5 ms·
So you think you are safer now that every single bad guy knows about it instead of one bad guy?
by cm2187 10y ago
So you think you are safer now that every single bad guy knows about it instead of one bad guy?
- CaptSpify 10y agoIt's safer because now users/administrators know about the issue and can watch for the exploit being abused.
- NetStrikeForce 10y agoApparently it was only exploited by a single state actor. Now anyone can exploit it. Thousands of small companies with no DPI are screwed up until the patch arrives. Way to go, Google.
- CaptSpify 10y agoDPI? Anyone could have exploited it before. Now people know it's exploitable. I'm still on Google's side here (as much as it pains me to say it). Making the vuln known is the best course of action.
- EdHominem 10y ago> Thousands of small companies with no DPI are screwed They were anyways. > Apparently it was only exploited by a single state actor. We don't actually know that. In fact, it's amazingly unlikely. > Way to go, Google. Suck it up and use the vulnerability as an excuse to implement better procedures. It'll only be worse tomorrow...
- NetStrikeForce 10y agoAll the reports I've read point to only GRU using the exploit, which invalidates your comment completely. And the downvote I got.
- CaptSpify 10y agoThat's the only group that we knew were using it. It's extremely likely that other groups were using it too, but weren't caught.
- NetStrikeForce 10y agoSo we only had evidence of a state actor using it against its objectives. Now we can be sure everyone is using it because the bug is public. I think it is easy to understand why this has been a mistake. I believe a patch was announced for next week; what's the risk for the general population if only one actor knows the bug? What's the risk if everyone knows the bug? IMHO this hasn't made the general population safer, quite the opposite. Google doesn't want to wait for the scheduled fix? Then disclose the information to AV and security vendors and at least we have a headstart against general exploitation of the bug until the fix is out.
- EdHominem 10y agoNo. We did it that way in the old days and MS took years to patch bugs. Now nobody gives their excuses any weight and they manage (mostly) to keep up. > only had evidence of a state actor You have no evidence of it being used so it must not have been then. That's that. Lack of evidence is evidence, or something. > hasn't made the general population safer Oh, you have evidence of that? This is a bit of a paradox. Any given disclosure might make some people less secure, but a policy of rapid disclosure has made all of us vastly more secure. > Then disclose the information to AV and security vendors Oh great, give the data to companies who will then turn around and bill me to tell me what to block. And weeks later, not in the moment when I need it. Thanks a lot! But this also misses that these partial disclosures are usually still enough to tell someone skilled how to write the exploit, and it only takes one exploit being written. All it does is give a false sense of security. Withholding bugs is a useless idea that's exclusively harmful.
- NetStrikeForce 10y agoGoogle's policy is to release under 7 days if there's evidence of the bug being exploited. They told Microsoft and a date for the patch was set, I guess because they follow processes to make sure they don't make it worse or break something else when patching. This is not "the old days", Microsoft's security track record is completely different. I can't believe that you're (rhetorically) asking me for evidence when it's Google who makes decisions based on that evidence. It's vox populi now that only one actor was using it. Google knows it, you know it too. Why are you trying to move the goal posts with useless rhetoric? How does publishing a bug with no patch available until a few days from now on make us safer? Especially when you don't want security companies to have a head start either. How are you going to protect your users then? I don't know if your comment is just bait, but there's a difference between withholding bugs and being a responsible company. As far as I understand Microsoft gave Google a date that's not very far in time. If whoever made the decision to disclose it anyway can't see the difference (or a calendar, this is 2016, not 1996) then I give up. Once the bug was discovered we need an urgent fix, disclosing the bug has prematurely expired any short time we had. There was no need for that. Why can't Google accept a patch date so close to their disclosure date and only disclose if the third party (Microsoft in this case) fails to deliver the patch? You can ignore all the above, but let me know one thing: How are you protecting your user base from someone exploiting this bug? If you don't have any security products capable of detecting the exploit nor a patched OS. I'm curious and I'm sure I can learn from you (I'm not being sarcastic).
- Jedd 10y agoIt's easy to read some tone in there that may not have been intended, but it's actually a really good question. Short answer - I don't know, but I think so. In my particular case I'm not exposed (I use Debian pretty much everywhere, with a couple of Win7 VM's for work that are NAT'd and sandboxed, used almost exclusively for editing MS-Office applications, with minimal Internet access, etc). You said 'instead of one bad guy', but there's no evidence a single bad guy had the exploit, so I can't really quantify my risk prior to the announcement. Anyway, in the general case of your question - yes, I think I am safer if I have the same knowledge (about problems with my software) that everyone else has, rather than me not knowing but some unknown number of potentially very sophisticated attackers are confirmed to know and be using that knowledge.
- cm2187 10y agoI was a bit sarcastic, because in my mind this is a no brainer. As soon as a hacking technique becomes public, every script kiddie will get their hand on it, and then suddenly your server is not exposed to just a team of russian hackers that may have used it in a targeted attack completely unrelated to your business, but to anyone else on the web, potentially scanning all IPs. You might have actively looked into the technique used, understood it, and done something to mitigate it. What about the hundred of millions of Windows servers that rely on monthly updates for security patches, maintained by IT teams that do not have the resources or expertise to investigate every MSFT security bulletin in detail. They will become sitting ducks. Is that a good outcome? In my mind it is a rhetorical question.
- Jedd 10y agoHey, I entirely get where you're coming from. But I'd suggest it's kind of a security by obscurity blanket (I know that's a horrendous aphorism - forgive me, please). I think the problem I have lies here: > As soon as a hacking technique becomes public, > every script kiddie will get their hand on it, At the time Google announced it we had no idea how many script kiddies (or worse) had their hands on it. Certainly it was known the number was > 0. So the question instantly becomes - is it safe to assume only relatively benign bad people know about, and are using, and other people (eg. swarms of script kiddies) don't know about it and won't for some weeks? I'm empathetic to people whose day job is not IT, and are stuck for various reasons using poorly maintained Microsoft software, but I genuinely do not believe we are all safer by assuming (hoping?) active exploits are minimally used. Anyway, Microsoft was well aware of Google's policy on announcements for actively exploited vulnerabilities, and didn't even choose to provide some mitigation advice prior to their (presumably upcoming) security patch.
- kbart 10y agoAt least now you know what to defend against. Also, how do you know that only one bad guy knows about it? If it's in a wild, all the bad guys will know about it sooner rather than later anyway.
- forgottenpass 10y agoHow do I turn the specific knowledge of the exploit into a more meaningful defense than if I had vague knowledge there is a windows zero-day actively in the wild? I'm not asking snidely. I legit want to know how this is leveraged in defense and what/how I can do. Is it common practice in the pre-patch period to enable some sort of system call tracing that monitors for (and/or kills) processes that use the vulnerable call in a way described by the google blogpost? Or is there a sandboxing solution where I can blacklist filter certain uses of system calls?
- EdHominem 10y ago> How do I turn the specific knowledge of the exploit into a more meaningful defense than if [...] By being able to raise an alarm and allocate actual time to fixing/mitigating it, unlike if it was only a vague warning. We know that there's never been a day where Windows didn't have a critical, remote-code execution, security flaw. Obviously if you're still using it management isn't doing anything proactive to improve security so you need these motivators.
- cm2187 10y ago> At least now you know what to defend against Who is "you"? Do you realistically think the hundred of millions of Windows Servers out there are actively managed by a team of security experts who have the expertise to go under the skin of new security vulnerabilities in a matter of hours and deploy a mitigating strategy?
- Bartweiss 10y agoI mean, no, but you can't actually account for the worst security results. Heartbleed is still unpatched in a lot of places, but there's really no disclosure strategy capable of improving that. Even a low-skilled maintenance team can be on heightened lookout for compromised accounts and illicit connections. I'm not sure I back Google here, though. Generally, I think active exploits are reasonable to disclose, but Microsoft had a specific patching plan that would have been up in another week. It seems reasonable to accommodate requests like that when the vulnerable product is actively being fixed.
- FT_intern 10y agothere's also the benefit that MSFT will be pressured to release quicker. even if there is a loss right now, there may be a higher pay off in the future with quicker fixes
- cm2187 10y agoBasically you are arguing against responsible disclosure?
- FT_intern 10y agono it's an argument against irresponsible patching. the budget allocated to fixing these exploits will be higher at M$ as a result from the backlash
- user5994461 10y agoMS is already fixing exploits and publishing patches regularly.