5 ms·
The manufacturers of devices should be held responsible for the security of the devices they sell. This is not different from what they are required to do for t
by pmontra 10y ago
The manufacturers of devices should be held responsible for the security of the devices they sell. This is not different from what they are required to do for the electrical and physical parts of the devices. Pass some standard tests that would prevent at least the most obvious vulnerabilities, default passwords and other bad practices. Run metaexploit against it, etc.
This would raise the attention to secure software development also in other areas of the IT business. Sure, it costs more upfront but we gain as we suffer less from this kind of attacks.
- whatupmiked 10y agopeople should start thinking about consumer protection for internet services and internet connected devices. Minimum security standards for products brought to market should be just one aspect of this.
- tedmiston 10y agoIn that case, who's responsible for keeping the anti-malware software up to date... and paying for it? Or maybe that's going too far and the first step is to just have them encourage / force more secure passwords. (Assuming this is correct [1]): > Mirai functions by infecting IoT devices by trying to brute force their passwords. The tactic it uses to brute force passwords is entering commonly used and default passwords. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware)
- pmontra 10y agoI suggest a gradual approach. Anyway, the manufactuter has more costs so the price is going to be higher. How higher in the long run? Maybe not much. We already experienced the same progression towards safety with materials that don't poison us and appliances that dont catch fire or interfere on the radio spectrum. Every one of those steps cost money. We still have cheap stuff to buy. The difference here is that those devices must be maintained or retired. So there could be a recurring cost. Eventually there will be ecosystems of companies taking care of the update and maintenance of devices made by their customers (the manufacturers.) We also have to educate people, to the point that they will feel ashamed to buy unsecure devices and inadvertently help the criminals behind those attacks in the news. Nobody wants to help the mob (or worse) by keeping their stuff at home, right? This is going to become a matter of national security in every country, because those attacks can be used as a weapon to incapacitate vital infrastructures.
- mirimir 10y agoWhy isn't there a mechanism for informing device users?
- pmontra 10y agoI can't answer because I'm not sure about which mechanism you're thinking about. Would you mind elaborating the concept? But as any mechanism: who's operating it, who's paying for it, what it's going to do, etc. An idea is a state owned crawler that tries to get into any device inside the country and tells people that their device X is insecure because of Y and Z. I think there are already many of those crawlers around, but they don't warn people. Quite the opposite ;-)
- scoot 10y agoTells what people? How do you know who owns a device?
- mirimir 10y agoIf you have an IP address, you can determine what ISP it's been assigned to. And ISPs typically know which accounts had which IPs at any given time.
- mirimir 10y agoI'm wondering whether it's possible to log IPs of attacking devices. From targets and from intermediaries. Then inform ISPs, and demand that they inform device owners. But yes, who would do that, and who would pay, are hard parts. Still, this was an expensive day for many providers.
- Pxtl 10y agoI agree. The manufacturer has not only released a device that is defective for its user, but has actually been weaponized against innocent 3rd parties. That goes beyond the normal problems of providing a product to buyers. When manufacturers can actually degrade the quality of the shared space, that's where we go beyond the normal consumer-protection rules and have special regulations like the FCC in the USA or the CRTC in Canada. While right now the stuff you provide is basically Caveat Emptor, I could see these security problems eventually being taken more seriously by regulators than simple liability.
- speedplane 10y agoI disagree. It should be the responsibility of the ISPs to monitor their network and shut down the harmful devices. Going after the hardware manufacturers is pointless, many of them are far too small to do anything about the problems they've created. You can sue them out of existence, but dozens more will pop up in their place.
- pmontra 10y agoBut they are big enough to pass FCC, CE (for Europe) and all the other certifications required to sell their goods. This is only one more compliance test to pass. It's not special because it's computer stuff.
- speedplane 10y agoOkay, so some regulator comes up with a security test, the device passes the test, and then later on some security researcher discovers a flaw in either the test or in the device in a way that was not expected. What now? The manufacturer may well be out of business or they may be too small to recall all of their devices. They cannot be counted on to remedy the situation. As much as you'd like to blame the manufacturers, blaming them won't do much good.
- pmontra 10y agoYou are right. We need a multi pronged approach. More secure devices is something we need no matter what. If compliance tests are required, I suspect that companies will emerge to provide management and upgrade services to devices. Manufacturers won't have to care of all aspects of security and will work with them. This will lower costs because economies of scale will happen inside the service company. This is going to require some standardization on the software platforms (but many are using Linux anyway) and the update methods. But those companies will become targets or accomplices. Beware. Second pronge. ISPs should firewall customers from within. I have a concern that this is going to be another step towards the Big Brother. I'm not an expert of networking so I can't make suggestions here but if that webcam from a long time disappeared manufacturer starts doing DDoSes, the ISP cuts it off the Internet. This is fine with me. Beware of false positives.
- speedplane 10y agoThe major difference between physical products, and network products, is that the damage caused by most physical products is limited to their immediate vicinity. Network products have no such limits. IOT devices in Calcutta can harm networks in the U.S. That isn't true of a bad lawn-mower or blender. The network operators and ISPs need to step in and do better policing of their networks. This of course, raises other issues but blaming device manufacturers, even if it really is their fault, just wont work.
- posterboy 10y agoDamage to the environment has often led to action, eg. with leaded fuels or CFC propellants.
- speedplane 10y agoYes, that approach works when the companies doing the damage are based in the U.S., and have the means to pay for the damages. Many of these IOT manufactures are based in other countries. Suing them out of existence may feel good, but it won't stop dozens of other companies from popping up and doing the same thing. Also, in your specific examples (leaded fuels, CFCs), it's relatively easy to test for bad products. How do you test for an insecure device?
- tombrossman 10y agoDidn't we try this same argument already with gun manufacturers? How well did that work? The problem with holding manufacturers responsible for releasing a potentially dangerous product is that the manufacturers view compliance with regulation as an obstacle to maximizing profits, and seek to avoid it. Manufacturing is also centralized and they organize and lobby politicians to influence regulation. Consumers are distributed and disorganized, and I predict that blame for not securing your IOT device(s) will stay with consumers for the foreseeable future. I agree some standardized testing would be a good idea though.
- x86_64Ubuntu 10y agoYou can't shoot someone halfway across the world with a gun you buy at WalMart.
- Spivak 10y agoRight, but if you keep your gun under your mattress, someone steals it, and then uses it to shoot someone halfway across the world it's not you're fault. It's like door locks -- we use them because thieves exist and we would rather manage keys than go though the effort of recovering our stolen goods, but even if someone doesn't have one, it's still always the fault of the thief.
- marmot777 10y agoWhat if door manufactures sold doors with locks that had a super easy way to pick them built into the locks that came with the doors? I'm not disagreeing with but just imagine how angry the public would get.
- marmot777 10y agoNot only that presumably gun manufacturers do not insert backdoors on their products or otherwise make the easier to steal through gross negligence. Many of these IoT manufactures clearly paid zero attention to security. That's unacceptable.
- jvermillard 10y agoMirai is pretty basic and use default device password which wasn't changed by the end user, so manufacturer will probably says it's all user fault
- marmot777 10y agoThe telnet password used by the botnets and the admin control for the end user are separate in many of these devices. My understanding is that the telnet password was set to not give the end user the access to change it, well, with the exception of technically savvy end users.
- marmot777 10y agoLet me rephrase that, many of these devices have a wise open port 23 and other ports through which Mirai accessed a backdoor.
- ComodoHacker 10y agoEasier to say then do. Information security is different from electrical and material safety and the key difference is pace of technical progress. The latter areas are relatively developed and stable, significant progress occurs in decades. While infosec landscape can drastically change in years and even months, within life-span of devices. To give you some perspective, toxicity of asbestos was discovered half a century after beginning of its widespread use [1]. And it took another half to fully realize the danger and stop using it. When designing a new device, you can't mitigate a threat that you can't imagine. And you don't have enough time and budget (time-to-market is the key) to mitigate all known threats. I'm not advocating status quo, which is dire. But there is no easy solution in sight. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asbestos#Discovery_of_toxicity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asbestos#Discovery_of_toxicity
- blfr 10y agoThe crucial difference is that information security measures have to withstand a deliberate attack, not just predictable use or wear and tear.
- malka 10y agoThere is. Stop making useless networked devices. You dont have time and budget to mitigate threats. Then dont release.
- ComodoHacker 10y agoIf they were useless no one would buy them. They are indeed useful. The problem is they also can be harmful, but not to their users. The situation can be remotely compared to RF interference. If you use RF spectrum irresponsibly, you harm your neighbors, police, military and other parties, so everyone understands some regulation is needed. RF spectrum regulation is in everyone's interests. If you use insecure IoT devices, they are exploited to harm some abstract people on the other side of the globe, who cares about them? If more people realize their devices can be used to shut down their Twitter and Instagram, maybe something will change. But I personally doubt that.
- deleted 10y ago