3 ms·
> There's no need to know the actual details of exploit to provide workarounds Your premise is wrong - there is a need. The details can be used to create signa
by sangnoir 10y ago
> There's no need to know the actual details of exploit to provide workarounds
Your premise is wrong - there is a need. The details can be used to create signatures for anti-malware software and IDSes by 3rd parties who are nimbler than Microsoft.
Additionally, there is more to be worried about than just workarounds: some organisations do full-take packet capture archiving and might be interested to know if they were hacked via this flaw (retrospectively) before (more) data is exfiltrated, the sooner they are made aware of an actively-exploited bug, the better.
> ... If they don't, everybody has to wait for Microsoft anyway, but the malware authors get one now famous 0-day
Wrong again: there is no need to wait for Microsoft for the reasons I mentioned above. Before this, only the bad guys knew about the exploit, now the good guys also know about it and may work to mitigate it. We have no idea how well-known this exploit was in underground forums, so it is hard to quantify how many more bad guys know it for certain.
- acqq 10y ago> The details can be used to create signatures for anti-malware software and IDSes by 3rd parties who are nimbler than Microsoft. No, you don't need to publish the details of the vulnerability to the public in order to cooperate among the anti-virus vendors. > some organisations do full-take packet capture archiving and might be interested to know if they were hacked via this flaw Observing full packets has nothing to do with giving to the public the details of which system API flaw was used for the attack.