This is a great introduction to voting theory, but there are several notable omissions. The video doesn’t tell the whole story about what it presents as “ranke

This is a great introduction to voting theory, but there are several notable omissions. The video doesn’t tell the whole story about what it presents as “ranked voting”, usually known as Condorcet voting. There are systems that always yield the Condorcet winner when one exists, and do a good job of resolving the unavoidable but rare preference cycles as consistently as possible. The most standard one is the Schulze method, which is used by the Debian, Ubuntu, and Gentoo projects, among many other organizations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method The video asserts that what it presents as “elimination voting”, usually known as instant-runoff voting, doesn’t suffer from the third-party spoiler effect. But that’s only true as long as the third party never gains enough support to have a real chance of winning. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ (I wonder: can you think of a pair of powerful organizations who might want to ensure that third parties never gain enough support to have a real chance of winning? Hmmm.) Finally, the video doesn’t talk about approval voting or score voting, which use a different ballot type to which Arrow’s impossibility theorem does not apply. Some game theorists argue that these systems actually do a better job of finding the ideal Condorcet winner than Condorcet systems do, in the presence of strategic voting. http://rangevoting.org/stratapproval4.pdf http://rangevoting.org/stratapproval4.pdf