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I misspoke in saying "receipt". You're right that we can't rely on voters keeping their receipts for a recount. I meant a paper record of the vote kept in addit
by grzm 10y ago
I misspoke in saying "receipt". You're right that we can't rely on voters keeping their receipts for a recount. I meant a paper record of the vote kept in addition to the electronic record.
I'm not sure where I might have given the impression that a recount would not be necessary. A paper record makes a recount possible and the election system auditable.
The linked Wikipedia article on end-to-end auditable voting systems provides an overview and links to different methods of making voting systems more trustworthy. There's a lot of thought and details that go into it, and if it's something you're interested in, I suggest following up on some of the links and spending more time. I know it's taken me reading a lot of different articles and implementations, and I still need to look up different parts of it.
I did find this slide deck from Ron Rivest helpful:
"Auditability and Verifiability of Elections"
ACM-IEEE talk March 16, 2016
https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv16x.pdf https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv16x.pdf
Were there particular areas that didn't make sense to you?
- 58 10y agoIt seems pretty simple to me. Have the machine print a receipt that shows your info and who you voted for, have the voter check it over and sign it, and then have the voter hand it in before leaving the voting station. The receipt is really no different than a paper ballot at that point. That's not to say that other security precautions can be ignored. Ideally I'd think there should be mature open-source software running on secure intranets for each voting station, and transparency at every level of the process, including better transparency in how those physical receipts are transported, handled, and stored.
- melse 10y agoBear in mind that by requiring each voter to sign their ballot slip, you're reducing the anonymity of the election, since it's potentially possible to prove that you voted in a certain way to sell your vote.
- VLM 10y agoThe gold standard, which has been deployed where I live for a couple decades now, is to skip all the e-voting network touchscreen foolishness and simply fill out an optical scantron sheet like the tests you probably filled out in school. The last step of voting is inserting the ballot into the scantron machine. Valid ballots are eaten, invalid are kicked back out at you. Theoretically the machine can output running totals at any time, and if you've never seen an optical scanner in action you'll be surprised how fast it can scan and grade a classrooms worth of multiple guess tests, less than a minute to scan and process perhaps a hundred tests, so a thousand people living in my voting district is not exactly a data processing challenge. The votes can obviously be counted by hand of course, they're just custom printed multiple guess test sheets. Optically scanned paper tapes and punch cards were contemporary in the 60s and optical scantron machines appeared shortly after. I'd estimate my state converted from mechanical voting machines and mimeograph machines to scantrons and photocopiers about the same time, lets say 1980 although maybe as late as 1984 or earlier in the 70s. I distinctly remember watching my parents vote one last time on an old fashioned voting machine when I was a little kid, probably voting for Nixon, may have been Reagan but I'd have been too old by then, I think. Old fashioned mechanical voting machines were cool and steam punk ish in appearance. Its such a simple, cheap, reliable system that it almost leads credence to claims that elections are being intentionally rigged. Its hard to explain otherwise why something so cheap simple and logical is being covered up and so few people know about it. Ironically I live in a non-swing state in a gerrymandered district so my vote has never mattered and never will, but at least if I ever get a chance to influence politics via voting, its pretty obvious my vote would be counted fairly.
- zelos 10y agoNot that I'd hold the UK up as a good example of democracy, but here there is a unique ID on each ballot paper that is noted down on a list next to your name when you vote. The ID/name list is kept securely, but can be used to find a voter's ballot paper later in the case of a dispute over the result or fraud.
- waxim 10y agoTwo systems. One assigns a unique a temporary code to you on arrival at the polling station, much like those "take a number" queues at places. Then another unconnected voting system with printable receipt. Step 1) You queue, get a "Temporary Voting Id" Step 2) Enter the booth, enter your "TVID" Step 3) Vote Step 4) The Machine prints your Receipt with your vote clearly visible and your TVID as local proof its you and your vote is right. Step 5) You fold your printed ballot and put it in a box. Step 6) You fold your ID Receipt and place that into a "Validation Box" as you leave. Step 7) All machines keep and print a "Tally" used as the count. Step 8) All ballots and validation id's are saved in boxes and shipped ready for recounts if needed, ID's can be matched to ballots to validate attendance and votes anonymously. Bonus Step) ALL vote machine should produce a "Vote Audit" when asked that will show a full history of votes (without times and in random order) and the ID's used and ALL id generation machine should produce all vote id's generated (again without times and in random order)