3 ms·
I don't think we are going to be able to NOT have ubiquitous surveillance. The tech won't go away and only gets better. The question is not how to prevent it,
by carapace 10y ago
I don't think we are going to be able to NOT have ubiquitous surveillance. The tech won't go away and only gets better.
The question is not how to prevent it, because we can't (my premise.) The question is, who gets to use it and for what?
We're going to have to learn to live without hypocrisy.
- dredmorbius 10y agoThat is why laws constrain the technically attainable. We don't pass laws against things which cannot be done (at least not as a normal course of action).
- carapace 10y agoLet's say we make laws that proscribe that no one shall use the tech "the wrong way", how do we ensure that everyone is adhering to those laws without using the tech "the wrong way"? My point is that we can't constrain the technology by passing a law, because you have to enforce it, and to do that we have to use the technology. In the limit we're going to have either hypocrisy and have a system like North Korea, or we're going to sort our shit out and have a system like Star Trek. (I'm hopeful, despite being well aware of which of my examples is fictional.)
- dredmorbius 10y agoI'll give you a specific example. David Simon of The Wire talked about the longshoreman's union in Baltimore in a UC Berkeley lecture titled "The Audacity of Despair", available on YouTube. It's long but excellent. At 36m30s https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=nRt46W3k-qw https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=nRt46W3k-qw In it, Simon mentions that the union was so corrupt that every day it had to forward a copy of documents -- possibly every document produced or received -- mail, memos, publications, P.O.s and receipts -- to either the DoJ or the state's AG office, under a consent decree. Basically, because of a long history of abuse of power the union had to run open books to law enforcement. The financial world operates similarly: companies are subject to audits (by private companies, not even government agencies, though those companies are themselves audited) for compliance with accounting practices and such. That is, again, you open your books. Regulation of other organisations operates on similar grounds. Pharmaceutical companies are regulated as to their drugs produced, food processors to their own practices, especially in beef, dairy, pork, and poultry. Some industries gain exceptions to anti-trust regulations in return for more regulation and oversight of other elements: major league sports, insurance (underwriting boards), telecoms, and transportation (rail, truck, air, sea). An item which popped up following Trump's request for followers to patrol polling places was a specific injunction on the GOP for doing just that dating to the early 1980s (and set to expire Real Soon Now, though Trump may just have fouled that up). Southern states in the US have operated under injunctions dating to the Voting Rights Act for violations of its provisions (some of which may have expired or been reduced by recent SCOTUS rulings, I've not kept close track). Google itself is already operating under a consent decree running for 20 years until 2031 as a result of "deceptive privacy practices" (that's the FTC's language, not mine) in rolling out its Buzz social network: "FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network" The mechanism for enforcement: The settlement requires the company to obtain users’ consent before sharing their information with third parties if Google changes its products or services in a way that results in information sharing that is contrary to any privacy promises made when the user’s information was collected. The settlement further requires Google to establish and maintain a comprehensive privacy program, and it requires that for the next 20 years, the company have audits conducted by independent third parties every two years to assess its privacy and data protection practices. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-c... It turns out that people have faced the questions of trust, verification, audit, and compliance for a long time. Trust, third parties, bounties, and similar mechanisms are typical modes for ensuring compliance. There are ways of determining if personal or private information has leaked (look up "fictitious entries" or "honeytraps" -- I've made a recent HN submission on the topic though it didn't go far). And yes, there are times that the auditors themselves are corrupt: Arthur Anderson and Enron, Ernst & Young HK and the Mozilla v. WoSign and StartCom CA backdating scandal. Mozilla will refuse to accept further audits from E&YHK, meaning that E&Y effectively mined its own credibility to generate present business at a cost of any future trust (I'd really like to see what the future fall-out of this is). Yes, passing effective laws is PRECISELY how you constrain technology.
- carapace 10y agoAwesome and education reply, cheers! But I'm not sure that we're not talking past each other. My point is that for the effective laws to be effective we have to use the technology to effect them. Someone is going to have the tech. Just like the spy agencies have had the whole time, yes? You can't just pass a law that says "no one uses this" without enforcing it, and to enforce it you must "use this". Spy agencies have always been the logical "strange loop" in governance. In other words, the technology is at a more fundamental level than the law. "Code is Law" as Lessig says. ------- If I may be so bold, here is a blag post I wrote about three years ago on the subject: "Total Surveillance is the Perfection of Democracy" For once I disagree with RMS, re: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.htm... I believe that it is fundamentally not possible to "roll back" the degree of surveillance in our [global] society in an effective way. Our technology is already converging to a near-total degree of surveillance all on its own. The article itself gives many examples. The end limit will be Vinge's "locator dust" or perhaps something even more ubiquitous and ephemeral. RMS advocates several "band-aid" fixes but seems to miss the logical structure of the paradox of inescapable total surveillance. Let me attempt to illustrate this paradox. Take this quote from the article: "If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last shred of effective control over our government and institutions." (First of all we should reject the underlying premise that "our government and institutions" are only held in check by the fear of the discovery of their "crimes and lies". We can, and should, and must, hold ourselves and our government to a standard of not committing crimes, not telling lies. It is this Procrustean bed of good character that our technology is binding us to, not some dystopian nightmare.) Certainly the criminally-minded who have inveigled their way into the halls of power should not be permitted to sleep peacefully at night, without concern for discovery. But why assume that ubiquitous surveillance would not touch them? Why would the sensor/processor nets and deep analysis not be useful, and used, for detecting and combating treachery? What "crimes and lies" would be revealed by a whistleblower that would not show up on the intel-feeds? Or this quote: "Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the Internet must be limited." How will this limiting be done? What authority will decide who gets to post what and when? And (like any profanity filter) won't this authority need to see the content to be able to decide whether it gets posted publicly? In effect, doesn't this idea imply some sort of ubiquitous surveillance system to ensure that people are obeying the rules for preventing a ubiquitous surveillance system? Let's say we set up some rules like the ones RMS is advocating, how do we determine that everyone is following those rules? After all, there is a very good incentive for trying to get a privileged position vis-a-vis these rules. Whoever has the inside edge, whether official spooks, enemy agents, or just criminals, gains an enormous competitive advantage over everyone else. Someone is going to have that edge, because it's a technological thing, you can't make it go away simply because you don't like it. If the "good guys" tie their own hands (by handicapping their surveillance networks) then we are just handing control to the people who are willing to do what it takes to take it. You can't unilaterally declare that we (all humanity) will use the kid-friendly "lite" version of the surveillance network because we cannot be sure that everyone is playing by those rules unless we have a "full" version of the surveillance network to check up on everybody! We can't (I believe) prevent total surveillance but we can certainly control how the data are used, and we can certainly set up systems that allow the data to be used without being abused. The system must be recursive. Whatever form the system takes, it shall necessarily have to be able to detect and correct its own self-abuses. Total surveillance is the perfection of democracy, not its antithesis. The true horror of technological omniscience is that it shall force us for once to live according to our own rules. For the first time in history we shall have to do without hypocrisy and privilege. The new equilibrium will not involve tilting at the windmills of ubiquitous sensors and processing power but rather learning what explicit rules we can actually live by, finding, in effect, the real shape of human society.