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I agree that a system that only has electronic records is very problematic. However, a system that includes a physical component (such as a paper ballot receipt
by grzm 10y ago
I agree that a system that only has electronic records is very problematic. However, a system that includes a physical component (such as a paper ballot receipt) can be used as part of an electronic system to permit something that's auditable and verifiable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...
- Graphon1 10y agook, a receipt. How is this supposed to facilitate a recount? Not all voters will retain their receipts. Not all voters will retained receipts will re-present them in the event of the need of a recount. Are you saying a recount will be unnecessary if E2E is done properly? I read the linked article but didn't get it.
- grzm 10y agoI misspoke in saying "receipt". You're right that we can't rely on voters keeping their receipts for a recount. I meant a paper record of the vote kept in addition to the electronic record. I'm not sure where I might have given the impression that a recount would not be necessary. A paper record makes a recount possible and the election system auditable. The linked Wikipedia article on end-to-end auditable voting systems provides an overview and links to different methods of making voting systems more trustworthy. There's a lot of thought and details that go into it, and if it's something you're interested in, I suggest following up on some of the links and spending more time. I know it's taken me reading a lot of different articles and implementations, and I still need to look up different parts of it. I did find this slide deck from Ron Rivest helpful: "Auditability and Verifiability of Elections" ACM-IEEE talk March 16, 2016 https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv16x.pdf https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv16x.pdf Were there particular areas that didn't make sense to you?
- 58 10y agoIt seems pretty simple to me. Have the machine print a receipt that shows your info and who you voted for, have the voter check it over and sign it, and then have the voter hand it in before leaving the voting station. The receipt is really no different than a paper ballot at that point. That's not to say that other security precautions can be ignored. Ideally I'd think there should be mature open-source software running on secure intranets for each voting station, and transparency at every level of the process, including better transparency in how those physical receipts are transported, handled, and stored.
- melse 10y agoBear in mind that by requiring each voter to sign their ballot slip, you're reducing the anonymity of the election, since it's potentially possible to prove that you voted in a certain way to sell your vote.
- VLM 10y agoThe gold standard, which has been deployed where I live for a couple decades now, is to skip all the e-voting network touchscreen foolishness and simply fill out an optical scantron sheet like the tests you probably filled out in school. The last step of voting is inserting the ballot into the scantron machine. Valid ballots are eaten, invalid are kicked back out at you. Theoretically the machine can output running totals at any time, and if you've never seen an optical scanner in action you'll be surprised how fast it can scan and grade a classrooms worth of multiple guess tests, less than a minute to scan and process perhaps a hundred tests, so a thousand people living in my voting district is not exactly a data processing challenge. The votes can obviously be counted by hand of course, they're just custom printed multiple guess test sheets. Optically scanned paper tapes and punch cards were contemporary in the 60s and optical scantron machines appeared shortly after. I'd estimate my state converted from mechanical voting machines and mimeograph machines to scantrons and photocopiers about the same time, lets say 1980 although maybe as late as 1984 or earlier in the 70s. I distinctly remember watching my parents vote one last time on an old fashioned voting machine when I was a little kid, probably voting for Nixon, may have been Reagan but I'd have been too old by then, I think. Old fashioned mechanical voting machines were cool and steam punk ish in appearance. Its such a simple, cheap, reliable system that it almost leads credence to claims that elections are being intentionally rigged. Its hard to explain otherwise why something so cheap simple and logical is being covered up and so few people know about it. Ironically I live in a non-swing state in a gerrymandered district so my vote has never mattered and never will, but at least if I ever get a chance to influence politics via voting, its pretty obvious my vote would be counted fairly.
- AimHere 10y agoReceipts are retained by the guys holding the election, not the voters. A physical record of which way a vote was cast would be an excellent way of enabling bribery of voters, and no sane system would allow it. That's also why photographing a ballot paper is usually banned in polling stations.
- kwhitefoot 10y agoGiving a receipt for a vote is illegal in many places because it enables vote buying.
- 24gttghh 10y agoWhich implies the ability to present your receipt to a third party for compensation of your vote?
- talmand 10y agoDoes anybody make the argument that the lack of a receipt prevents vote buying?
- ebalit 10y agoIf you can claim to vote in a way when you voted another way, then no one is going to bribe or force you to vote in a given way. That what the voting booth and envelopes are for. Its not a random thing. Our voting systems are low tech, but it's well designed.
- talmand 10y agoThat's simple, if I were to engage in such deceitful practices then I would say payoff requires my candidate winning.
- fgonzag 10y agoNot in Mexico, vote buying is pretty common. But over here it pretty much relies on the fact that poorer folk don't know your vote is completely anonymous. They'll tell you sure I'll give you money, a TV, cellphone, whatever. But I will find out if you don't vote for me, and most simply believe it. And in the latest election where the incumbent party lost, It was pretty publicized that they went to a lot of the poorer colonies to try and get their money, cell phones and tvs back. All quickly forgotten as soon as the media got a whiff of it. Buying votes in a first world country probably isn't possible as most people are somewhat (and probably wrongly) educated on the topic, and hold pretty firm views on it. However, it's a piece of pie on mostly illiterate people. Even then, people get tired, see the latest elections in Mexico.
- gm-conspiracy 10y agoPlease explain any benefit to electronic voting?
- grzm 10y agoElectronic voting can mean different things as computers can plan different roles in the voting process. For example, just in terms of recording votes, we have - internet voting - touch screen voting - optical scan voting Computers can also be used in other roles, such as voter verification, vote tabulation, and results transmission, result verification, and auditing. With only paper ballots, arbitrary vote verification is likely to be a tedious process, if possible at all. Cryptographic methods such as homomorphic tallying can ensure vote secrecy and vote verifiation. This can also provide stronger guarantees of chain of custody integrity by verifying voter receipts or cast paper ballots are included in the final tally. With only paper ballots, trust that a given cast ballot is included in the result relies on trust in those doing the tallying and the chain of custody of the ballots themselves. One could imply from the phrasing of your question that you have reservations about any benefits electronic voting might have. What's your take?
- gm-conspiracy 10y agoI fail to see how the benefits outweigh the added complexity and lack of trust. Optical scan is the only above mentioned method that can be verified by laypeople. Also, although a tedious process, paper voting has worked for quite some time. Centuries? Chain of custody will always be a problem, whether it be source code to a compile runtime, or paper ballots. However, the potential for abuse seems less likely for a more manual process. A voter signs in to vote, so we know how many voters to reconcile to the same number of ballots. If we have more ballots cast than signed in votes, we have a problem. Additionally, ballots are serialized, though not associated with any particular individual. So we know what ballots were used and unused. If we find multiple ballots with the same serial number, we know there is a problem, too. Voting should not rely on a blackbox algorithm. The majority of the voting public can count pieces of paper, but can they understand and verify code running on a device? Who cares if it saves time, particularly at the cost of transparency and trust? My question to you is, what problem did electronic voting solve (as implemented in the US), that needed solving?
- closeparen 10y agoThe process of collecting receipts is identical to the process of collecting paper ballots.