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I approve of the handling, but this just underscores why you want self-hosted instances.
by bsder 10y ago
I approve of the handling, but this just underscores why you want self-hosted instances.
- ifhs 10y agoDon't you mean on-premise?
- Normal_gaussian 10y agoDatacentre's have outstanding track records, and if you secure your box correctly there are few ways to compromise it. On-premise will either be incredibly costly or missing key protections or infrastructure. Self-hosted git (through the many installable git servers or raw git) running on a correctly sized box is almost certainly the way to go
- newsat13 10y agoThis github vulnerability has nothing to do with insecure box. It has to do with a bad application logic. This can happen anywhere - self-hosted or not.
- bsder 10y agoThat is true. But, if I'm running my own instance, the probability is that it doesn't matter if someone else gets access via bad application logic. Everybody is probably employed by the same company. It's a difference of degree: compromising my self-hosted or on-premise server means that somebody already in my employ has more access than they should. If I'm a small organization, that probably doesn't matter. If I'm a big organization, I probably have an IT staff to deal with this and the people involved are still "nominally" under my control. The github mistake means that people completely unrelated to my repository can get access.
- ifhs 10y agoWell, the code can simply be made public by bad application logic. Which is why I thought you where talking of on premise where the intranet will seal off outsiders
- asolove 10y agoDoes it? Except for very sophisticated organizations, I doubt it. You don't hear about intrusions into self-hosted source repositories. Not because there are fewer, but because they likely don't have the security infrastructure in place to know that they ever happened.
- kosievdmerwe 10y agoAlso, there is very little incentive for them to advertise that they've been compromised. Whereas, Github has a duty to disclose that they've been compromised to their clients.
- Silhouette 10y agoYou don't hear about intrusions into self-hosted source repositories. Not because there are fewer, [Edit: Multiple downvotes within moments of each other do not make calling out the above speculation any less justified.]
- closeparen 10y agoWe've had a couple of VPS provider admin panel compromises, Shellshock and other showstopper remote vulnerabilities for privately administered servers that don't get constant professional attention, etc. It's possible, but not obvious.
- cm3 10y agoIf you have private repositories that should never be public, no matter what, which isn't true for most users of private repositories, then: Given that git provides many transports and ways to push commits around, I agree. If you have to be safe, there's no reason to use github or a self-hosted git collaboration service (gitlab, etc) on a publicly accessible server, regardless of access control measures. If you really need to have sources on a remote machine, you can limit the potential damage by only sharing archives of a certain revision, without history. I know many will dismiss it, but if you're serious about the repositories being private, then the most you make them accessible is via an on-premises hosted gitlab instance, which is local to the company network, not accessible via the public network, and only allowed to, if you want, by dialing into VPN first. Then, to be safe, you null-route anything but the VPN traffic on the connected off-premises developer machine. Access keys get stolen, just like SSH keys are, so you need to use a VPN service that requires additional security like the use of OTP key generators or similar measures. This probably sounds like a hassle in the day and age of people just going for the comfort of private github or gitlab repositories, but it's what companies have been doing for almost 20 years as standard practice. You cannot consider any git repository, even on your own root server, safe to keep private code on. CIOs would argue against that practice for good reason. The same CIOs require work laptops to encrypt all data. If you don't need to be that serious, then an incident like this should be planned and accounted for as part of using such hosting, and shouldn't be a big deal.