I certainly do. You must, by definition of Apple's iOS security, trust them it is actually secure. We cannot know how secure it is because we cannot know how it

I certainly do. You must, by definition of Apple's iOS security, trust them it is actually secure. We cannot know how secure it is because we cannot know how it is implemented in hardware or software because it is all proprietary. Meanwhile, I can reasonably trust, say, crypto++ and its component libraries, because I can (and when I use it, do) audit its source code. I may not be able to trust the processor that eventually compiled binary runs on, but that is another problem that several fronts (POWER8, RISC-V) are moving towards solving. And no, at the end of the day, you have to trust someone untrustworthy with your computers. We don't have access to fabrication hardware to make them ourselves, and even if we did... the rabbit hole continues and how can you trust the fab? Instead, you minimize your risk and have the smallest surface area of exploitation possible. It is harder to make a whole CPU, whose instructions you have, operate against your will (because you can see the output and compare results) than a black box of silicon you just get cryptographic data out of. But without source and design documentation on products I own I have no reason to believe they are anything but malicious with planted backdoors to circumvent any of my own attempts at privacy. Which makes using computers for private reasons borderline impossible without a full libreboot system.