2 ms·
> You asked whether the LRNG had been competently audited. No, that's not what I asked. I asked how can one know whether or not it has been competently audite
by lisper 10y ago
> You asked whether the LRNG had been competently audited.
No, that's not what I asked. I asked how can one know whether or not it has been competently audited. Those are two very different questions. (An illustrative analogy: "Does the Higgs boson exist?" and "How do we know that the Higgs boson exists?" are two very different questions. The answer to the first question is "yes". The answer to the second question is a very long story.)
> It has been, by multiple groups.
Yes, I know. Again, that's not what I asked. What I asked was: how can someone who doesn't know who you are, and hence is not willing to take your word for it, convince themselves that this statement is true?
> I don't see how these answers depend on who asked the question.
Do you understand it now?
> I thought I'd entered it by agreeing with you!
And I'm pretty sure you still do :-)
- tptacek 10y agoMy suggestion is, if you're wondering whether the LRNG has been competently audited, that you ask someone in a position to know. There are lots of those people.
- lisper 10y agoOK, but that only works for open-source OSs, not commercial ones. Also, it really helps to have a certain amount of crypto-savvy to be able to distinguish a competent consultant from a snake-oil salesman. BTW, /dev/urandom on OS X may be random, but it is ridiculously slow: ``` time head -100000 /dev/urandom > /dev/null real 0m1.832s user 0m0.015s sys 0m1.817s ``` So there's another reason someone might want to implement their own CSPRNG.
- tptacek 10y agoI don't understand. For closed-source operating systems, why can't you do the exact same thing? Just ask people who might know. You won't get specific answers, because that kind of work happens under NDA, but you'll get the answer you need, which is in this case "yes, they've been reviewed, by experts". Take yes for an answer!
- lisper 10y agoOnce again I find myself feeling like I'm about to insult your intelligence by explaining something that you surely already know: Computer security is different from all other areas of software engineering because it is inherently adversarial. One of the tactics that attackers use is to conceal the fact that they are attackers (this is how social engineering attacks work, for example). There can be no more ideal concealment for an attacker than to be widely accepted as a trustworthy authority on computer security. Hence it is unwise to assume that a person or entity is not acting on behalf of an adversary simply because they appear to be a trustworthy authority. You don't even have to get very far into tinfoil-hat territory to have reasonable skepticism about the security claims of closed-source software. The person you are consulting may well have a good-faith belief based on good evidence that everything is hunky-dory. But the problem is that unless that person has had access to every stage of the production process there is no way that they can be sure that they have not been dealing with an adversary somewhere along the line. For example: it would not be difficult for someone with the right skill and access within Apple to insert a back door that would be undetectable even to other Apple employees. And it would not be beyond the capabilities of state actors to identify such a person and coerce them to do this. Again, I'm not saying this has happened, only that it's possible, and so if the stakes are high enough for you, then you need to take such things into account even if you ultimately end up deciding not to worry about them. But given the low cost of educating yourself how to implement your own CSPRNG, the extremely high value of the system CSPRNG as a target, and the ease with which it could be compromised by someone with the right access, I think it is not at all unreasonable to choose to roll your own even if there are experts out there telling you that you don't need to.