> end users must be able to patch beyond the support lifetime That's the kind of thing that gives regulation a bad name. One of the worst ways an IoT device c

> end users must be able to patch beyond the support lifetime That's the kind of thing that gives regulation a bad name. One of the worst ways an IoT device can get hacked is if it's reflashed with malicious firmware that then can't be reflashed back. You've got a permanent backdoor that requires trashing the device and a lot of users won't throw away a device that still works (for them) even if they know it's infected with something that causes problems (for someone else). That's real money. A simple way to fix that is locked bootloaders that only runs signed code. Then even if the running image gets hacked, a reboot fixes it and at least the device can't be irreversibly hacked. A regulation like the one you propose would presumably make signature-locked firmware illegal, or at best, require the checks to be disabled after a certain date (which then requires secure clocks: more stuff to go wrong). It's the sort of thing that sounds good but can cause more problems than it solves, which is the typical problem of regulation.