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As usual, this article makes me think of Wittgenstein, who would probably say, "I agree with everything you're saying, except the word 'strange'." The content

As usual, this article makes me think of Wittgenstein, who would probably say, "I agree with everything you're saying, except the word 'strange'." The content is interesting, definitely, but you could save some time and potentially misleading "appreciation of strangeness" by stating that neutral drift allows for dramatically more random possibilities than those offered by one-time random mutations. Not that Wittgenstein (or I) want to poopoo the "wonder" element of science or life in general... but I think it's telling that the author, as other comments point out, mentions creationism, as if that's a natural motivator for "wonder" (or a natural view to take in light of "wonder"). But creationism is simplistic, incoherent, and wrong. If "strange" is adding nothing to the truth or falsity of any of the statements involved, and "strange" is somehow an excuse for creationism, perhaps we should take issue with this being "strange" at all.

hsitz 10y ago
A maybe relevant Wittgenstein quote: "It is not how the world is, that is the mystical, but that it is." Tractatus 6.44
- simondedalus 10y ago
  indeed, the early wittgenstein thinks that the world is must be one of those things we must pass over in silence, while how the world is is exactly the kind of thing about which we can talk and reason. the later wittgenstein (still?) thinks that explanation comes to an end somewhere, and just wants to make sure one doesn't append "and isn't that mysterious?" to the end of a good explanation (ie one that sets out to answer a precise question, then does so). but who knows. wittgenstein and mysticism is an interesting topic... for the early wittgenstein, it's crystal clear that he's saying there are 2 domains: stuff that admits of being talked about in a propositional way, and stuff that doesn't. all the latter stuff is mystical; it's not necessarily supernatural, it's just that we can't get anywhere talking about it with true/false (or satisfaction-condition or whatever) talk. but what about the later wittgenstein? he thinks that the domain of things we can talk about has opened up considerably, because he no longer things that language functions as a mirror of "the world", nor should it even try to. now he thinks that utterances are tools to get this or that done. this does not neatly carve out anything to be called mystical. --- relating this back to the article, the idea is that we sort of put an air of magic about the mystical, and when we treat something for which we can create an adequate explanation as mystical or magic (or "strange"), we lead ourselves and others into getting perplexed. and if there is something to be said for religion or purpose, it's not to be found in something we can explicate adequately by adverting to neutral drift, etc. that being the case, we want to be careful about what we call strange. what are we endorsing when we see strangeness in something we can understand?

hsitz 10y ago

A maybe relevant Wittgenstein quote: "It is not how the world is, that is the mystical, but that it is." Tractatus 6.44

simondedalus 10y ago
indeed, the early wittgenstein thinks that the world is must be one of those things we must pass over in silence, while how the world is is exactly the kind of thing about which we can talk and reason. the later wittgenstein (still?) thinks that explanation comes to an end somewhere, and just wants to make sure one doesn't append "and isn't that mysterious?" to the end of a good explanation (ie one that sets out to answer a precise question, then does so). but who knows. wittgenstein and mysticism is an interesting topic... for the early wittgenstein, it's crystal clear that he's saying there are 2 domains: stuff that admits of being talked about in a propositional way, and stuff that doesn't. all the latter stuff is mystical; it's not necessarily supernatural, it's just that we can't get anywhere talking about it with true/false (or satisfaction-condition or whatever) talk. but what about the later wittgenstein? he thinks that the domain of things we can talk about has opened up considerably, because he no longer things that language functions as a mirror of "the world", nor should it even try to. now he thinks that utterances are tools to get this or that done. this does not neatly carve out anything to be called mystical. --- relating this back to the article, the idea is that we sort of put an air of magic about the mystical, and when we treat something for which we can create an adequate explanation as mystical or magic (or "strange"), we lead ourselves and others into getting perplexed. and if there is something to be said for religion or purpose, it's not to be found in something we can explicate adequately by adverting to neutral drift, etc. that being the case, we want to be careful about what we call strange. what are we endorsing when we see strangeness in something we can understand?