>your argument certainly doesn't settle the matter one way or the othe I consider the matter settled and don't wish to engage in dialogue around it. For me th

>your argument certainly doesn't settle the matter one way or the othe I consider the matter settled and don't wish to engage in dialogue around it. For me there is nothing to discuss and it is a waste of resources to do so. Obviously others could disagree with me. >A simulation of pain might have enough fidelity that it would be reasonable to call it "real pain" that is felt by some actual entity with subjective experiences as real as our own, but it's far from a slam-dunk. I consider this to be a slam-dunk, and the reason why is an inductive process of replacing one cell at a time with one that interfaces with the other cells the same way (as a black box) but simulates the inner workings of that individual cell rather than perform them biochemically: obviously consciousness does not occur within a single neuron or nerve cell, so that if we replace that neuron with a black box that has the same interface with other cells, but internally is a simulaion, then consciousness would cease. This is clearly not the case. Clearly if it has the same interface with the other cells then it will still have consciousness, and by a system of induction you can come to the infallible conclusion that it is possible to have a process of real pain that is entirely simulated. It is like the inductive reasoning why it must be possible to build an artificial object that flies: if you replaced any single bone or ligament in a bird with a mechanical version with the same properties, it must still be able to fly, therefore an entirely mechanical object must be theoretically posisble which is capable of flight. In practice flight isn't done this way, and no bird is copied on a muscular level to achieve flight. It just shows that it's certainly and irrefutably possible. This inductive argument shows that it is irrefutably possible (for me). I consider it a slam-dunk case, beyond any need for discussion, yes. One thing that you do not talk about in your comment is under the scenario where pain is simulated with enough fideily (on a neural level) to be actual pain, how this changes if the simulation is deterministic. In what sense is its calculation then a "process", since we do not have any influence over its outcome? ==> I do have a question for you: does the nonillionth prime exist in your opinion? Does it have a specific well-defined value?