The focus of this argument seems to center around people casting multiple votes, "dead" people voting, etc. The problem is that there's no vote-verifiable trail

The focus of this argument seems to center around people casting multiple votes, "dead" people voting, etc. The problem is that there's no vote-verifiable trail and serious security issues with electronic voting booths. There was even a video interview with Howard Dean where he shows how easy it is to dink around in the MS Access database on voting machine and change the votes [0]. This [1] paper from 2003 sums up some of the issues nicely: Voters can cast multiple votes without leaving any trace. Voters, as well as voting staff or others with access to the machine, can perform actions that normally require administrative privileges, including viewing partial results and terminating the election early. Furthermore, communications between voting terminals and the central server are not properly encrypted, allowing a malicious man in the middle to alter the content of the communications I have zero faith in Diebold voting machines (or machines like it). And I'm very skeptical that people with malicious intent haven't already attacked and plan to attack such electronic components. [0] http://www.bradblog.com/?p=2724 http://www.bradblog.com/?p=2724 [1] https://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/hackavote2003tr.pdf https://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/hackavote2003tr.pdf