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The "security industry" was never significantly involved in improving product security and software quality. They have roots in profiting from the deplorable st
by fulafel 10y ago
The "security industry" was never significantly involved in improving product security and software quality. They have roots in profiting from the deplorable state of PC security. Centralised firewalls, "intranets", and anti-virus products are not sustainable solutions to any of these problems - they're just so ingrained in the mindset of IT profiessionals that they self-perpetuate.
- tptacek 10y agoEndpoint security traces back to antivirus and PC security. Firewalls do not --- firewalls trace back to the Unix culture.
- eeZah7Ux 10y ago[citation needed]
- tptacek 10y agoNot really, no. But: the first commercial firewall was Ranum's DEC SEAL. Ranum is an old-school Unix programmer. The first book on firewalls is "Firewalls and Internet Security", by Bellovin and Cheswick, who previously created one of the first firewalls (predating DEC SEAL) and possibly coined the name. Both of them are, as you'd expert, Unix nerds. People were building firewalls in 1988, several years before there was even Trump Winsock, let alone a reason for PCs to need to filter Internet traffic.
- rudolf0 10y agoGood firewalls can make good security easier.
- viraptor 10y agoI get what you're going for but you're actually wrong. Both firewalls centralised or not (configure to prevent all access outbound apart from approved nodes) and intranets (put IoT in isolation) would actually prevent Mirai from both spreading and attacking anyone. But most people are not implementing either, because home router is all you need...
- fulafel 10y agoTo prevent Mirai you have to convince the least competent security camera owners running their corner supermarket or whatever to spend the money and effort. The people who are self-selected technologically illiterate cheapskates because they bought the cheapest Chinese IP security camera. Yeah, you can always make this argument. "If only there had been sufficiently advanced and non-buggy firewall rules in place in firewalls optimally placed in the topology, looked after by competent networking staff" It just doesn't work in most environments because you don't have firewall experts on staff and you have no incentives to spend money and effort on firewalls. (And even for professional firewall wranglers it's hard in normal semi-chaotic IT organisations, you don't intrinsically get any assurance things are set up tightly, or that it remains so after network configuration changes, and you keep breaking working systems, you just get feedback for angry users that you've inconvenienced and you never get feedback from successfully defending against attacks. etc etc. And at the end of the day for the same money you could have gotten better security improvement by spending man hours (and hours lost by impeding your users) elsewhere, in line with end-to-end thinking.)
- viraptor 10y agoYou're talking about people, I was only talking about technologies. > If only there had been sufficiently advanced and non-buggy firewall rules in place We don't even have to look for ideal or advanced solutions. First forbid spoofed IPs, then kill incoming low port traffic to residential users (but let them opt out of that, just like we already often do with outgoing port 25). This applied globally would kill a large chunk of DDoS attacks these days. But today's ISPs are not doing even that. I don't know how we can convince people to care enough.