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I see the same sentiment all the time here on HN. "Just reimplement it in rust" Well, why do you think openssl is so pervasive? It's everywhere and it's not d
by dijit 10y ago
I see the same sentiment all the time here on HN.
"Just reimplement it in rust"
Well, why do you think openssl is so pervasive? It's everywhere and it's not due to marketing or ease of use or code quality.
It's because nobody in their right mind wants to implement a TLS library. Openssl itself was only conceived because the original author was teaching himself C.
- DasIch 10y agoI'm mentioning Rust to make clear the direction I'd like things to go and because there isn't really an alternative that allows for similar reusability and is practical for developing cryptographic libraries. That being said there are also implementations of TLS in other languages like Haskell or OCaml, that also wouldn't be vulnerable to these kinds of issues. I agree that this is a difficult problem but I don't think that's really the barrier here. AI is also difficult and there is no shortage of improvement in that area. The real problem isn't the difficulty of implementing a TLS library, the real problem is inertia and an unwillingness to change.
- duneroadrunner 10y agoSaferCPlusPlus[1] is an easier option when starting from a C/C++ code base. It's also one of the faster options, but if people are willing to accept some performance cost, I think the easiest solution would probably be to "harden" the LLVM/gcc sanitizers so that they can be used in deployed builds, not just debug builds. The sanitizers don't catch everything, but pretty close it seems. [1] shameless plug: https://github.com/duneroadrunner/SaferCPlusPlus https://github.com/duneroadrunner/SaferCPlusPlus
- nickpsecurity 10y agoI'll add that SAFEcode and Softbound+CETS automatically make C programs memory-safe against lots of problems. There was also the Clay language that could've been updated. C0 is a subset that was easier to verify used in Verisoft's microkernel and apps. Rod Chapman found an error in reference implementation recoding it in SPARK Ada. So that could be used. All kinds of things could solve the C-level problems or substitute with a C wrapper but nobody cares enough to do it.
- duneroadrunner 10y agoSAFEcode and Softbound+CETS would be ideal, but seem to have a few problems in practice. First, the resulting executables are apparently quite slow. Like several times slower that executables compiled normally. The sanitizers are much faster, but even so the "address sanitizer" alone has a 2x performance cost. The other problem with SAFEcode and Softbound+CETS is that they don't always work. The TOR project tried to build firefox using them, but they couldn't successfully build it [1]. Perhaps nobody cared to address the C/C++ (memory) safety problems when the solutions required significant compromise. But the santizers are now (or could be with a little effort) a much more practical "no code modification required" solution than the previous options. And I think SaferCPlusPlus is now a more practical "some code modification required" solution than previous alternatives. Maybe these new and improved choices will make a difference. We can dream, can't we? :) [1] https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb-hardened https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb-hardened
- nickpsecurity 10y ago"Like several times slower that executables compiled normally. " That's usually true if it's a naive scheme for safety. The main benefit of clever ones like Softbound+CETS or SAFEcode is they try to optimize away a lot of that. The first, SAFEcode paper reported worst-case of 30% overhead in their tests. SVA-OS overhead was mostly well under 2x with a few cases that did 2-4x. I can't remember what the S+C was. Remember that these also knock out almost every root cause of code injections in C apps with SVA-OS covering whole Linux kernel. Might be worth buying a second CPU to cover the overheads. ;) "The TOR project tried to build firefox using them, but they couldn't successfully build it" I wasn't aware of that. Thanks for telling me. Shows some work needs to be done. Would've been nice if they were more specific than "they didn't work." I was holding off on applying them to Tor anyway since such services must do covert-channel analyses. I'm not sure what effect these techs have on that. I recommended redoing it in SPARK Ada with Kemmerer's method for covert channel analysis. "And I think SaferCPlusPlus is now a more practical "some code modification required" solution than previous alternatives." I disagree. The reason is that there's way more tooling for statically analyzing, verifying, certifying object code of, and so on for C programs. Very little for C++ in comparison. So, taking up C++ gives you the few measures of safety it provides while forgoing tech you can get in C such as Astree Analyzer or CompCert. Too much a sacrifice. People stuck in legacy codebases might want to apply or improve on Ironclad, though. http://acg.cis.upenn.edu/papers/ironclad-oopsla.pdf http://acg.cis.upenn.edu/papers/ironclad-oopsla.pdf https://github.com/crdelozier/ironclad https://github.com/crdelozier/ironclad
- pjmlp 10y agoI doubt anyone in C community would turn them on anyway. They even made the "security" annex optional in C11!
- duneroadrunner 10y agoWell that's just it, use of the sanitizers is not up to the developers, it's a build-time option. The TOR guys have enabled them when building firefox[1]. But apparently some of their debugging features actually introduce potential vulnerabilities themselves so they're not really appropriate for deployed executables. Yet. [1] https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb-hardened https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb-hardened
- dom0 10y agoAnother facet is that full compatibility to OpenSSL is required on the internet. Ten years ago plenty of projects were using alternative SSL implementations (eg Peter Gutmann's cryptlib), many of which had slight interop problems with OpenSSL (which one to blame is impossible to say). In turn many projects switched away from these libraries - they had to, interop issues making software unreliable are vexing for every user - and moved to OpenSSL. OpenSSL will also often be the first implementation that has a new TLS feature, it's the internet's demo implementation. New optimizations in algorithms tend to land first in OpenSSL as well etc. Today there are like ~four or five relevant TLS implementations, and only one is in widespread use on servers.
- my123 10y agoWindows' crypt32 also matters, and has a much cleaner API compared to OpenSSL, with backwards compat.
- lmm 10y agoThere are options now though. My production services terminate SSL with a non-C implementation. (ocaml-ssl may be beta and unaudited but my judgement call is that I trust it more than any C implementation).