indeed, the early wittgenstein thinks that the world is must be one of those things we must pass over in silence, while how the world is is exactly the kind of

indeed, the early wittgenstein thinks that the world is must be one of those things we must pass over in silence, while how the world is is exactly the kind of thing about which we can talk and reason. the later wittgenstein (still?) thinks that explanation comes to an end somewhere, and just wants to make sure one doesn't append "and isn't that mysterious?" to the end of a good explanation (ie one that sets out to answer a precise question, then does so). but who knows. wittgenstein and mysticism is an interesting topic... for the early wittgenstein, it's crystal clear that he's saying there are 2 domains: stuff that admits of being talked about in a propositional way, and stuff that doesn't. all the latter stuff is mystical; it's not necessarily supernatural, it's just that we can't get anywhere talking about it with true/false (or satisfaction-condition or whatever) talk. but what about the later wittgenstein? he thinks that the domain of things we can talk about has opened up considerably, because he no longer things that language functions as a mirror of "the world", nor should it even try to. now he thinks that utterances are tools to get this or that done. this does not neatly carve out anything to be called mystical. --- relating this back to the article, the idea is that we sort of put an air of magic about the mystical, and when we treat something for which we can create an adequate explanation as mystical or magic (or "strange"), we lead ourselves and others into getting perplexed. and if there is something to be said for religion or purpose, it's not to be found in something we can explicate adequately by adverting to neutral drift, etc. that being the case, we want to be careful about what we call strange. what are we endorsing when we see strangeness in something we can understand?