build those models. With that in mind, do you think it's possible to functionally emulate any single neuron in silicon? If not, what's the missing entity? I don't think claiming vehemently that these things are 100% known is intellectually honest. Be gentle with accusations of intellectual honesty. Honesty does not require absolute correctness, only belief. I see no reason to believe that logicallee is overstating his confidence in his logic, which at its base is Occam's Razor. This may be a case where it is better to be "clear and wrong" than "fuzzy and arguably correct". (the article on swifts is great, thanks!)

by GuiA 10y ago

logicallee 10y ago

if you meant to summarize my ultimate truth via "The core point is that qualia emerges out of perception, and therefore that any system that can perceive in a broad sense, even if that perception is merely simulation of perception, will effectively experience consciousness" then you didn't understand. The ultimate truth or core point is that qualia emerges as an emergent property of what the parts are doing, and if you simulate those parts with enough fidelity consciousness still emerges. Certainly lots of things could perceive without being conscious - a roomba vacuum cleaner for one thing. So this argument about simulating parts -- it's like a fine mechanical watch that tells time: if you simulate it with enough precision the simulation can "tell time" only rather than telling time, the emergent property of the clockwork is "be conscious". you may not get my analogy and that's fine. I'm not here to convince anyone. it's not worth discussing in my opinion. I've given a very explicit model under which I'm wrong. if you disagree with me that's fine.

nkurz 10y ago
it's not worth discussing in my opinion. No, I think it's worth discussing. I may not have understood you completely, but I for one appreciated reading your explanation. You may or may not be right, but I thought your exposition was coherent and worth reading. GuiA: Perhaps you could be a little more rigorous yourself. Where in here do you start to disagree: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12878939 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12878939? Presumably you agree that you could replace all the muscles and bones of a bird and it would still fly, but you feel it is not obvious that you could replace all the neurons in a brain and it would still think. Why not? what's different? What's missing?
- GuiA 10y ago
  > Presumably you agree that you could replace all the muscles and bones of a bird and it would still fly Well here's the thing, I think I have a problem with that premise in itself. Theoretically that idea seems easy to agree with. But in practice, has it ever been done? The answer is a resounding no. Can we make things fly? Of course, but only by being insanely inefficient at it. Humans have never built something like a common swift, which can fly for 10 months without landing (http://phys.org/news/2016-10-ten-months-air.html http://phys.org/news/2016-10-ten-months-air.html). Can we reach that point one day? Maybe yes, maybe no, I have no clue. But if we are to reach that point, we need to build sound formal models to get there. Until we have such models for reasoning with things at that scale, I don't think claiming vehemently that these things are 100% known is intellectually honest.
  - nkurz 10y ago
    Maybe yes, maybe no, I have no clue. The question isn't whether we can make an artificial bird now, but whether such a thing is possible in principle. I think logicallee's point is that any answer other than a clear "yes" would require the assumption that there is something fundamentally "unknowable" about the problem, and generally such objections are considered unscientific. Unscientific doesn't mean wrong, of course, but it does weaken the case. So let's go back a step: can we theoretically replace a single bone in a single bird with without affecting its flight performance? I think the answer has to be yes. If so, is there a point at which we can no longer replace successive bones? While it might be a technical challenge, it's difficult to see how there could be a clear line between "flies" and "doesn't fly". Can we replace an individual neuron in a human brain with an electronic equivalent without affecting the perception of pain? The argument is that if one can, what's to prevent replacing all the other neurons in succession? Are certain neurons special and unreplaceable? Again, it's difficult to see that there could be any clear line between "pain" and "no pain". I think the strength and weakness of logicallee's argument is the assumption that it's possible to replace a single neuron with an electronic equivalent without causing any other changes to the system. If one can, it would seem straightforward to argue that machines can feel pain. I think the alternative would require assuming the existence of some "life force" for which we currently have no scientific basis. But if we are to reach that point, we need to build sound formal models to get there. To actually build such a system, probably, but are formal models necessary to reason about the consequences? Maybe, but thought experiments might help us build those models. With that in mind, do you think it's possible to functionally emulate any single neuron in silicon? If not, what's the missing entity? I don't think claiming vehemently that these things are 100% known is intellectually honest. Be gentle with accusations of intellectual honesty. Honesty does not require absolute correctness, only belief. I see no reason to believe that logicallee is overstating his confidence in his logic, which at its base is Occam's Razor. This may be a case where it is better to be "clear and wrong" than "fuzzy and arguably correct". (the article on swifts is great, thanks!)