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> Do you check the issuer every time you go to a secure site? Your browser does (for high-value sites). That's what certificate pinning and HPKP are for.
by svenfaw 10y ago
> Do you check the issuer every time you go to a secure site?
Your browser does (for high-value sites). That's what certificate pinning and HPKP are for.
- bandrami 10y agoAnd they have to do that precisely because there are 170 or so entities of various levels of dubiousness that are by default authorized to sign any certificate for any domain, and everybody knows that this is fundamentally a horrible idea. For that matter, since HPKP requires sideband key management, it's A) an admission that PKI doesn't actually work, and B) a pretty clear example of why the CAs are unnecessary If you have pinned certificates you are essentially operating exactly the way 99% of us do with SSH (only rather better because there are several million eyes on high-value certificates), which means you don't need CAs anymore.
- 45h34jh53k4j 10y agoNot quite. Pins are either built into the browser by the vendor, or assigned on first access AFTER a successful server authentication (via the cert). Pins are trusted/verified through another channel. SSH Tofu trust occurs pre server authentication. It has no defense against an ALWAYS mitm. Of course there are far less ALWAYS MITM for SSH than TLS. You have no way of validating the pubkey you have written to known_hosts against anything else.
- bandrami 10y agoPins are either built into the browser by the vendor Right, sideband, and browsers do it manually for domains they consider "high value". It has no defense against an ALWAYS mitm For that matter nothing does, since at some point I downloaded my OS or browser (wherever my CA store is) to begin with.