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It might be worth noting that those are still hypotheses at this point, and a whole range of things don't appear to be localized. In particular, showing that di
by _delirium 17y ago
It might be worth noting that those are still hypotheses at this point, and a whole range of things don't appear to be localized. In particular, showing that disabling a certain part of the brain changes an outcome doesn't show that anything was localized in that part of the brain, only that it was necessary to the outcome (but not necessarily sufficient).
In addition, there's often a sleight-of-hand, where the neuroscientist takes some term for a high-level concept (like "morality" or "intelligence") and uses a specific operational definition of it that seems rather suspiciously tailored to make their experiment work, as opposed to choosing a formalization that's already in the philosophy literature. Sometimes the operationalization is even chosen after the experiment, i.e. the researchers find some interesting feature in their data, and try to find a way to map it onto concepts like "intelligence" or "morality" or "motivation" after the fact. (To be fair, that doesn't seem to be the case here; and sometimes when it is the case, it's the fault of the university's PR office.)
- a-priori 17y agoYou're right, and it's a pity when good research is spun to make it sound further along than it really is. It's even worse when the scientists do it themselves. Thankfully, that doesn't seem to be the case here; their definitions are specific and the hypothesis builds directly from prior results (one author's PhD thesis).